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ABSTRACT
The Internet has become ubiquitous in our lives today. With its rapid adoption and
widespread growth across the planet, it has drawn many research efforts that attempt to
understand and characterize this complex system. One such direction tries to discover the
types of devices that compose the Internet, which is the topic of this dissertation.
To accomplish such a measurement, researchers have turned to a technique called OS
fingerprinting, which is a method to determine the operating system (OS) of a remote host.
However, because the Internet today has evolved into a massive public network, large-scale
OS fingerprinting has become a challenging problem. Due to increasing security concerns,
most networks today will block many of the probes used by traditional fingerprinting tools
(e.g., Nmap), thus requiring a different approach. Consequently, this has given rise to
single-probe techniques which offer low overhead and minimal intrusiveness, but in turn
require more sophistication in their algorithms as they are limited in the amount of infor-
mation that they receive and many parameters can inject noise in the measurement (e.g.,
network delay, packet loss).
This dissertation focuses on understanding the performance of single-probe 
algorithms. We study existing methods, formalize current problems in the field and 
devise new algorithms to improve classification accuracy and automate construction of 
fingerprint databases. We apply our work to multiple Internet-wide scans and discover 
that besides general purpose machines, the Internet today has grown to include large 
numbers of publicly accessible peripheral devices (e.g., routers, printers, cameras) and 
cyber-physical systems (e.g., lighting controllers, medical sensors). We go on to recover 
empirical distributions of network delays and loss, as well as likelihoods of users re-
configuring their devices. With our developed techniques and results, we show that 
single-probe algorithms are an effective approach for accomplishing wide-scale network 
measurements.
ii
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
With the rapid growth of the Internet, our world has become a connected grid of het-
erogenous devices which differ in hardware capability, security awareness, software fea-
tures, and daily usage. Measuring the amount, type, and behavior of these devices, as well
the networks they connect to, has become an interesting topic that has gained traction in
the literature [28], [32], [42], [55], [61], [67], [77]. To categorize the devices that compose
today’s networks, researchers have employed a technique called OS fingerprinting, which
aims to determine the operating system of remote hosts using their responses to external
stimuli.
While the signals used in OS fingerprinting can be based on network protocols such as
DNS [62], ICMP [4], [73] and DHCP [51], [78], our focus is on the TCP/IP stack. This
is because the TCP/IP implementation greatly differs not only between OS families (e.g.,
Linux, Windows and Mac), but also versions and patches of the same OS (e.g., Windows
XP vs. Vista and Linux 2.4 vs. 3.0). This is explained by the freedom allowed in selection
of certain default stack parameters, ambiguities in IETF RFCs [13], [81], [83] as well as a
lack of standardization for responses to malformed requests. The methods using TCP/IP
can be partitioned into three categories – banner-grabbing via plain-text protocols (e.g.,
telnet, HTTP, FTP) [92], multi-probe tools that elicit OS-specific responses from various
non-standardized combinations of flags and/or unexpected usage of protocol fields (e.g.,
SinFP [6], [10], [38], [65], Nmap [73], [91], [104], SYNSCAN [105], Xprobe [120],
[121], p0f [122]), and single-probe methods that send only one legitimate SYN to each
host (Snacktime [7], RING [112]).
For usage at large scale over the Internet, banner-grabbing is no longer considered
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viable due to frequent removal of OS-identifying strings by administrators for security
purposes, high bandwidth overhead, and common interaction with non-platform-specific
application-layer software (e.g., apache, nginx). Multi-probe tools have their own chal-
lenges – heavy load on the target (e.g., over 100 packets in Nmap), massive complaints
about intrusive activity when used at wide scale, and reduced accuracy when firewalls
block auxiliary probes (e.g., UDP to a closed port, rainbow flags in TCP headers) or the
destination IP is load-balanced across a server farm (i.e., different packets hit different
machines). As we show later in Section 4, multi-probe OS classification over the public
Internet is a complex and poorly understood problem, with certain pitfalls and unintended
side-effects.
Thus, in this dissertation we focus on examining the scalability of OS fingerprinting to
millions of target hosts. With this goal in mind, the next subsection presents the structure
of the rest of this dissertation.
1.2 Dissertation Structure
Figure 1.1 shows the three main topics we will study in this work. Since our objective
is to examine the viability of OS fingerprinting on a large scale such as the Internet, we
require a classifier that is fast, low-overhead and does not trigger IDS systems and harass
network administrators. We turn to the methodology used by single probe classifiers,
which use only one outbound TCP SYN packet and require a response from an active
port on the host. However, this approach introduces several challenges due to limited
features, loss of packets, and non-negligible queuing and processing delays encountered
in communication with the target.
To overcome these challenges, our first topic in Section 3 describes our approach to
building a stochastic model to handle these obstacles. We then combine our models into a
classifier we call Hershel and subject it to various scenarios in simulations to test its accu-
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Figure 1.1: Dissertation structure.
racy. This is accomplished by building a database of 116 OS stacks, which were manually
installed within our lab or identified within our department network, and adding noise to
each signature. We show that our models can provide reliable classification even under ex-
treme scenarios (e.g., half of all responses are lost, multiple second delays). Satisfied with
our results, we then use Hershel to classify 37M hosts from an Internet scan, showing the
distribution of devices we encountered in different countries and AS regions of the world.
Finally, we also show that our classifier is robust against scrubbers that aim to confuse OS
classification.
To be adaptable to the ever-evolving Internet, we require our techniques to be versatile
and allow for different sizes and compositions of networks. Thus, for our next topic,
we target the issue of building a database flexible to the network to be measured. Since
our previous effort of 116 stacks was a manual process that was susceptible to human
error and poor repeatability, our goal in Section 4 is to develop an automated, repeatable
process for building a database. We propose a novel unsupervised clustering algorithm
called Plata to separate unique signatures and discard duplicate ones. We show how this
works by applying Plata to a scan of our university network, and automatically create a
database of 420 OSes, which are labelled by a banner download from compliant hosts.
We also update Hershel to correctly treat independence between the delays observed for
each packet, giving rise to a new classifier we call Hershel+. We close out this section
by conducting a large Internet study to fingerprint 66 million webservers, the first such
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effort to use an automatically built database, and comparing our results with Nmap, a well
known multi-packet classifier.
The final topic builds on both the previous by building a complete classification sys-
tem that does away with user defined heuristics. For example, Hershel relies on assumed
probability distributions of noise observed in the Internet measurement, such as network
one-way delays, packet loss, popularity of each OS, and user modification of network
stacks. Section 5 develops an iterative classifier under the Expectation-Maximization (EM)
framework called Faulds, and shows that the OS fingerprinting problem can successfully
be modeled under EM to leverage its convergence properties. Using extensive simulations,
we also show that recovery of the true distributions of observed noise is not only possible,
but results in much more precise classification. Finally, we conclude by conducting a mea-
surement where besides outputting the correct OS popularity, we obtain packet loss/delay
and feature modification probabilities from 63 million hosts across the Internet – a study
from a unique perspective which opens up new angles for Internet measurement in the
future.
4
2. RELATED WORK
Besides use in various applications of Internet measurement [11], [30], [52], [59], OS
fingerprinting is a well known approach used by network administrators for securing their
networks. It has been used to discover vulnerable network services [63], [100], detect
rogue systems and stealth intruders [1], defend against target-based fragmentation attacks
[74], [97], and even expose botnets [56], [69]. It is also used by industry analysts to
understand trends in OS usage [5], [31] and market share analysis by public tools [70],
[71]. Below we take a look at the previous work done in this field.
2.1 Multi-Probe Techniques
OS fingerprinting has roots in banner grabbing, which relies on application-layer pro-
tocols (e.g., HTTP, SSH, SMTP, FTP, telnet) to provide a textual description of the OS as
part of the communication sequence after successful handshakes. While this worked well
in the 1990s, banner grabbing today faces many impediments, including high overhead,
administrator ban on OS-identifying strings in responses, generic software (e.g., apache,
nginx) that can run on multiple platforms without exposing the underlying OS, and pur-
posefully incorrect banners that aim to mislead the various fingerprinting tools.
The second wave of OS classification started in 1997 with the release of Nmap [73],
which pioneered TCP/IP tricks that would elicit different responses from different im-
plementations. By default, it sends 1032 probes to the target, including a vertical port
scan and certain malformed packets that trigger popular IDS such as Snort [89]. Nmap
ideally expects the target to accept a TCP connection, send ICMP port unreachable on a
closed UDP port, and respond to a ping. Under bandwidth-optimized settings for OS clas-
sification, Nmap requires no fewer than 38 different probes; however, due to mandatory
retransmission, this in practice corresponds to well over 100 packets per host.
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Due to its popularity, Nmap has received a great deal of attention in the literature,
which includes usage of neural networks to differentiate between versions of the same OS
[91], detection of unknown devices [64], and techniques for reducing the number of sent
probes [35]. Additional work includes fuzzy matching [120], application of formal testing
methods to the detection problem [38], and classification using lengthy observations (up
to 100K packets) of Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) from the TCP header [65], [121].
Another direction in multi-packet classification uses clock drift in the kernel, which
can be derived from observing the timestamp option in streams of reply packets [50] or
variation in timer frequency [17]. This approach requires sending a steady stream of re-
quests to discern the accurate skew, which can add up to a large overhead (i.e., thousands
of packets) and requires handling of randomness introduced in the replies by OS schedul-
ing. Thus, while this approach has its uses in localized networks, it is hardly scalable to
millions of targets.
Besides the amount of traffic generated by multi-packet tools in large scale-scans, an-
other problem is the prevalence of load balancers in the Internet today. These devices,
commonly placed in front of servers, may disperse consecutive probes to different physi-
cal machines or perform certain elements of the handshake themselves, leading to jumbled
fingerprints. This can be avoided by scanning techniques that rely on one outgoing packet,
which we describe next.
2.2 Single Probe Algorithms
RING [112] and Snacktime [7] are the only tools that perform classification using
temporal features from a single outbound probe.1 As shown in Fig. 2.1, each measurement
consists of a SYN packet, server processing delay T needed to accept the connection, and
a stream of n SYN-ACK responses from the target OS, followed by an optional TCP reset
1Nmap [73] used to rely on temporal features, but later stopped supporting them due to classification
difficulties.
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Figure 2.1: Retransmission timeouts (RTOs) between SYN-ACK packets.
(RST) with its own RTO. RING uses the n − 1 values in the RTO vector and presence
of the final RST packet in classification. Snacktime ignores the RST feature, but instead
uses the default TCP window size and TTL carried in the SYN-ACKs, which allows it
to differentiate between 25 operating systems [7]. We analyze its classification process
in more detail later in Section 3. A simplified version of Snacktime and extension to 98
signatures was offered in [45], [55]; however, no accuracy analysis, modeling, or verified
improvement was provided.
Another tool with a related capability is p0f [122]. In addition to passive fingerprinting,
it can actively generate SYN packets and profile remote network stacks based on a set of
fixed features from the SYN-ACKs (i.e., window size, TTL, IP flags, and TCP options);
however, it does not leverage the RTOs and by default is quite verbose (i.e., sends eight
copies of the same SYN per target). The current version can differentiate between 18
operating systems.
2.3 Common Defenses
There exist many approaches to thwart remote OS fingerprinting. The most basic tools
tweak Windows registry [20], [75] or implement plugins [8], [9], [90] for the Unix packet-
mangling module Netfilter [68]. Their objective is to modify the fixed features of departing
packets to no longer resemble those of the underlying host. A similar direction is to deploy
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network honeypots [85], [110] or standalone systems [115] that spoof arbitrary operating
systems and their services. Placing obfuscation into the network gives rise to intermediate
devices known as fingerprint scrubbers [84], [101].
While these techniques can effectively deal with static header fields, they are not well
suited for distorting the temporal features of departing packets, which requires expensive
buffering of packets and per-flow state. Additionally, lack of technical support and possi-
bility for various side-effects (e.g., disabling SACK in TCP may lead to significantly lower
throughput) raises questions about deployment of these tools in production systems and/or
at large-scale. Nonetheless, we study the impact of these scrubbers on our work in more
detail in Section 3.5.
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3. LARGE-SCALE OS CLASSIFICATION*
3.1 Introduction
The Internet has been the target of numerous measurement studies, with the trend
recently shifting from covering a small subset of destinations [77], [86] to scanning the
entire IP space [22], [42], [55], [87]. This allows researchers to enumerate live hosts,
detect vulnerabilities, and shed light on deployment of new protocols. Over the years,
network scanning has become progressively faster – from 4 months [87] down to 30 days
[42], then one day [55], and now 45 minutes [29]. In conjunction with these studies, low-
overhead OS fingerprinting can allow significantly better understanding of the systems
researchers interact with and improve our general knowledge about the Internet.
OS fingerprinting consists of two approaches – passive and active. The former [50],
[122] monitors ongoing communication (inbound and/or outbound) with remote hosts, but
does not generate traffic of its own. Unless each studied device voluntarily connects to
the measurement server, this technique is difficult to use for classifying each IP on the
Internet. The latter approach, which is our topic of interest, actively sends packets to
targets and infers their operating system from the collected responses.
One important aspect that differentiates between the active methods is the potential
maliciousness of probing traffic, where certain nonsensical combinations of TCP flags
(e.g., SYN-FIN-RST-ACK) or intrusive actions (e.g., trying to delete the root directory
in HTTP fingerprinting [92]) may harm or crash the target. Additionally, these packets
are easily detected and dropped by IDS [102], which leads to complaints against research
institutions using these methods and possibly reduced accuracy of the results.
The second aspect is the amount of outbound traffic required by the classifier, which
*Reprinted, with permission, from "Hershel: Single-Packet OS Fingerprinting" by Z. Shamsi, A. Nand-
wani, D. Leonard and D. Loguinov which appeared in [95] and [96]. c© 2016 IEEE.
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ranges from a single SYN probe [7], [112] to lengthy multi-packet exchanges [65], [73],
[92], [105], [120]. Ideally, fingerprinting should be performed with no extra overhead
to scan traffic, which rules out techniques [73], [120] that expect to reach the target on
multiple open ports, using different protocols (e.g., ICMP, TCP, UDP), and elicit responses
on closed ports. While LAN environments can tolerate high traffic rates and may allow
multi-protocol access to each host, these conditions are generally difficult to satisfy when
scanning the entire Internet.
The third aspect is the ability of the underlying estimator to correctly identify the
target OS under realistic network conditions and without using retransmission. Since prior
single-packet techniques [7], [112] were mainly developed for local use, they are not well
provisioned to overcome high amounts of fluctuation and loss in temporal features. They
also lack resilience to OS tuning, which can be applied by end-users in hopes of optimizing
network performance or obfuscating the default parameters of the stack. Either way, the
modified OS features may exhibit little correlation to those originally present at the host,
which cripples estimation accuracy of existing tools.
3.1.1 Contributions and Ethical Implications
Given the many open issues in wide-scale fingerprinting and lacking performance anal-
ysis in the literature, our first goal is to formalize the estimation problem in single-packet
OS classification and study the pitfalls of existing techniques. We then develop a low-
overhead framework we call Hershel1 for overcoming the various randomization effects
(i.e., queuing delays, packet loss, manual tuning) and apply it as proof-of-concept in a
measurement study that classifies every visible webserver on the Internet.
We next discuss the ethical implications of this work. Our main objective is to bene-
fit researchers studying the Internet at wide scale and provide a solution to an interesting
1William J. Herschel invented forensic usage of fingerprints in 1858.
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mathematical problem. However, one may become concerned that intruders can use our
algorithms for detection of vulnerable operating systems and better tailor the attack pay-
load to particular configurations (e.g., patch levels) of the targets. As opposed to Nmap,
our techniques require no additional bandwidth during port scanning, which makes them
completely stealthy against IDS and other security monitors.
While hypothetically this may be true, we do not believe there is great cause for con-
cern. With modern botnets, large-scale port scanning can be performed in a highly de-
centralized fashion, with very little traffic originating from each hijacked IP. This affords
the attackers a luxury of using more verbose OS fingerprinting tools (i.e., Nmap) and still
remaining undetected. Researchers, on the other hand, are typically constrained to a sin-
gle subnet whose generation of disruptive volumes of highly anomalous traffic is bound to
attract negative attention.
Additionally, we are not aware of any evidence confirming that attackers are interested
in profiling discovered devices using only SYN packets. Recent studies [124] show that
once an open port is found, bots either perform more extensive testing of the open service
or attempt all known exploits (some outdated by decades) against the port without dis-
crimination. Eliminating Nmap from the picture and directly interacting with the service
is much quicker and more informative in that context. We therefore do not see OS finger-
printing as a practical technique for increasing maliciousness of the Internet ecosystem.
3.2 Stochastic Model
We assume a single-packet scanner similar to Snacktime in Fig. 2.1. While this ap-
proach has minimal intrusiveness, lowest transmission overhead, and non-malicious op-
eration, it also exhibits several fundamental challenges. These arise due to the complex
ways in which the RTOs can be modified by packet traversal across wide-area networks,
scarcity of information about the target host contained in the samples, and user tuning of
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features, all of which has a strong influence on one’s ability to detect the underlying OS.
It should be noted that straightforward application of machine-learning methods [108]
to our problem is difficult. Experimentation with support vector machines, neural net-
works, and decision trees has led to the realization that they perform poorly when the
measured samples contain missing data (i.e., the RTO vector is corrupted by packet loss).
Statistical imputation [34] is a common technique for dealing with these problems; how-
ever, it requires knowing which features are missing and ability to accurately reconstruct
the remaining (non-missing) features. In our case, lost packets go completely unnoticed
and additionally modify the following RTOs to produce feature vectors that have little
resemblance to the original (see below).
Our contribution in this subsection is to formalize single-packet OS fingerprinting,
set forth clear goals for the classifier, study the impact of network delay and loss on the
measured samples, analyze the existing methods, and outline the assumptions under which
the classification problem is tractable.
3.2.1 Objectives
Assume a database D = (1, 2, . . . ,M) of M ≥ 1 known operating systems, where
each OS j has some vector-valued fingerprint yj collected during a-priori measurement
of the OS. The fingerprint consists of multiple features, which we partition into those
modified only by the network (e.g., RTOs) and those only by the user (e.g., TCP window
size). Suppose the former are described by some vector δj and the latter by another vector
uj . While the length of δj normally depends on j, that of uj is constant across all operating
systems.
As both vectors undergo random modification before being observed by the scanner,
the response of OS j to probe traffic is some random variable that is a function of yj . Given
an observation x = (δ; u) from an Internet host, a typical estimation problem is to find the
12
most likely OS s(x) that could have produced that vector:
s(x) : = argmax
j∈D
p(yj|x) = argmax
j∈D
p(x|yj)p(yj)
p(x)
= argmax
j∈D
p(x|yj)p(yj), (3.1)
where notation p(x|y) refers to the probability (or conditional density, if more convenient)
of x given y. Observe that the probability p(x) that some OS in D has produced x is
constant for a given observation and can be omitted from the optimization. If the fraction
of Internet hosts p(yj) running OS j is unknown, it is common to set each value to 1/M ,
which removes this term from the optimization as well.
The more interesting component of (3.1) is the probability p(x|yj) that OS j has pro-
duced the observation, or equivalently that yj has become distorted into x. Before investi-
gating this metric further, observe that network and user modifications to the OS features
can be treated as independent, from which it follows that:
p(x|yj) = p(δ|δj)p(u|uj). (3.2)
This means that the two terms can be dealt with separately, which we do in the rest of
the section.
3.2.2 Network Features: Jitter
For single-packet techniques [7], [112] described in 2.2, the vector of temporal features
δj consists of individual RTOs generated by network stack j. Classification based on δj
is possible not only because some devices deviate from TCP algorithms (e.g., exponential
timer backoff), but also because RFCs that govern TCP retransmission [13], [81], [83] do
not specify the initial RTO or how many SYN-ACKs must be generated. As a result, a
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Figure 3.1: Effect of jitter on observed RTOs.
wide variety of unique RTO patterns exists.
For the time being, assume loss-free conditions. During collection of sample x, sup-
pose d is the sum of propagation and transmission delays along the path from the server
back to the scanner. Note that d is a constant due to the fixed size of SYN-ACKs. Now
define Qm to be a random queuing delay of the m-th packet in the return path. As shown
in Fig. 3.1, the RTO vector δj undergoes distortion that is independent of the forward path,
server think time T , and propagation delay d:
δ(m) = δj(m) +Qm+1 −Qm, m = 1, 2, . . . , |δj| (3.3)
Defining OWD (one-way delay) jitter Jm = Qm+1 − Qm and considering that the
gap between subsequent SYN-ACKs is sufficiently large (i.e., at least several seconds),
it follows that back-to-back packets arriving from the server are not likely to encounter
the same busy period of the queues they traverse. In that case, it is reasonable to assume
that sequence Q1, Q2, . . . consists of independent and identically distributed (iid) random
variables. Furthermore, since the number of hops and congestion of the path is not affected
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by j, the distribution of each Qm does not depend on the OS being profiled. This leads to:
p(δ|δj) =


∏|δ|
m=1 f(δ(m)− δj(m)) |δ| = |δj|
0 otherwise
, (3.4)
where f(.) is the PDF (probability density function) or PMF (probability mass function)
of OWD jitter, depending on whether Jm is treated as continuous or discrete. It should
also be noted that V ar[Jm] = 2V ar[Qm], while f(.) is zero-mean and symmetric. For
certain models of OWD, jitter can be obtained in closed-form. For example, exponential
Qm produces the Laplace distribution with the same parameter λ and Gaussian N(µ, σ2)
becomes N(0, 2σ2).
We next contrast (3.4) with the RTO classifier in Snacktime [7], which is a tool that is
the closest to our objectives and most advanced in single-packet OS fingerprinting. For
each RTO m, this method first computes the number of matching digits (limited to 6
decimal places of precision) between the sample and all known fingerprints j:
Yjm = max(⌈− log10(max(|δ(m)− δj(m)|, 10
−6))⌉, 0).
It then assigns score Wj to OS j using the sum of these weights across all available
RTOs:
Wj =
|δ|∑
m=1
Yjm. (3.5)
For the example in Table 3.1, which exemplifies the common pitfalls of Snacktime,
(3.5) scores six for the first OS and two for the second OS, indicating that jitter combina-
tion (0, 12) is more likely than (0.1, 0.1). Taking the log of (3.4), our model can also be
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RTO1 (sec) Yj1 RTO2 (sec) Yj2 Wj
Observation δ 3.0 24.0
Fingerprint δ1 3.0 6 12.0 0 6
Fingerprint δ2 2.9 1 23.9 1 2
Table 3.1: Snacktime example.
reduced to optimizing a summation:
log p(δ|δj) =
|δ|∑
m=1
log f(δ(m)− δj(m)); (3.6)
however, it differs from (3.5) in two important ways. First, the log is applied to the distri-
bution function f(.) rather than the jitter itself. Second, there is no loss of precision due to
rounding to the nearest integer or capping the jitter at 10−6.
Nevertheless, while (3.4) is a good starting point, it does not work in real networks due
to the lacking robustness against packet loss. This is our next topic.
3.2.3 Network Features: Loss
The main problem with (3.4) is that loss-free conditions are impossible to satisfy dur-
ing Internet scans. Besides congestion, routing loops, and various checksum violations,
the RTOs may be altered by the target server crashing or shutting down during the mea-
surement, which affects the tail of the RTO vector and appears similar to packet loss.
Since single-packet fingerprinting by definition cannot retransmit SYN probes, OS detec-
tion must be performed using only the features available in observation x, which calls for
more sophistication in the model.
To exacerbate the situation, packet loss creates more dramatic changes to the RTO
vector than delay jitter. For example, consider a scenario with δj = (3, 6, 12), where
all delays are given in seconds. Even with a relatively large E[Qm] = 100 ms, delay
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jitter remains small compared to each RTO. On the other hand, the loss of a single packet
produces one of four dissimilar combinations – (3, 6), (3, 18), (6, 12), or (9, 12) – while
that of two packets leads to six additional options – (3), (6), (9), (12), (18), or (21). The
RTO swing in these cases is significantly higher, which makes mapping x to the correct
OS more challenging.
We now examine how to model the combined probability that loss and jitter transform
δj into observation δ. This will allow us to solve such dilemmas as whether δ = (3, 18) is
a more likely match to (3, 6, 12) with one lost packet or to some other signature (2.6, 17.9)
without any loss. To deal with these cases, we propose to generalize the concept of RTO.
First, let τj be a vector of |δj |+ 1 packet-transmission timestamps from OS j:
τj(m) =


0 m = 1
τj(m− 1) + δj(m− 1) m ≥ 2
(3.7)
and τ be the corresponding random vector observed in x after the packets have traversed
the network. Then, a generalized (m,m + k)-RTO is the distance τj(m + k) − τj(m),
which is illustrated in Fig. 3.2 for m = 1 and k = 2. Note that k = 1 produces the usual
RTO and that all timestamps are given using local clocks (i.e., τj at the server and τ at the
client).
Now suppose set Γ(τ, τj) contains all subsets of size |τ | of integer sequence (1, 2, . . . , |τj |).
We can view each γ ∈ Γ(τ, τj) as a mapping of received packets in τ to their position in
the original vector τj , i.e., γ(m) = k means that the m-th received SYN-ACK was initially
in position k. For the example in Fig. 3.2, we have γ(1) = 1 and γ(2) = 3. Assuming
no reordering of SYN-ACKs, which is reasonable given at least several seconds between
them, each γ is a vector of strictly increasing integers.
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Figure 3.2: Generalized RTOs under packet loss.
Armed with these definitions, we get:
p(τ |τj) =


∑
γ∈Γ(τ,τj)
p(γ)p(τ |τj, γ) |τ | ≤ |τj |
0 otherwise
, (3.8)
where the number of summation terms equals the number of ways to select |τ | objects
from |τj| available options and (3.8) is non-zero only if the number of received packets
does not exceed that in the fingerprint. This is in contrast to (3.4), where the two vectors
had to have equal length.
Again leveraging the large spacing between server responses, we can treat congestion
events affecting SYN-ACKs as independent, which allows one to approximate packet loss
as an iid Bernoulli process with some probability q. Since each loss combination is equally
likely, we get:
p(γ) = q|τj |−|τ |(1− q)|τ |, (3.9)
which can be moved outside the summation in (3.8). To deal with p(τ |τj, γ), which is the
probability to observe τ from OS j under loss pattern γ, notice that the gap between each
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adjacent pair of received packets is determined by the generalized RTO:
τ(m)− τ(m− 1) = τj(γ(m))− τj(γ(m− 1)) + J
′
m, (3.10)
where m ≥ 2 and generalized jitter J ′m is given by:
J ′m = Qγ(m) −Qγ(m−1). (3.11)
Rearranging the terms in (3.10), define the m-th jitter sample under pattern γ as:
Rγjm = τ(m)− τ(m− 1)− τj(γ(m)) + τj(γ(m− 1)). (3.12)
Noticing that J ′m has the same distribution as Jm yields:
p(τ |τj , γ) =
|τ |∏
m=2
f(Rγjm). (3.13)
We thus get for |τ | ≤ |τj|:
p(τ |τj) = q
|τj |−|τ |(1− q)|τ |
∑
γ∈Γ(τ,τj)
|τ |∏
m=2
f(Rγjm), (3.14)
which replaces p(δ|δj) in (3.2).
3.2.4 User Features
OS tuning is common practice in the current Internet, with numerous online guides rec-
ommending optimizations to network settings [76], [109] and automated software offering
tuning capabilities to the TCP/IP stack to achieve better performance [27]. A number of
fixed header parameters in general-purpose kernels (e.g., Unix, Windows) can be changed
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through registry or using command-line tools. Unlike jitter-induced noise, where small
distortions are generally more likely that large ones, the main difference with OS tuning
is that there may be no correlation between the manually selected values of the user and
those installed in the OS by default. For example, TCP window size may be more likely
to jump from 8192 to 65535 than to 8193.
While accurate modeling of manual modification and human psychology is difficult,
it makes sense for the analysis to at least take into account whether a given feature under
user control has been changed. Suppose that πm is the probability of such modification in
feature m and assume that user tuning is applied independently to each available parame-
ter. Defining Ijm = 1{u(m)=uj(m)} to be an indicator of the event that the m-th measured
feature matches the original of OS j, we get:
p(u|uj) =
|u|∏
m=1
[
(1− πm)Ijm + πm(1− Ijm)
]
. (3.15)
Besides user interference, vector uj may be modified by intermediate devices along the
path (e.g., NAT, IDS, fingerprint scrubbers [20], [84], [90], [101], [115]), whose actions
can be clumped under the same umbrella of (3.15). Since buffering packets for periods
of time comparable to RTO (i.e., 3 − 6 seconds) and per-flow state are expensive, it is
often safe to assume that these devices do not alter the RTO pattern in significant ways
and thus leave enough features by which the OS can still be identified. This underscores
the importance of having a robust RTO estimator.
The Snacktime algorithm for scoring user-modified features can be generalized as a
sum of weights assigned to each match:
W ′j =
|u|∑
m=1
wmIjm =
∑
Ijm=1
wm, (3.16)
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which is added to the RTO score Wj in (3.5) for a final result. One open issue, how-
ever, is selection of proper weights, which need to be somehow correlated with feature
volatility. Our model is much simpler since πm directly provides this probability. To better
understand the difference between (3.15) and (3.16), assume that πm > 0 for all m and
write:
log p(u|uj) =
∑
Ijm=1
log(1− πm) +
∑
Ijm=0
log πm. (3.17)
For πm ≈ 1, we get log πm ≈ 0, the second term of (3.17) disappears, and our model
reduces to Snacktime with weights wm = log(1−πm). However, in more realistic cases of
πm ≪ 1, the second term of (3.17) becomes non-negligible and serves the role of balancing
non-matching features against those that do match. Snacktime has no such mechanism.
3.2.5 Final Result
We now consolidate the various models into one formula. Combining (3.14) and (3.15)
in (3.2) and (3.1), dropping terms that do not depend on j, and performing straightforward
manipulations, we get:
s(x) = argmax
j∈D:|τ |≤|τj|
{
p(yj)q
|τj |−|τ |
∑
γ∈Γ(τ,τj )
|τ |∏
m=2
f(Rγjm)
×
∏
Ijm=1
(1− πm)
∏
Ijm=0
πm
}
. (3.18)
Although (3.18) maximizes the OS-detection probability under the assumptions stated
above, its performance with a-priori-unknown q, πm, f(.), and p(yj) is an open question.
We return to it later in the section; in the meantime, we outline the various remaining
issues.
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3.2.6 Limitations
First, the SYN packet may be lost and never reach the target. Since there is no way to
verify this, the host will automatically be considered non-responsive and will be excluded
from fingerprinting. Not much can be done to overcome this problem unless SYN retrans-
mission is allowed. If we relax the single-packet assumption, the estimator will face the
problem of determining which of the SYNs triggered which SYN-ACK response, without
which the RTOs cannot be computed correctly. This problem can be solved in the future
by encoding the retransmission attempt into the source port of the SYN.
Second, our model allows only the network to modify the received RTOs; however,
this may not hold if users manage to alter SYN-ACK spacing during OS tuning. This
is not of wide-spread concern as few optimization guides target the RTO pattern. With
enough effort, scrubbers and obfuscation tools can disrupt inter-SYN-ACK delays; how-
ever, we do not consider development of end-to-end methods to combat such approaches
a fruitful objective. A related problem arises with middleboxes and caches that accept the
connection on behalf of the server [43], in which case any fingerprinting tool is bound to
classify only the visible side of the TCP stream (i.e., the OS of the middlebox).
Third, Hershel’s accuracy may deteriorate if the network jitter process Jm becomes
non-iid or deviates from the predicted bounds, e.g., due to significant kernel scheduling
latency during CPU overload. Similar issues may surface if network loss depends on j,
users modify different operating systems with different probability, or there is correlation
in loss events within a single stream of SYN-ACKs. Solving these problems requires a
per-OS set of parameters (qj , fj(.), πjm), which is our focus in Section 5.
3.3 Classifier
Our next contribution is to enhance Snacktime’s feature vector, describe a working
classifier based on the theory developed above, bring awareness to RTO randomization
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performed by certain OSes, and explain how to collect signature databases under these
conditions.
3.3.1 Features
Snacktime uses only two non-RTO features – TCP advertised window size and TTL;
however, additional parameters are readily available from the SYN-ACKs. Following Ta-
ble 3.2, these include the Do Not Fragment (DF) flag in the IP header, four different fields
from the RST packet (more on this below), the Maximum Segment Size (MSS) declared
by TCP, the order in which the OS assembles the option fields (OPT), SYN-ACK RTOs
(SA-RTO), and the RST RTO (R-RTO). Some of these features are self-explanatory, but
others require additional elaboration.
First, it should be noted that the initial TTL cannot be reconstructed exactly at the
receiver. We use the common technique of rounding this value up to the nearest "likely"
boundary, which includes four values used by the OSes in our database D – 32, 64, 128,
and 255. Second, the reset features are quite rich. In Table 3.2, the binary flag RST
is 1 for the fingerprints that contain a reset packet, RA indicates whether the RST has
the ACK bit set, RN is 1 if the ACK sequence is non-zero, and RW records the window
of the reset packet. RST features represent peculiarities of internal stack operation and
cannot be modified via OS tuning. However, fingerprint scrubbers, NAT/IDS, and kernel
recompilation can still change them.
Third, as seen in the table, support for TCP options differs between the operating
systems since no specific subset is required to be implemented [46]. More importantly,
users have the freedom to disable them as needed. As certain options are considered se-
curity risks (e.g., timestamps), they may be disabled by default, although users can still
re-enable them. Certain devices (e.g., printers) do not allow OPT tweaking at all, while
newer versions of popular operating systems tend to support fewer choices. For example,
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Operating system Win TTL DF Reset MSS OPT SA-RTO R-RTO
RST RA RN RW
Windows 7 8192 128 1 1 0 1 0 1460 MNWST 3, 6 12
Linux 2.6 5792 64 1 0 – – – 1460 MSTNW 3.8, 5.9, 12.1, 24, 48.2 –
Linux 2.0 32736 64 0 0 – – – 1414 M 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96 –
Mac OS 10.3 33304 64 1 1 1 1 32768 1460 MNWNNT 2.92, 6, 12, 24 30
NetBSD 4.0.1 32768 64 1 0 – – – 1460 MNWNNTSNN 2.92, 6, 12, 24 –
VxWorks 5.4.2 8192 64 0 1 1 1 8192 512 MNW 5.58, 24 45
Juniper Netscreen 8192 64 0 1 0 0 8192 1380 M 1.67, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 2
Table 3.2: Sample signatures.
(M = MSS, N = NOP, W = window scale, S = SACK, T = timestamp)
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even though Windows 7/2008 provides registry keys to disable TCP timestamps, the mod-
ification does not work. Similarly, SACK can be disabled only if the entire TCP stack is
offloaded to the NIC [66].
What makes OPT a good feature is not the specific string, but rather the order in which
non-padding options appear. This is illustrated in Table 3.3, where we progressively dis-
able various combinations of options and observe the resulting SYN-ACK packets. For
example, Windows XP supports four options MWTS. Turning off W produces MTS inter-
spersed by NOPs as padding. Simplicity of implementation and lacking reasons to reorder
the options suggests that this phenomenon likely exists in other stacks.
As a result, OPT requires a more advanced classification logic than straight compari-
son. Specifically, a match is registered if the observed sample x contains a feasible string,
which we examine by taking an intersection of non-NOP options between x and each fin-
gerprint, followed by verification that the order of the resulting letters is the same. For
example, MTW is a match to Linux, VxWorks, and Juniper in Table 3.2, but not the other
OSes.
Fourth, the reset RTO (R-RTO) helps in resolving additional ambiguities, such as be-
tween Mac OS 10.3 and NetBSD 4.0.1 in Table 3.2, which otherwise have identical SA-
RTO patterns. Additionally, we expand Snacktime’s default measurement time limit from
65 seconds to 120, the latter of which is the MSL (Maximum Segment Lifetime) of TCP
[83]. For instance without considering the 96-second RTO of Linux 2.0 in Table 3.2, it
might be hard to differentiate it from Linux 2.6.
Table 3.4 summarizes the features used in our classification and compares them to
those in Nmap, p0f, and Xprobe [73], [105], [112], [120], [122]. We have four novel
features and one match type (subset) never used in fingerprinting before.
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Operating system All enabled Drop S Drop T Drop W Drop ST Drop SW Drop WT Drop all
Linux 2.6 MSTNW MNNTNW MNNSNW MST MNW MNNT MNNS M
Windows XP/2003 MNWNNTNNS MNWNNT MNWNNS MNNTNNS MNW MNNT MNNS MNW
Windows 7/2008 MNWST – – MST – – – –
FreeBSD 8.2 MNWST MNWNNT – – – – MSE M
Solaris 10 NNTMNWNNS NNTMNW – – – – – –
Table 3.3: Examples of transformations applied by the OS to TCP options (dashes indicate impossible cases).
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Feature Description Appeared In
Win Receiver window [7], [73], [105], [120], [122]
TTL Time-to-live field [7], [73], [105], [120], [122]
DF Do Not Fragment [73] [105] [120], [122]
SA-RTO RTO sequence [7], [105], [112]
RST True if RST packet [112]
MSS Max segment size [73], [105], [122]
OPT TCP options (exact) [73], [122]
RA ACK bit in RST New
RN ACK seq 6= 0 in RST New
RW Window in RST New
OPT TCP options (subset) New
R-RTO RTO of RST packet New
Table 3.4: Enhanced feature vector.
3.3.2 Stochastic Timers
Table 3.2 shows SA-RTOs from a single captured sample of the OS; however, it turns
out that many kernels naturally exhibit significant RTO variation, sometimes by as much
as 50%. Two examples are shown in Fig. 3.3 using a 2D scatter plot of the first two SA-
RTOs. For Server 2003 in subfigure (a), there are two distinct patterns – the lower left
corner, with RTO1 distributed in [2.2, 3.3] and RTO2 frozen at 6.56, and the upper section,
with RTO1 scattered in [3.3, 4.6] and RTO2 in [9.5, 9.8]. Furthermore, the two scenarios are
not equally likely as the bottom one occurs 68% of the time. This shows that the temporal
model must take into account not just the possible RTO regions, but also their likelihoods.
A similar picture emerges for Linux 2.6 in subfigure (b). The mass of the RTO is
now concentrated on 11 distinct points, where RTO1 ranges from 3 to 4.4 seconds and
RTO2 from 6 to 6.2. Again, the popularity of individual points is non-uniform, swinging
from 2% to 16%. Note that both cases in Fig. 3.3 have been collected from idle hosts
over a single-hop network consisting of one switch, which makes this behavior part of the
fingerprint itself rather than an artifact of the sampling environment.
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Figure 3.3: RTO randomness in TCP/IP scheduler.
Possible reasons for this fluctuation are the absence of per-connection RTO timers
during the SYN-ACK phase and discretization of retransmission delays. What these ex-
amples show is that internal OS operation is a complex stochastic system that requires
measuring the RTO distribution (rather than a single snapshot) during creation of the sig-
nature database. This is necessary because such large variations are not taken into account
by the jitter model, which normally assumes OWDs on the order of tens or hundreds of
milliseconds, with similarly sized jitter.
Our approach is to treat RTOs as random variables, unlike prior work that has always
considered them deterministic. Specifically, suppose OS j haswj unique types of behavior,
each occurring with probability βjr, where r = 1, 2, . . . , wj . We call each of these types a
subOS and assign it a separate RTO vector τjr, which updates (3.13) to:
p(τ |τj , γ) =
wj∑
r=1
βjrp(τ |τjr, γ). (3.19)
A simpler technique is to measure each host w times and let each obtained RTO vector
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τjr be a subOS with βjr = 1/w. In that case, (3.19) becomes:
p(τ |τj , γ) =
1
w
w∑
r=1
|τ |∏
m=2
f(Rγjrm), (3.20)
where Rγjrm is the generalized jitter of the m-th RTO under subOS r of OS j and loss-
pattern γ. Note that summations involving Γ(τ, τj) remain the same since all subOSes
within a given OS send a fixed number of SYN-ACKs. They also exhibit deterministic
user features, which keeps (3.15) unchanged.
3.3.3 Fingerprint Database
In order to produce an accurate fingerprint τj , the OS must be measured in some iso-
lated testbed with low end-to-end delays and idle conditions at the server. To avoid loss-
related bias, each host must be sampled multiple times to determine the longest vector
of RTOs it produces, which should then be used to collect w loss-free samples for the
database. Following these guidelines, we installed a variety of commodity operating sys-
tems in our lab, determined the proper size of their RTO vectors, and collected w = 50
clean fingerprints from each. We also captured a number of embedded devices found in
our department LAN.
While Snacktime ships with 25 signatures and [55] uses 98, our database contains 116
network stacks. We can distinguish not only between different operating systems (e.g.,
Windows, Linux, FreeBSD), but also sometimes identify their versions and patches (e.g.,
Windows Server 2003 with and without SP1, MacOS 10.3 vs MacOS 10.4).
3.3.4 Hershel
Our classification method, which we call Hershel, builds upon (3.18) and (3.20), where
we treat all w = 50 subOSes as deterministic. Common sense suggests that users, scrub-
bers, and network devices are not likely to directly tweak individual RST features RA,
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Win TTL DF OPT MSS RST
39.2 4.7 1.8 1.1 5.5 14.4
Table 3.5: Classification accuracy (percent) of isolated features.
RN, and RW; instead, these fields (if modified at all) will be simultaneously replaced with
another set that comes from a different OS. We thus combine all four RST values in Table
3.2 into one atomic feature for classification purposes. This makes vector uj consist of six
fields – Win, TTL, DF, MSS, OPT, and aggregated RST. Table 3.5 shows the accuracy of
individual features across the entire database (all ties are broken uniformly randomly).
RTO vectors τ and τj include timestamps of all SYN-ACKs and the first RST (if
present). To account for resets that might be injected by firewalls/IDS after they time
out the connection, (3.8) and (3.15) require a revision. Specifically, if the measured vector
τ contains a reset, but τj does not, the RST is removed from τ prior to computing (3.8).
To account for the mismatch in the RST feature, (3.15) gets multiplied by π6. In the oppo-
site case, i.e., τj contains a RST, but τ does not, it is important to avoid mistaking packet
loss for changes in the RST feature and improperly penalizing p(u|uj) with π6. Next, if
both vectors contain a reset packet, (3.15) gets hit with either π6 or 1 − π6 depending
on the match in (RA, RN, RW). Finally, if neither vector has a RST, then (3.15) enjoys
multiplication by 1− π6.
3.4 Simulations
Our contribution in this subsection is to explain how to select the parameters of the
model and examine Hershel’s accuracy in simulations in comparison to Snacktime.
3.4.1 Parameters
For lack of a better assumption, we suppose that all OSes are equally likely to appear
in the trace and set p(yj) = 1/M to be a uniform PMF. While it is possible to consider
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multiple iterations and refine this value after each pass, the resulting system sometimes
exhibits instability and divergence into inferior states. We analyze these stability issues
further in Section 5, but for now perform a single iteration in our evaluation below.
We use πm = 0.01 for RST and OPT, while keeping πm = 0.1 for the other features.
The rationale is that RST behavior and option ordering can be changed only through kernel
source-code modifications and usage of aggressive intermediate devices, neither of which
we believe is that common in today’s Internet compared to stack tuning. For queuing
delay, we use a simple exponential distribution with CDF 1 − e−λx whose mean is set to
0.5 seconds (rate λ = 2). This produces Laplace jitter density:
f(z) =
λ
2
e−λ|z|. (3.21)
Note that usage of λ = 2 is fairly pessimistic, with the majority of paths likely ex-
hibiting significantly smaller delays. For example, this model assumes 82% of the paths
produce over 100 ms queuing delays, 37% over 500 ms, and 14% over 1 second. For
packet loss, we use Google’s study [18] to set q = 3.8%, which was their highest rate of
SYN-ACK loss.
3.4.2 Results
Our next goal is to examine Hershel’s robustness in the presence of OWD jitter, packet
loss, and random feature modification by the user. We also aim to assess the sensitivity
of results to our choices of default parameters above. We simulate a FIFO queue between
the server and the client with a given delay distribution. Each packet is dropped by the
router with some probability qreal and each feature is independently modified with another
probability πreal. Since these are per-packet and per-feature metrics, it also makes sense
to examine the fraction χ = E[(1 − qreal)|τj |](1 − πreal)6 of all generated samples that do
not have any loss or feature modification, where the expectation is taken over all j.
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The distribution of popularity preal(yj) ∼ j−α is set to Zipf with shape parameter
α = 1.2, which approximates the fact that some OSes are much more popular than others.
We do not attempt to make our assignment of index j to each physical OS such that its
preal(yj) closely follows that in the Internet (which is unknown anyway); instead, the
simulation simply verifies performance of the proposed estimator when the OS frequency
is highly non-uniform. For that purpose, random ordering of OSes in the database is
sufficient.
Table 3.6 shows classification accuracy for several scenarios of interest. We examine
three types of OWD with mean µ in the first column – Pareto 1 − (1 + x/β)−α with
α = 3 and β = µ(α − 1), exponential with rate 1/µ, and uniform in [0, 2µ]. We use
the original Snacktime since the simplified version from [45] performs worse. Using just
the RTOs, Snacktime in the table starts at close to 13%, but then deteriorates below 1%
near the bottom. This amounts to essentially guessing across the 116 available options
(i.e., 1/116 = 0.86%). Augmented with Win and later TTL, Snacktime begins at a more
healthy 52− 58%, but then eventually reduces to single digits.
The next six columns show Hershel with its default λ = 2. Classifying just based on
the RTO vector, Hershel doubles Snacktime’s accuracy in the first three scenarios (i.e.,
the first 12 rows of the table), triples it in the next one, and improves by an order of
magnitude in the last one. As additional features are added, Hershel becomes even better,
with significant gains seen at the Win and OPT boundaries. This shows that unlike DF,
option strings form an orthogonal dimension to Win/TTL. The MSS improves the result
further by 3% and the RST packet by an additional 0.5 − 3%, with the impact mostly
limited to high-loss cases.
Staying with λ = 2, observe that Hershel is quite insensitive to selection of f(z).
Specifically, classification accuracy improves not when λ equals 1/µ or the PDF of real
delay matches (3.21), but as µ gets smaller or the tail of the delay gets lighter. This can
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OWD µ Snacktime Hershel λ = 2, q = 0.038 Hershel Hershel
distribution (sec) RTO +Win +TTL RTO +Win +TTL +DF +OPT +MSS +RST λ = 10 q = 0.1
qreal = 0, πreal = 0 (χ = 100%)
Pareto 0.5 12.6 51.8 58.3 22.1 81.4 86.2 88.5 96.2 99.72 99.72 94.62 99.69
Exp 0.5 12.8 51.8 58.3 21.9 82.6 86.9 89.4 96.5 99.92 99.94 96.21 99.82
Uniform 0.5 13.0 51.9 58.4 21.7 84.1 87.4 89.8 96.8 99.99 99.99 98.50 99.99
Pareto 0.1 16.3 56.9 62.9 33.1 93.0 94.9 96.7 99.0 99.99 99.99 99.69 99.99
qreal = 3.8%, πreal = 0 (χ = 84%)
Pareto 0.5 10.0 43.4 49.0 21.4 78.5 85.1 87.7 96.1 99.69 99.69 94.68 99.66
Exp 0.5 10.1 43.4 49.0 21.5 80.1 85.6 88.1 96.3 99.76 99.82 96.21 99.80
Uniform 0.5 10.3 43.4 49.0 21.7 81.1 86.4 89.0 96.7 99.96 99.96 98.50 99.96
Pareto 0.1 13.1 47.9 53.2 31.6 89.6 93.6 95.6 98.8 99.96 99.96 99.66 99.97
qreal = 3.8%, πreal = 10% (χ = 49%)
Pareto 0.5 10.0 39.9 44.4 21.4 72.7 77.7 78.6 91.4 94.93 95.37 90.13 95.25
Exp 0.5 10.1 39.9 44.4 21.5 73.8 78.3 79.1 91.6 95.02 95.55 91.78 95.34
Uniform 0.5 10.3 39.9 44.4 21.7 75.1 78.9 79.7 91.9 95.20 95.63 93.97 95.57
Pareto 0.1 13.1 44.3 48.5 31.6 83.8 87.3 87.7 95.0 96.54 96.92 96.67 96.87
qreal = 10%, πreal = 10% (χ = 34%)
Pareto 0.5 6.9 29.9 33.4 20.1 68.1 76.2 77.1 91.2 94.84 95.22 90.01 95.14
Exp 0.5 7.0 29.9 33.4 20.1 69.2 76.8 77.7 91.5 94.98 95.43 91.76 95.20
Uniform 0.5 7.2 29.9 33.4 20.1 70.4 77.4 78.3 91.7 95.13 95.51 93.82 95.46
Pareto 0.1 9.3 33.5 36.8 29.4 78.4 85.3 85.7 94.5 96.38 96.71 96.46 96.67
qreal = 50%, πreal = 50% (χ = 0.13%)
Pareto 0.5 0.82 2.37 2.49 10.4 23.7 28.1 35.6 53.7 56.65 59.95 58.95 60.23
Exp 0.5 0.83 2.37 2.49 10.5 24.1 28.4 35.9 53.8 56.74 60.12 60.40 60.31
Uniform 0.5 0.84 2.37 2.49 10.6 24.5 28.6 36.5 54.0 56.89 60.25 60.79 60.46
Pareto 0.1 1.11 2.90 2.95 14.4 28.3 32.0 40.5 56.8 59.45 62.68 64.84 63.06
Table 3.6: Classification accuracy (percent) in simulations of 218 samples.
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be seen by contrasting the two Pareto cases (µ = 0.1 and µ = 0.5) and comparing Pareto,
exponential, and uniform cases (all with µ = 0.5). As the difference between the last three
scenarios is quite small, we conclude that the distribution of network jitter, as opposed to
its mean, generally has a minor effect on accuracy. Therefore, keeping the Laplace model
(3.21) appears reasonable.
To shed additional light on selection of parameters, the next column of the table re-runs
Hershel with all available features and λ = 10. While this slightly improves the µ = 0.1
case, this happens only under 50% packet loss and at the expense of significant reduction
in accuracy in other rows, which suggests that 1/λ should overestimate, rather than un-
derestimate, the real network delay. To this end, our previous conservative choice λ = 2
seems quite appropriate. The last column of the table reverts to λ = 2 and demonstrates
that the model is insensitive to selection of q. We thus keep q = 3.8% for the Internet
classification below.
3.5 Experiments
Our contribution in this subsection is to apply Hershel to a wide-scale Internet scan
and provide an assessment of the obtained classification.
3.5.1 Dataset Properties
We use Internet scan data from [45], which is based on a 2010 survey of webservers in
[55]. These IPs were discovered by sending port-80 SYN packets from Windows Server
2008 (with all TCP options enabled) to every address in BGP. The experiment garnered
37.8M samples x that contained at least one SYN-ACK, which we later feed into Hershel.
We start by examining occurrence of various features in the dataset and their mapping to
signatures in D. We qualitatively group them into four types – linux, windows, embedded
(routers, modems, cameras, hardware gadgets), and other (BSD, Mac, AIX, NetApp, Big-
IP, SunOS).
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RTOs Hosts Sigs Group
3 9,639,810 27 all
2 9,070,991 16 windows, embedded
5 7,834,027 23 linux, embedded, other
4 5,066,940 16 unix, embedded
1 2,669,222 1 Dell printer
0 1,992,196 0 –
6 540,042 9 linux, embedded, other
19 202,733 2 embedded
18 162,442 0 –
17 110,335 0 –
Table 3.7: Top RTO counts (99% of total).
Window Hosts Sigs Group
5,792 10,143,772 4 linux
16,384 7,051,858 6 windows, embedded, other
8,192 4,266,370 17 windows, embedded
65,535 3,551,640 9 windows, other
5,760 2,643,274 0 –
5,840 981,136 3 embedded
16,000 781,225 5 embedded
4,096 775,473 5 embedded
1,024 758,230 4 embedded
2,800 677,211 1 TP-Link router
Table 3.8: Top window sizes (87% of total).
To first step is to ensure that packet loss has not produced totally unworkable temporal
features in the dataset. Table 3.7 shows the number of available RTOs per destination. It
is encouraging to see that the top four spots retain enough information for a meaningful
match and the most difficult case (i.e., single SYN-ACK) follows in sixth place. While the
average number of received packets was 5, one host transmitted over 3M SYN-ACKs. We
next analyze sanity of the remaining features and build intuition for what to expect from
Hershel classification.
The scan contains a staggering 3,815 unique window sizes, while our fingerprint col-
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lection D has only 51. While users tuning their stacks and scrubbers modifying the OS
signature are possible reasons, we also found that the advertised window of SYN-ACKs
can be easily changed at the application layer by resizing the socket buffer (i.e., calling
setsockopt with the SO_RCVBUF option) before the connection is accepted. This
highlights the need for a flexible classifier that allows features to mismatch.
The good news is that the distribution of window size is heavily skewed towards well-
known values, as seen in Table 3.8. The most common window is unique to Linux variants,
while the most ambiguous is split across 17 operating systems. Interestingly, window size
5760 in position #5, which we later discovered belongs to Ubuntu, is absent not just from
ours, but also other fingerprinting databases (e.g., p0f, xprobe). We come back to these
hosts later and examine how Hershel classifies them. Ideally, unknown devices should be
mapped to the same OS family (i.e., Linux in this case).
Another peculiar case are 168K hosts with zero window size, which in our database
corresponds to a single device related to building automation. This particular stack forces
the sender to finish the 3-packet handshake (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK) and wait for the
window to move before sending the first GET request. Immediately after the sender’s
ACK, the window expands to 12,288 bytes. Closed receiver windows can be an artifact of
rate-limiting firewalls or site policies related to congestion control. One notable example
is a popular host craigslist.com that prior to 2006 was completing all TCP handshakes
with window size zero [58]. Other usage of this technique comes from network tarpits [3],
which aim to slow down scanners by advertising small windows in SYN-ACKs. All of
this suggests that the true window size may remain "hidden" from the fingerprinting tool
for reasons unrelated to users, scrubbers, or TCP socket options.
The TTL values of received packets are plotted in Fig. 3.4(a), covering 251 unique
points out of the 255 possible. A vast majority of the hosts are clustered on the values
just before the initial TTL defaults 64, 128, and 255. Fig. 3.4(b) shows the distribution of
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Figure 3.4: Received TTL and reverse path length.
TTL Hosts Sigs Group
64 26,275,301 70 linux, embedded, other
128 7,129,667 17 windows, embedded, other
255 4,214,927 22 linux, embedded, other
32 190,697 7 embedded
Table 3.9: Initial TTL distribution (100% of total).
reverse hop length for each host back to the scanner, calculated by subtracting the received
TTL from the nearest well-known initial value. This distribution appears reasonable, with
less than 0.4% of the mass below 10 or above 30 hops. This suggests the number of non-
standard initial TTLs (if any) is small. Table 3.9 shows the distribution seen by Hershel
and the corresponding number of signatures in D.
A good number of hosts (69%) set the DF flag, indicating they intend to perform
path-MTU discovery, which matches 45% of the signatures. Out of 37.8M responsive
targets, 5.9M (16%) send at least one reset packet (in addition to the SYN-ACKs), which
is consistent with 56 OSes. The reset window (RW) deviates from that in the SYN-ACK
for 20.8% of the IPs and 8 fingerprints in D.
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Feature Hosts Sigs Group
RA= 1, RN= 1 4,368,098 35 embedded, other
RA= 0, RN= 1 1,167,761 11 windows, embedded
RA= 0, RN= 0 367,915 10 embedded
RA= 1, RN= 0 37,113 0 –
Table 3.10: Breakdown of 5.9M hosts with RSTs.
Options Hosts Sigs Group
MSTNW 13,156,171 8 linux
MNWNNT 6,214,837 18 embedded, other
MNWNNTNNS 5,579,866 12 windows, other
M 5,431,682 41 embedded
MNW 2,656,342 5 linux, embedded, other
MNWST 1,107,935 2 windows, unix
MNWNNTSEE 762,593 4 other
MNNSWNNNT 412,602 0 –
MST 370,699 1 Windows Vista/7
MNNSNW 339,215 1 Akamai linux
Table 3.11: Top options strings (95% of total).
Table 3.10 examines the interplay between RA and RN in reset packets. In the most
common scenario, hosts indicate that the ACK sequence is valid and correctly acknowl-
edge values one larger than transmitted by the scanner in the SYN packet (which encodes
the destination IP); however, there are also 37K hosts (last row) with broken implemen-
tations that indicate a valid ACK, but set the field to zero. None of our signatures exhibit
this behavior.
We have 21 unique combinations of options in D; however, the dataset shows 264
different strings, with the top 10 provided in Table 3.11. Similar to Table 3.8, a few
popular cases account for the majority of IPs and Linux variants hold a clear lead, but
now the most ambiguous combination splits across 41 embedded devices. While Akamai
currently reports 137K servers [2], it seems reasonable that multiple NICs and IP aliasing
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MSS Hosts Sigs Group
1460 21,969,799 70 all
512 3,523,272 9 embedded
1452 3,512,626 2 embedded
1380 1,633,852 3 windows, embedded
1440 1,472,969 2 linux, embedded
1400 1,074,502 2 embedded
536 620,013 7 embedded
1448 562,961 0 –
1420 431,720 1 Avocent KVM switch
768 419,326 2 embedded
Table 3.12: Top MSS values (93% of total).
can produce 339K samples in last row.
Practically every host (99.5%) supports the MSS option, with Table 3.12 showing the
top 10 cases out of the 1,021 observed in the dataset. The most common MSS 1460
does not provide much information about the OS, but the other values appear useful at
partitioning the dataset into small groups. On the downside, general-purpose OSes often
set the MSS as a function of the underlying data-link layer (i.e., MSS = MTU – 40), which
creates some interesting dilemmas. For example, MSS 1452 in third place can be classified
as one of two embedded devices or as home computers with 1492-byte MTUs commonly
seen over PPP links such as DSL. This emphasizes importance of Hershel’s probabilistic
matching (3.15) and explains the significantly smaller number of unique MSS values in D
(i.e., only 20).
3.5.2 Classification Overview
We run Hershel on the scan dataset and obtain a non-zero classification probability
for 37.4M devices. Before showing these results, we perform additional sanity checks by
examining how often individual features of each IP matched those in the most-likely OS
suggested by Hershel.
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Feature Fraction RST possibilities Fraction
Win 70.3% Neither has RST 80.9%
TTL 95.2% Both have RST, match 10.4%
DF 96.2% Missing RST 4.2%
MSS 70.6% Both have RST, non-match 3.5%
OPT 99.4% Bogus extra RST 1.0%
Table 3.13: Hershel’s feature match rate.
Starting with the first two columns of Table 3.13, observe that window size is quite
volatile, with 30% of the decisions going to signatures with a different window. This was
expected given the numerous reasons to modify this field and the large amount of unique
values seen earlier. Additionally, these 30% cover unknown devices whose RTOs and other
features may match some OS in D, but not the window size. Hershel remains robust in
these cases and simply identifies the closest signature based on the available information.
For example, 98.4% of Ubuntu cases with the unknown window 5760 are classified to
Linux 2.4/2.6. These 2.6M hosts account for 25% of all window mismatch.
TTL and DF both exhibit match rates over 95%, while MSS comes in much lower
at 71%. This is not surprising in light of its dependency on the MTU. The OPT string
proves extremely reliable, where 77.4% of the cases match exactly and 22% are feasible
subsets/supersets of the original. The five possible cases with RST packets are shown in
the other two columns of Table 3.13. Combining the first two rows, we can conclude that
91% of the hosts have a matching RST feature. The next row with missing RSTs allows
us to ballpark network packet loss at qreal = 4.2%, not too far from the model’s 3.8%. The
majority of non-matching combinations (RA, RN, RW), responsible for 3.5% in the table,
are caused by RW. Some of this behavior was also expected since tweaking of window
size causes certain OSes to alter RW as well. Finally, we see 1% of the cases with extra
RST packets, which we suspect are injected by firewalls, NAT boxes, and other devices as
indication that they have expired the per-flow state.
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OS Count
Linux 2.6 / 2.4 9,610,732
VxWorks embedded systems 4,179,583
Windows Server 2003 SP1 SP2 2,316,590
VxWorks 5.4.2 / Xerox embedded 1,890,585
Linux 2.6 / Debian / CentOS / SonicWall 1,196,143
Embedded Linux / Mikrotik routers 1,190,102
Windows Server 2008 SP1 SP2 R2 / Vista / 7 1,146,609
TP-Link / Iball / Huawei home routers 1,046,985
Windows Server 2003 / 2000 / XP SP1 1,001,343
Cisco / Scientific Atlanta cable modems 827,285
Table 3.14: Top individual signatures (65% of total).
Group Count
Linux 13,882,999
Embedded 13,590,803
Windows 7,561,839
Other 2,396,455
Table 3.15: Common families of operating systems.
3.5.3 Results
Having verified the general soundness of Hershel’s output, we show it in Table 3.14.
Linux attracts the most classification decisions, accounting for nearly a quarter of the
webservers. This signature is quite unique, which makes accidental lumping of unknown
devices or misclassified hosts into this category highly unlikely. In second and fourth place
is VxWorks, which is an embedded OS extensively used in routers, modems, cameras, and
printers. Interestingly, Windows 2003 is third, well above Server 2008 in seventh position.
More Linux, home routers/modems, and Server 2003/XP make up the remaining OSes.
Table 3.15 groups fingerprints by type. Linux not just takes the first spot, but it dom-
inates all other types of unix combined by a factor of 6. Embedded systems continue in
second place, while windows is firmly in third. Interestingly, these results differ quite a bit
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IPs Result Count
Consensus 429 Both correct 424
Neither correct 3
Indeterminate 2
Disagreement 571 Hershel correct 476
Snacktime correct 9
Neither correct 6
Indeterminate 80
Table 3.16: Manual verification.
from those in prior application of Snacktime to this dataset [55], with the most noticeable
difference being 9M hosts moving from windows to embedded. This is not surprising as
Snacktime’s ability to overcome noise, packet loss, and feature corruption is quite weak.
Further, as shown above, Microsoft OSes often share the window size and TTL with em-
bedded devices, making this distinction even more difficult for Snacktime.
To better understand the difference between these methods, we carry out comparison
using manual analysis of 1,000 random targets for which we had an HTTP header from
a separate download process that grabbed the root page of each replying IP (this was
done in real-time during the 2010 scan). Table 3.16 shows the result. The first category
in the table breaks down 429 hosts on which both methods produce the same exact OS.
Out of these, 424 are correct matches, 3 incorrect, and 2 indeterminate. The last option
occurs for devices inadequately represented in the database (i.e., no resemblance to any
signature) or when multiple OSes appear to be probable (e.g., due to extensive packet
loss or missing/ambiguous "Server:" field in the HTTP response header). Among the 571
disputed hosts, Hershel delivers 476 correct results and Snacktime 9.
We can make a decision for 918 cases, out of which Hershel’s accuracy is 98% and
Snacktime’s is 47%. The 9 cases where Hershel is wrong, but Snacktime is right, are
caused by bogus RSTs, which Snacktime ignores, but Hershel takes into account. Overall,
we find that when the two methods disagree, Hershel is overwhelmingly more accurate.
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Country Hosts Windows Linux Embedded Other
US 16,187,542 16.1% 30.4% 47.2% 5.2%
CN 2,345,462 54.1% 14.2% 14.6% 16.1%
ES 1,620,920 4.1% 89.2% 5.5% 0.8%
JP 1,614,724 11.3% 37.0% 35.8% 14.7%
DE 1,043,699 19.9% 57.7% 15.7% 5.7%
GB 862,571 32.1% 34.8% 25.0% 5.9%
CA 849,285 25.9% 45.3% 12.8% 14.7%
IT 810,104 14.3% 53.3% 29.1% 1.7%
BR 685,597 14.5% 52.8% 25.2% 5.3%
TW 644,645 35.9% 47.2% 10.8% 5.3%
Table 3.17: Top countries running webservers (71% of total).
AS Size Owner Hosts Windows Linux Embedded Other
7922 71.0M Comcast Cable 3,444,634 3.3% 6.2% 89.8% 0.3%
4134 109.7M Chinanet 988,397 50.7% 13.3% 15.9% 18.5%
3352 10.9M Telefonica de Espana 861,222 2.3% 92.0% 4.8% 0.5%
4837 54.5M CNC Group China 595,931 53.2% 9.4% 15.0% 21.7%
20001 5.7M Time Warner Cable 485,766 2.4% 1.5% 95.4% 0.3%
11351 4.9M Time Warner Cable 436,329 2.0% 1.1% 96.3% 0.2%
2914 7.7M NTT America 429,648 25.6% 20.6% 20.3% 33.1%
22773 11.9M Cox Comm. 426,807 4.8% 2.8% 90.8% 0.6%
7018 75.2M AT&T Services 373,068 31.0% 36.2% 18.9% 11.0%
7155 988K Viasat Comm. 370,821 39.0% 0.0% 60.9% 0.0%
Table 3.18: Top ASes running webservers (22% of total).
3.5.4 World View
Next, we use the MaxMind GeoIP database [23] to glean trends in OS usage around
the globe. Table 3.17 shows the top countries in the measurement. The US leads the
list, accounting for almost half of the discovered web servers (i.e., 16M out of 37M) and
exceeding China in second place by a factor of 8. The distribution of OS popularity is
quite diverse, with only Italy and Brazil exhibiting similar vectors. Interestingly, Linux
prevails over Windows in all countries except China; Spain stands out with 90% Linux,
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far more than any other locale in the list; and the US has the highest fraction of embedded
devices among the entries in the table.
Table 3.18 breaks down the data by AS, shedding additional light on the results. Home
access providers in the US (i.e., Comcast, Time Warner, Cox) are full of embedded devices,
likely consumer routers and modems. In combination, these 4.8M boxes represent 30%
of the discovered servers in the US, which helps explain the high percentage of embedded
stacks seen earlier. Similarly, Telefonica de Espana, a large telecommunications provider
in Spain and South America, is responsible for 50% of Spanish webservers in our dataset.
This company is known for collaborations with RedHat and a cloud-computing emphasis
[103]. Its 92% bias towards Linux is consistent with an earlier observation that Spain is
dominated by this operating system. China’s propensity towards Windows may stem from
lax software-piracy laws, with 67% of its devices coming from two ISPs in Table 3.18,
each replete with Microsoft OSes.
3.5.5 Scrubbers
While the Hershel’s main purpose is large-scale measurement, where OS scrubbing is
not likely to be prevalent, it still makes sense to examine its performance in such scenarios.
Table 3.19 lists four obfuscators mentioned in existing literature and available for testing.
The first is Linux iptables, part of the packet-filtering framework called netfilter [68].
It is commonly used to inspect packets, modify routing tables, and configure the kernel
firewall. It has extensions that ‘mangle’ packets and change certain header fields; however,
the only ones of interest to Hershel are TTL and MSS. OSfuscate [20] is a Windows
scrubber that thwarts fingerprinting tools by changing the registry. It can modify Win,
TTL, MSS, and certain options (i.e., drop SACK and timestamps). Along similar lines,
TCP Optimizer [75] gives its users ability to change the same five registry values, in hopes
of improving TCP transfer speed. Finally, IPPersonality [90], built on top of the netfilter
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Tool Win TTL DF TCP Options MSS
Netfilter iptables – X – – X
OSfuscate X X – Drop S and T X
SG TCP Optimizer X X – Drop S and T X
IPPersonality X X X Replace or reorder X
Table 3.19: Capability of OS obfuscation tools.
Loss Snacktime Hershel
(%) All RTO -RST-RTO -RST RTO All RTO+RST
0.0 9.9 12.6 0.0 11.8 22.1 36.6 47.6
3.8 7.8 10.0 0.0 11.4 21.4 34.8 45.3
10 5.2 6.9 0.0 10.9 20.1 31.9 41.8
50 0.6 0.8 0.0 6.0 10.4 15.6 20.5
Table 3.20: Scrubbed accuracy (percent) among all OSes.
framework, is the most sophisticated scrubber in the list. It can modify all Hershel features
except RST and RTO.
To evaluate performance against scrubbers, we simulate the worst-case scenario – IP-
Personality with an adversary who mimics the signature with the closest RTO vector from
another OS family (i.e., windows, linux, embedded, other). Table 3.20 shows the result
using Pareto OWDs (µ = 0.5 sec) and the Zipf setup from Table 3.6. Snacktime stays in
the single digits, showing performance slightly below that of using just the RTOs. Her-
shel with only the fixed features from previous literature (i.e., all except RTO and RST)
produces the expected 0% match rate. Adding the RTO pushes accuracy to 6-12%, but
this far from impressive – the RTO alone works better, achieving 10-22%. Employing all
Hershel features almost doubles the result; however, the real winner in this comparison is
the RST+RTO combination, which reaches as high as 47%.
Limiting the simulation to 26 Windows/Linux signatures that the scrubber modifies
using the same rules produces a more challenging case outlined in Table 3.21. There is
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Loss Snacktime Hershel
(%) All RTO -RST-RTO -RST RTO All RST+RTO
0.0 2.5 5.9 0.0 5.0 14.6 31.8 41.7
3.8 2.0 5.0 0.0 4.7 14.1 29.8 39.4
10 1.4 3.8 0.0 4.5 12.9 26.9 35.7
50 0.1 0.5 0.0 2.2 6.2 12.0 16.3
Table 3.21: Scrubbed accuracy (percent) among Windows/Linux.
an accuracy reduction in all categories, but the scrubber-resilient version of Hershel still
manages to correctly pinpoint over 41% of the samples that sustain no loss.
3.6 Conclusion
In this section, we modeled the problem of single-packet OS fingerprinting and de-
veloped novel approaches for tackling delay jitter, packet loss, and user modification to
SYN-ACK features. Based on this theory, we created a classification method called Her-
shel, that significantly increased the accuracy of existing techniques, both in simulation
and the real Internet. We employed Hershel on a large Internet dataset, obtaining classifi-
cation of 37.4M hosts, and broke down the results to show OS usage of different countries
and ASes. Finally, we also verified Hershel’s robustness to scrubbers, showing that re-
spectable accuracy can still be maintained by ignoring the scrubbed features.
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4. AUTOMATED DATABASE CREATION*
4.1 Introduction
For classifiers such as Hershel to work, there must be a process that establishes sig-
natures for known types of behavior and builds a database that contains all sufficiently
different specimens found in the wild. To keep results up-to-date, new signatures must
be periodically acquired and merged into the existing database. This is often a manual
process that suffers from human error, poor repeatability, heuristic decisions, and database
compositions incompatible across different classification methods.
To overcome these problems, in this section we investigate algorithms and models for
automated creation of clusters among the available samples, elimination of duplicates, and
assignment of labels to the resulting signatures. We next explain the issues involved and
our results.
4.1.1 Motivation and Contributions
Performance of each classifier depends on not only its internal algorithms, but also
database D and types of volatility experienced during measurement. This makes compar-
ison between different approaches (e.g., Nmap [73], Snacktime [7], p0f [122], Hershel)
fairly complicated, especially if they utilize incompatible sets of features, databases, or as-
sumptions on feature determinism. For example, consider method M1 with n signatures
and M2 with m ≪ n. It may appear that M1 is more powerful because its D is big-
ger; however, its classification accuracy may be lower due to the larger number of options
to choose from and/or less reliable decision-making. Additionally, the specific model of
distortion X (i.e., noise in certain features) applied during the experiment may have a dra-
*Reprinted, with permission, from "Unsupervised Clustering Under Temporal Feature Volatility in Net-
work Stack Fingerprinting" by Z. Shamsi and D. Loguinov which appeared in [93] and [94]. c© 2017 IEEE.
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matic impact on the result. In such cases, it is possible thatM1 resorts to random guessing
and makes inferior choices to those of M2.
To capture these aspects, our first contribution is to propose that each classification
method be characterized by the number of signatures d(1 − ǫ,X ), which we call the di-
mension, between which it can differentiate with probability at least 1 − ǫ under a given
noise model X . We also argue that database D should be customized to each pair (ǫ,X )
to contain exactly d(1 − ǫ,X )-separable signatures. To determine the dimension and the
correspondingD, our second contribution is to propose an algorithm we call Plata1, which
disturbs each candidate signature in D using X and verifies that it can be matched to itself
with probability at least 1 − ǫ. Samples that fail to meet this criterion are eliminated and
classification decisions among other signatures are redistributed in an iterative procedure
that stops when all remaining candidates are (1 − ǫ,X )-separable. Assuming availabil-
ity of labels for a subset of initial candidates, we explain how Plata automatically assigns
them to the d generated clusters.
We apply these concepts to Hershel, which allows random OS behavior and provides
probabilities, rather than heuristic weights, for the match across any pair of samples. We
focus on its temporal network features (i.e., delay jitter) since they are highly volatile and
fairly well-understood, but difficult to separate using manual analysis.
This leads to our third contribution that consists of building a Plata database using
9.7K webservers discovered in our campus network and passing all HTTP headers through
simhash [60] to label the elements of D. Using only delay features, we show that Hershel
achieves 80%-separation under 500-ms random distortion on 117 signatures. Adding de-
terministic header values, this number jumps to d(0.8,X ) = 398, which is 3.4 times larger
than the database we used in Section 3.
While Plata works well, its Monte Carlo simulations require a large amount of CPU
1The city of La Plata in Argentina pioneered fingerprint databases in 1892.
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time to compute the Hershel probabilities (i.e., over 24 hours using 16 cores). There-
fore, our fourth contribution is to build a closed-form model for the matrix produced by
Plata. This leads to an interesting discovery that Hershel’s iid (independent and identically
distributed) jitter assumption is violated in practice, making the model disagree with sim-
ulations. We therefore create a novel classifier for temporal features that relies on one-way
delay instead of jitter. We call the resulting method Hershel+ and show that it is not only
more accurate, but also faster than Hershel after an appropriate expansion of integrals.
It also admits a closed-form representation of the entire Plata matrix, which reduces the
separation time to just 12 minutes and boosts our database dimension to 420 separable
signatures. All of this forms our fifth contribution.
We finish the section by scanning the Internet on port 80 and applying Hershel+ to
the result. Among Internet-wide studies, this is the largest population to be fingerprinted
(i.e., 66M IPs), using the most extensive database (i.e., 420 signatures), and the first such
attempt with an automatically generated D. Compared to the scan dataset from 2010
that we used with the Hershel classification earlier, we find that the number of Linux and
embedded devices has almost doubled, while that of Windows has remained stable. We
compare some of our results with those of Nmap and discover a major flaw in the operation
of the latter that surfaces in scenarios with non-ideal network conditions (e.g., firewalls).
More importantly, however, we conclude that stochastic network effects do not impede the
use of temporal features, but they require a more careful database construction process.
Our proposed framework of Plata and Hershel+ is a step in the direction of automated,
repeatable, and streamlined classification of massive datasets.
4.2 Background
The majority of efforts in stack fingerprinting [6], [7], [17], [50], [65], [73], [105],
[112], [122] concentrate on introducing new features and designs to further distinguish
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between the OSes, thus improving the classification step; however, they universally rely
on manual effort to construct databases. Since nearly all of them rely only on deterministic
features, database creation is fairly uncomplicated.
The closest related problem to ours is automatic discovery of features that can be used
to differentiate one OS from another. For example, [15] proposes a set of rules built from
sending out a large number of probes (i.e., 300K) to controlled hosts and randomly varying
header fields to detect patterns that produce OS-specific responses. The authors show that
this method can reliably differentiate between three stacks (i.e., Windows XP, Linux 2.6,
and Solaris 9) in a LAN environment.
In [88], this idea is explored at a larger scale by increasing the number of network
stacks and applying a wider range of machine-learning algorithms from the Weka tool [40].
However, their results from scaling this approach to more signatures are quite pessimistic
– the authors conclude that over-fitting to non-deterministic header fields, training bias
towards certain implementations, and lacking semantics lead to confusion for the learning
algorithms.
4.3 Overview
We start by defining the type of decisions we are facing and the inherent challenges.
While we later use examples from stack fingerprinting, the same concepts are applicable
to broader families of problems.
4.3.1 Terminology
Classifiers rely on vectors of distinctive features that identify each specimen, either
uniquely or with some reasonably high probability. The former case arises when the fea-
tures are deterministic, meaning all inspections of a given system produce the same result
(e.g., the order of TCP options). The latter case occurs when the features are inherently
random due to some non-deterministic processes running within the specimen (e.g., SYN-
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ACK retransmission delays). Features of either type may undergo additional modification
due to influence of system owners or as byproduct of the measurement process, in which
case we call them volatile (e.g., users tuning the TCP window size, queuing delays affect-
ing packet spacing). All four types are illustrated in Fig. 4.1(a).
Note that volatility and randomness are not the same – the former arises due to forces
external to the object being classified, while the latter due to internal. This distinction is
important when internal disturbances exhibit substantially larger variance than external,
or produce patterns that cannot be accounted for in the volatility model alone. With this
in mind, we call classifiers simple if they operate using only non-volatile deterministic
features (i.e., type-1 in Fig. 4.1(a)) and complex otherwise (i.e., types 2-4).
Consider an automaton that performs classification decisions for measurements x using
some database D. We call the matching process membership if it returns the probability
that x ∈ D, where determination of the most-likely match is not important. One example
is intrusion detection that aims to decide whether payload x is malicious or benign against
a database of known exploits. We call the process identification if the result must produce
the one signature y ∈ D with the highest similarity to x. Stack fingerprinting falls into
this category. In either case, the accuracy of the method is assessed by the percentage of
correctly classified values under a particular model of volatility.
4.3.2 Challenges
We are now ready to describe the problem of creating D. Assume a measurement of
several, possibly duplicate, specimens. Membership classifiers are not overly concerned
with high-precision duplicate elimination as these have no effect on accuracy, only on
speed and memory consumption. Simple identification classifiers can construct D by re-
taining the observations with unique combinations of features, which makes the problem
trivial. However, complex identification classifiers must instead ensure separability among
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Figure 4.1: Classifier features.
the signatures, keeping only those that can be reliably distinguished from each other under
various types of distortionX . Inseparable specimens inD drop classification accuracy and
increase overhead, while offering no tangible benefit.
To visualize this better, Fig. 4.1(b) plots random features of four hypothetical systems
– circles, squares, diamonds, and triangles – where each point is a random observation
of the corresponding system. Assuming uniformly random noise centered at each sam-
ple, distortion X1 keeps circles and diamonds separable, but not necessarily triangles and
squares. Dropping either of the last two leads to a separable 3-signature database. For
larger radius of noise (e.g., X2 in the figure) the database may consist of only two separa-
ble signatures – diamonds and one of circles/squares/triangles.
Our goal in this section is to study separation algorithms for volatile and/or random
features, with application to inter-packet delays in wide-scale stack fingerprinting. This
problem arises in single-packet techniques [7], [112] whose classifier must heavily rely
on temporal features. The general appeal of these methods includes low bandwidth con-
sumption (i.e., no extra packets beyond those sent by the scanner), a reduced probability
of tripping IDS, no requirement that the target respond on closed ports or multiple pro-
tocols, and good scalability in Internet-wide classification. However, unlike traditional
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tools (e.g., Nmap [73]) that rely on deterministic features, single-packet classifiers require
prohibitively expensive manual effort to construct databases of non-trivial size. Since this
problem has not been studied before, we address it below.
4.4 Database Creation Using Plata
This subsection describes our technique for ensuring separability between observations
with volatile/random features and building a database on top of such measurements.
4.4.1 Preliminaries
Traditional manual construction of D isolates each unique system and lets the clas-
sifier analyze it separately. In contrast, our framework assumes a one-step measurement
process that remotely probes production systems S1, . . . , Sn and builds the entire database
without knowing which ones are duplicates of each other. We allow these specimens to
exhibit feature randomness and aim to constructD that is (1− ǫ)-separable under a known
volatility model X .
To capture random behavior, each specimen Si must be observed several times to es-
tablish a distribution of its behavior. Let ∆i be the corresponding random feature vector
whose probability mass function (PMF)
pi(δ) := P (∆i = δ) (4.1)
is built from observation. Note that δ = (δ1, δ2, . . .) is a deterministic feature vector that
consists of multiple scalar values. Using a pair of initial RTOs (SYN-ACK retransmission
timeouts), Fig. 4.2(a) shows the distribution of ∆i for two Xerox printers in our dataset.
Depending on the target jitter modelX , these two hosts may very well be (1−ǫ)-separable;
however, doing so manually for hundreds of thousands of points is close to impossible. To
compound the issue, the majority of systems use random vectors with at least 3 dimensions
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and some with over 20.
Classifiers that deal with random features must provide a function p(δ|δ′,X ) that pro-
duces a similarity score for each pair of deterministic vectors (δ, δ′) under a given volatility
model X . This metric estimates the likelihood that δ′ has been distorted to δ during re-
mote measurement. Then, similarity between two observed systems (Si, Sj) is given by
the following expectation
p(∆i|∆j,X ) =
∑
δ
∑
δ′
p(δ|δ′,X )pi(δ)pj(δ
′). (4.2)
For a given i, classifiers are typically concerned with finding j that produces the largest
value in (4.2). However, we are facing a different problem that requires normalization.
Let πi(X ) :=
∑n
j=1 p(∆i|∆j,X ) be the total similarity weight of system Si across all
available options j. Depending on the classifier, πi may not always be 1. To handle such
cases, define
q(∆i|∆j,X ) =
p(∆i|∆j,X )
πi(X )
(4.3)
to be the probability that Si gets classified as Sj . Now suppose systems S1, . . . , Sn are de-
ployed in a production environment (e.g., wide-area Internet) and measured using remote
probing. Therefore, instead of seeing ∆i, the observer now samples ∆i+θ, where random
vector θ is driven by the same distortion model X . We are thus interested in identifying
the largest subset of S1, . . . , Sn in which each system can be matched back to itself with
probability at least 1− ǫ under noise X , i.e., E[q(∆i + θ|∆i,X )] ≥ 1− ǫ.
4.4.2 Matrix Construction
We next describe our database-construction framework, which we call Plata. It starts
by building a confusion matrix M = (Mij), where each cell Mij = E[q(∆i + θ|∆j ,X )]
54
0 20 40 60
δ1 (sec)
0
50
100
150
200
δ
2 
(se
c)
S1
S2
(a) random features
0.45 0.19 0.36 0.00 
0.05 0.49 0.44 0.01 
0.12 0.12 0.72 0.04 
0.07 0.05 0.00 0.88 
0.52 0.47 0.01 
0.13 0.82 0.04 
0.05 0.00 0.95 
0.95 0.05 
0.00 1.00 
(b) matrix reduction
Figure 4.2: Randomness of RTO features and elimination of duplicates in Plata.
and the expectation is taken over θ. In general, classification decisions and vectors θ may
be available only as output of some algorithm. For example, the former might be a C4.5
decision tree and the latter may require simulations of a specific queuing discipline. In
such cases, the only solution is to run Monte-Carlo simulations that repeatedly distort ∆i,
classify the resulting observations, and average the result to obtain an approximation to
Mij .
To this end, suppose we generate r vectors θ1, . . . , θr by simulatingX . Using the PMF
in (4.1), we obtain the same number of instances from random variable ∆i, which we call
δ1i , . . . , δ
r
i . Then, the approximate matrix is given by
M˜ij =
1
r
r∑
m=1
q(δmi + θm|∆j,X ). (4.4)
Since this expands to
M˜ij =
1
r
r∑
m=1
∑
δ′
q(δmi + θm|δ
′,X )pj(δ
′), (4.5)
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the overhead of constructing M˜ is determined by the product of r, matrix size n2, the
number of unique values δ′, and complexity of computing p(δ|δ′,X ), which typically is a
linear function of the combined vector length |δ|+ |δ′|.
4.4.3 Separation
Once complete, the diagonal of M˜ contains the probability of self-classification under
X . The next task is to iteratively eliminate specimens that disperse a significant frac-
tion of classification decisions to non-diagonal cells until the target (1− ǫ)-separability is
achieved, i.e., all M˜ii ≥ 1 − ǫ. At each step, Plata removes row k with the smallest di-
agonal value and redistributes its probability weights to the remaining systems. The naive
approach is to re-run Monte-Carlo simulations and build a new matrix with dimension
(n − 1) × (n − 1); however, this is extremely expensive, especially when r is orders of
magnitude larger than n.
The second option is to infer the new weights using a model and build a sequence of
approximations that produce a final matrix similar to that in the naive method. Consider
row i that needs to partition M˜ik, i.e., the probability to classify i as k, among the other
columns. If we assume that in the absence of system k, classification decisions follow the
remaining probabilities in row i, the likelihood to classify δmi + θm as j 6= k now becomes
M˜ij/(1 − M˜ik). Multiplying this by the weight being removed and adding to the current
M˜ij , we get the following transformation that keeps row sums invariant
M˜ij = M˜ij +
M˜ij
1− M˜ik
M˜ik. (4.6)
Note that if none of i’s classifications went to system k, i.e., M˜ik = 0, row i does
not change. This process continues until all diagonal values are above 1 − ǫ. The re-
maining systems at that stage are added to the database and their number establishes the
(1 − ǫ,X )-dimension of the classifier. An example of this reduction process is shown in
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Fig. 4.2(b), where the rows are sorted in ascending order of M˜ii for convenience of pre-
sentation. Setting ǫ = 0.2, there are three rows that violate separability constraints. Since
(S1, S2) are both similar to S3, but none of them resembles S4, intuition suggests the initial
measurement may contain only two separable specimens. After removal of the first row,
all diagonals receive a boost, but (S2, S3) are still inseparable. Another iteration produces
the expected two vectors that match themselves with probability 0.95 or better.
Note that 1 − ǫ can be used as a tuning parameter – larger values reduce the number
of eventual vectors in the database, while smaller values preserve more, but at the risk of
having more duplicates and poor classification accuracy. Although only M˜ii is compared
against 1 − ǫ, the entire matrix needs to be recomputed after each iteration. This is nec-
essary in order to properly distribute the weights of eliminated systems using (4.6). Thus,
the complexity of each step is n2, repeated n − d times, where d := |D| is the size of the
final database.
4.4.4 Labeling
Once database D is created, Plata needs to assign system-identifying labels to the
available signatures. Assume a process that collects mappings from each Si to the cor-
responding label li using some type of download (e.g., port-80 HTTP requests), oracle
input, or other means, but possibly for a subset of the known specimens. Incomplete la-
beling may occur due to bandwidth constraints, obfuscation of certain systems by their
administrators, and generic software names (e.g., apache) that fail to identify the underly-
ing system. Since labels might be available for hosts that have been discarded during the
matrix-separation step, we must again consider the entire set S1, . . . , Sn. To this end, we
classify each known specimen using D and produce a set of clusters C1, . . . , Cd, where d
is the (1− ǫ,X )-dimension of the database/classifier obtained earlier by Plata.
To eliminate duplicate labels, a separate procedure clusters them into multiple cate-
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Figure 4.3: Applying labels to database clusters.
gories L1, L2, . . . using some type of string-similarity matching. As shown in Fig. 4.3,
there is a directed edge between clusters Lk and Cj if there exists a system Si ∈ Cj such
that its label li ∈ Lk. Note that this forms a bipartite graph in which Lk may point to
multiple clusters Cj . Plata leaves the specifics of choosing the right label for each Cj to
the application. One option is to combine the labels of all in-neighbors, as done in Fig.
4.3. Another option is to assign weights to edges (e.g., equal to the number of correspond-
ing Si’s) and enforce some minimum frequency before a label is considered valid. This
can be further extended to allow for majority voting. For example, 100 hosts with label
"Linux 2.4" and two with "Windows 7" mapping to Cj probably indicate the former is
more appropriate than the latter.
4.5 OS Fingerprinting Database
Plata is quite general and does not assume much beyond existence of similarity func-
tion p, algorithms to produce distortion θ, and ability to observe remote systems. We now
apply this framework to our problem of OS stack fingerprinting under random/volatile
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features.
4.5.1 Classifier
The database for single-packet fingerprinting tools has evolved from 25 signatures in
[7] to 98 in [55], and eventually to the set of 116 signatures we built in Section 3, but the
corresponding (1−ǫ,X )-dimensions of the underlying classifiers remain unknown. So far,
manual construction of D in these tools has relied on separation only across deterministic
features (e.g., window size, TTL, RST bit) and never examined how to determine whether
two hosts with the same fixed header values have sufficiently distinct RTO vectors. To
address this issue, we next apply Plata to temporal features of single-packet classifiers and
build the first OS-fingerprinting database that is separable across random/volatile features.
4.5.2 Data Collection
We scan our campus network (three /16 blocks) on port 80 to obtain observations
∆1, . . . ,∆n from responsive hosts S1, . . . , Sn. Since each ∆i may be random due to
kernel-scheduling peculiarities, as in Fig. 4.2(a), we persist in gathering w = 50 RTO
vectors from each host, which is typically enough to capture whatever variation ∆i may
exhibit. Additionally, to exclude lossy vectors from being included in the database, the
scanner continues until it receives w samples of the maximum length seen so far. Since
packet loss in our network is low, quick convergence follows – the average number of SYN
probes per responsive IP was 50.14.
As each Si is a public server, care needs to be exercised to not overload the target with
w back-to-back requests and cause unnecessary side-effects (e.g., rejected connections,
CPU overload). However, as it turned out, even conservative 1-second inter-SYNs delays
were too small. One such problem surfaced with certain printers, whose SYN-backlog
queue [125] was smaller than w. When the queue was full, the printers terminated the old-
est ongoing sequence of SYN-ACKs and started a new one. This caused the corresponding
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∆i to exhibit random truncation and presented difficulties in obtaining w loss-free obser-
vations. We eventually settled on delaying SYN probes by 240 seconds, i.e., double the
TCP MSL (maximum segment life), which solved the problem.
The final caveat relates to OS kernel timing of RTOs. As we speculated earlier, some
hosts use a global timer that is independent of the SYN arrival time to generate SYN-
ACKs for half-open connections. This causes the first RTO (and sometimes the remaining
ones) to be randomized in some default range. In such cases, it is important to capture
these effects in the database. We thus add random variable U to 240 seconds to avoid
SYNs synchronization with any global clocks. Our U is uniform in [0, 3] seconds, but
other options are possible as well.
Along with the scan, a separate process opens a connection to each responsive host
and attempts to download its root page over HTTP. While banner grabbing is not generally
considered reliable because any identification strings may be replaced by OS-oblivious
names (e.g., apache) or altogether removed, it works for our purpose since admins have
no incentive to obfuscate OS names behind our campus firewall, and Plata only needs a
subset of S1, . . . , Sn to be labeled. This provides a fast, repeatable process that requires
no manual intervention.
We receive SYN-ACKs from 9,879 IPs, assemble w loss-free RTO vectors from n =
9,701 hosts, and successfully complete a banner download from 9,594 of them.
4.5.3 Separating Features
Single-packet OS-fingerprinting tools use both deterministic and random features. For
each Si, we move the former into vector ui and the latter into ∆i. In general, Hershel treats
ui as volatile, which means it allows users to change TCP/IP header values without making
the OS fundamentally different. However, there is no even remotely accurate model for
distortionX applied by users to these features. We therefore limit our efforts to the better-
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Grouping RING Snacktime IRLsnack Hershel
Deterministic only 28 209 209 344
Random only 23 52 50 117
Both 39 260 257 398
Table 4.1: Database dimensions.
understood network delay jitter and its volatility. If a realistic noise model X becomes
available for ui, Plata can be used to compact duplicate hosts even further.
The simplest way to achieve separation on the deterministic features is to combine ui
with the size of RTO vector ∆i. Splitting the available hosts S1, . . . , Sn into clusters based
on the deterministic pair (ui, |∆i|) produces the first row of Table 4.1, with 28 signatures
for RING [112], 209 for Snacktime [7] and IRLsnack [55], and 344 for Hershel. Note that
hosts within each cluster have same-length RTO vectors and our next goal is to further
subdivide them into smaller groups that are (1− ǫ,X )-separable.
To decide on X , assume the objective is to achieve sufficient accuracy during Internet-
wide scanning, where each ∆i is disturbed by random queueing delays along the path
from the server back to the scanner. Due to constant SYN-ACK packet size, fixed trans-
mission/propagation delays cancel out during RTO computation. It is thus sufficient to use
a FIFO-queue simulator that adds random delay jitter θ to each measurement, ensuring
that no packets are reordered. As Hershel is fairly insensitive to the assumed model of
jitter, we use exponentially distributed queueing delays with mean 500 ms, which results
in θ being zero-mean Laplace. If better knowledge of network conditions is acquired, θ
can be modified accordingly.
We generate r = 1K random noise vectors θ1, ..., θr and add them to each observation
of ∆i, resulting in wr = 50K disturbed samples per host Si. We run Plata for each
candidate classifier using their similarity function p and compute (4.5), in which pj(δ′) =
1/w. This creates one matrix M˜ for each unique combination of deterministic features,
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Figure 4.4: Plata example.
which is fed to Plata’s separation algorithm with 1 − ǫ = 0.8. After all matrices are
compacted, we combine the surviving specimens into the final database D.
Going back to Table 4.1, the second row shows that RTO features alone allow single-
packet tools to differentiate between 23-117 stacks under this combination (ǫ,X ). Hershel
more than doubles the dimension of its nearest competitor, which stems from its more so-
phisticated model for p(δ|δ′). Combining both deterministic and random features, Hershel
ends up with 398 signatures, which is quite significant given the limited scope of the initial
scan. Due to its higher accuracy and better separation ability, the rest of this section stays
with Hershel as the underlying classifier for Plata.
To demonstrate how matrix reduction works in practice, consider five actual Windows
hosts in Fig. 4.4(a) with |∆i| = 2. While all of these OS kernels produce noisy RTOs,
there are two distinct patterns. Fig. 4.4(b) shows the result of Plata separation, which suc-
cessfully extracts both patterns (Windows Server 2003 with two different service packs)
out of the group and represents them using hosts (S3, S5).
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4.5.4 Label Clustering
Note that Plata does not specify how to assign labels to clusters {Lj}. Besides ground-
truth obtained from device owners, which may be infeasible for large decentralized net-
works, some of this information can be collected automatically. Our approach is to proceed
along this route. Recall that HTTP headers contain the "Server:" string that sometimes
identifies the version of the web server and uniquely ties it to a particular OS (e.g., Win-
dows IIS). However, in other cases, the operating system can be inferred only from the
HTML content of the page, as is the case with certain embedded devices (e.g., printers,
cameras). We thus combine the "Server:" field with the entire HTML page and perform
clustering using simhash [60], which is a well-known technique for detecting similar web-
pages. This creates 515 clustersL1, L2, . . ., which we match to d = 398 Hershel signatures
C1, . . . , Cd using the procedure in Fig. 4.3.
The final step is to perform manual verification of label sanity, determine which tags
in the HTML to use (e.g., head, title), and convert low-level software versions to the corre-
sponding OS name (e.g., IIS 7.5 to Windows Server 2008 R2). With enough coding effort
to account for the various formats, most of this can be automated [107], but we found it
easier to just show each page to a human and let them decide which of the found labels is
appropriate. Plata does this by sequentially rendering one page from each Lk and record-
ing the user’s response. Even for n → ∞, the number of unique clusters should remain
reasonably small.
Results reveal that our label clustering works quite well – 326 out of 398 signatures
(82%) receive a meaningful description. They are responsible for 98% of n = 9,701
measured hosts. Table 4.2 shows the top five most-popular signatures on our campus,
where Plata successfully shrinks the most common Windows RTO pattern from 3,803
hosts down to 1. Heavy usage of Windows (43% of all servers) and Linux (12%) is no
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Banner Hosts Deterministic features Mean RTOs
Win TTL DF TCP options MSS RST
Windows Vista / 7 / 8 / 2008 / 2012 3,803 8,192 128 1 MNWST 1,460 1, 0, 0, 1 3, 6, 12
Ubuntu / Debian / CentOS / Sci. Linux 822 5,792 64 1 MSTNW 1,460 0, 0, 0, 0 4.3, 6, 12, 24.1, 48.2
Windows 2008 R2 / 2012 394 8,192 128 1 MNWST 1,460 0, 0, 0, 0 3, 6
Ubuntu / Redhat / CentOS / SUSE 366 14,480 64 1 MSTNW 1,460 0, 0, 0, 0 1.1, 2, 4, 8, 16
HP LaserJet Series 310 11,680 64 1 MNWNNT 1,460 0, 0, 0, 0 3, 6, 12
Table 4.2: Top 5 database signatures gathered from our campus scan
(Win = window size, TTL = time to live, DF = do not fragment, MSS = max segment size, RST = reset packet features).
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surprise, but we also find a large amount of HP LaserJet printers in fifth place. The 398-
326=72 unlabeled cases belong to network elements that either fail to provide a banner or
supply one that contains no clue about the underlying OS. The latter case often happens
with extremely rare devices for which we have only one banner to analyze. If Plata is
exposed to additional data collection and user input (i.e., outside of our network), these
gaps can be eliminated. The main benefit of our framework is that only a small fraction of
n (i.e., 72/9701 = 0.7%) requires further attention.
Note that using automated banners for labeling does limit our ability to distinguish
between OS versions. For example, the two Linux signatures in Table 4.2 are likely from
different kernel versions. However, if the application requires more fine-granular labeling,
additional effort – installing each OS in a test environment or contacting the owner – is
needed in conjunction with Plata.
4.6 Optimizing Plata
While Plata works well, it bottlenecks on generating θm and recomputing p(δmi +
θm|δ
′,X ) for each of the r random noise samples. This becomes especially noticeable
in large groups, such as Windows with 3.8K hosts. Using 16 AMD Opteron cores @ 2.8
GHz and 64 GB of RAM, a parallelized C++ implementation requires over 24 hours to
compute M˜ . Although database creation is a one-time process, it is still desirable to have
faster and more scalable algorithms that can tackle larger input. We address this next.
Analyzing (4.5), there are two obvious ways to reduce complexity – lowering r and
making function p(.) faster. However, for Hershel, we can attempt to do even better – re-
place Monte-Carlo simulations with a directly evaluated model that produces the expected
probability that Si gets classified as Sj under random noise θ. The rest of the subsection
treats θ = (θ1, θ2, . . .) as a vector consisting of scalar random variables, with respect to
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which all expectations are taken. Since Mij := E[p(∆i + θ|∆j,X )] can be written as
∑
δ
∑
δ′
E[p(δ + θ|δ′,X )]pi(δ)pj(δ
′), (4.7)
construction of M in Plata requires only knowing E[p(δ + θ|δ′,X )] for two deterministic,
same-length vectors δ, δ′.
4.6.1 Closed-Form Plata-Hershel Matrix
To understand and create context for the results that follow, we briefly review how
Hershel deals with delay jitter. Assuming f(x) is the distribution (density or PMF) of
one-way jitter and em = δm− δ′m is the error term in the m-th RTO, the similarity between
two deterministic vectors is
p(δ|δ′,X ) =
|δ|∏
m=1
f(em). (4.8)
Note that (4.8) treats error values (e1, e2, . . .) as iid random observations. For the
default model of X , recall from Section 3 that Hershel uses exponential one-way delay.
This produces Laplace jitter with density f(x) = (λ/2)e−λ|x|, where parameter λ should
conservatively reflect the amount of jitter anticipated in the network during actual mea-
surement (i.e., 1/λ should upper-bound the real mean). With this in mind, our goal is to
derive the following expectation
E[p(δ + θ|δ′,X )] = E
[ |δ|∏
m=1
f(em + θm)
]
, (4.9)
where each θm is a random variable.
Given vectors δ and δ′, we are interested in how similar Hershel considers them after
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the former undergoes random modification by the network. Suppose variables (θ1, θ2, . . .)
are iid Laplace with rate µ. Note that µ may not equal λ if separation is performed for
purposes other than future scanning of the Internet. In that case, µ may be set to match
the environment in which S1, . . . , Sn are probed (e.g., 5-ms average jitter for a campus
network). Define bm = e−|em| and consider the next result.
Theorem 1. For the Hershel classifier, the expected similarity between δ + θ and δ′ is
E[p(δ + θ|δ′,X )] =
(λµ
4
)|δ| |δ|∏
m=1


gm λ 6= µ
hm λ = µ
, (4.10)
where
gm =
2(λbµm − µb
λ
m)
λ2 − µ2
, hm = b
λ
m
(
|em|+
1
λ
)
. (4.11)
Proof. Using (4.8),
E[p(δ + θ|δ′)] = E
[ |δ|∏
m=1
f(δm + θm − δ
′
m)
]
=
|δ|∏
m=1
E[f(δm + θm − δ
′
m)] (4.12)
=
(λµ
4
)|δ| |δ|∏
m=1
∫ ∞
−∞
e−λ|em+z|−µ|z|dz.
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First assume λ 6= µ. Given a constant c < 0, we get
∫ ∞
−∞
e−λ|c+z|−µ|z|dz =
∫ 0
−∞
eλ(c+z)+µzdz
+
∫ −c
0
eλ(c+z)−µzdz
+
∫ ∞
−c
e−λ(c+z)−µzdz (4.13)
=
eλc
λ+ µ
+
eµc − eλc
λ− µ
+
eµc
λ+ µ
.
When c ≥ 0, we have
∫ ∞
−∞
e−λ|c+z|e−µ|z|dz =
∫ −c
−∞
eλ(c+z)+µzdz
+
∫ 0
−c
e−λ(c+z)+µzdz
+
∫ ∞
0
e−λ(c+z)−µzdz (4.14)
=
e−µc
λ+ µ
+
e−λc − e−µc
µ− λ
+
e−λc
λ+ µ
.
Combining the two cases, notice emergence of |c|
∫ ∞
−∞
eλ|cm−z|eµ|z|dz =
e−λ|c| + e−µ|c|
λ + µ
+
e−µ|c| − e−λ|c|
λ− µ
.
For the special case λ = µ, we obtain
∫ ∞
−∞
eλ|c+z|e−λ|z|dz =
e−λ|c|
λ
+ |c|e−λ|c|
= e−λ|c|
(
|c|+
1
λ
)
. (4.15)
Simplifying using bm, we get (4.10).
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The next logical step is to investigate whether matrix M built using (4.10) matches
the Monte-Carlo version M˜ . We consider a simple scenario with |δ| = 2, δ = δ′, and
λ = µ = 10. This represents some diagonal cell Mii, i.e., similarity score of Si to itself,
for a deterministic ∆i. Setting em = 0 for all m, (4.10) produces 6.25, while Monte-Carlo
simulations yield M˜ii = 6.7. The error increases with RTO vector length and is more
difficult to predict for off-diagonal values Mij .
Further analysis uncovers that the source of this bias lies in Hershel’s assumption on
delay jitter. To illustrate this point, consider distorting a two-RTO vector δ using θ =
(θ1, θ2). From the queuing model of Hershel, consecutive Laplace jitter values can be
expressed using three iid exponential one-way delays X, Y, Z, i.e., θ1 = Y − X and
θ2 = Z − Y . While we were reasonable in arguing that X, Y, Z are independent due to
the large gaps between SYN-ACKs, the same logic unfortunately does not apply to jitter
because θ1 and θ2 share a common variable Y . For em = 0 and |δ| = 2, the correct
expectation of (4.9) is E[f(θ1)f(θ2)]. On the other hand, Theorem 1 uses Hershel to
deduce the result as E[f(θ1)]E[f(θ2)] = λ2/16. We next expand the former term and
show that it deviates from the latter for all λ.
Theorem 2. For µ = λ and em = 0, the expected Hershel similarity under dependent
two-RTO jitter (θ1, θ2) is
E[f(θ1)f(θ2)] =
29λ2
432
. (4.16)
Proof. Considering jitter dependent, we must look at three separate cases. For the first
one, define
χ1 = E[f(J1)f(J2)|X > Y,Z > Y ] (4.17)
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and notice that event X > Y,Z > Y happens with probability 1/4. Now observe
χ1 = λ
5
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
y
∫ ∞
y
e−λ(x−y)e−λ(z−y)e−λ(x+y+z)dxdzdy
= λ5
∫ ∞
0
e−3λyy2dy = λ5
2
(3λ)3
=
2λ2
27
. (4.18)
For the second case, we have
χ2 = E[f(J1)f(J2)|X < Y,Z < Y ], (4.19)
where event X < Y,Z < Y also happens with probability 1/4. This leads to
χ2 = λ
5
∫ ∞
0
∫ y
0
∫ y
0
e−λ(y−x)e−λ(y−z)e−λ(x+y+z)dxdzdy
= λ5
∫ ∞
0
eλy
∫ ∞
y
e−2λdx
∫ ∞
y
e−2λdzdy
=
λ3
4
∫ ∞
0
e−3λydy =
λ2
12
. (4.20)
The remaining two cases X > Y > Z and Z > Y > X are identical to each other.
Without loss of generality, we use the former and define
χ3 = E[f(J1)f(J2)|X > Y,Z < Y ], (4.21)
which leads to
χ3 = λ
5
∫ ∞
0
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
e−λ(x−y)e−λ(y−z)e−λ(x+y+z)dzdydx
= λ5
∫ ∞
0
e−2λx
∫ x
0
e−λyydydx
= λ3
∫ ∞
0
e−2λx(1− (1 + λx)e−λx)dx =
λ2
18
. (4.22)
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Figure 4.5: Features in Hershel (δ) and Hershel+ (a).
Combing these cases with respective weights 1/4, 1/4, and 1/2, we get the overall
expectation in (4.16).
Using λ = 10 in (4.16) produces 6.7 observed in simulations. While we succeeded in
correctly modeling Mii for two RTOs, doing the same for i 6= j and longer vectors δ is
very tedious.
4.6.2 Hershel+
We now show how the classification problem can be solved using only one-way de-
lay (OWD). This requires a new model for p(δ|δ′,X ) and additional constraints during
creation of D. For host Si, define Ai to be a random vector of SYN-ACK transmission
timestamps relative to the departure time of the first reply. Then, assuming that network
delays are negligible, the distribution of elements inside Ai can be accurately obtained at
the measurement client by subtracting the RTT of the first SYN-ACK from all observed
values.
Now suppose that the scanner finds a remote host on the Internet and obtains a vector
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of SYN-ACK arrival instances as A, which are relative to the transmission time of the
SYN. The main caveat here is that the forward SYN delay and server think time, which
we collectively call T , are not just unknown in the public Internet, but also likely non-
negligible. Consequently, the classifier must consider all options for T in its decision
whether the observed A could have been produced by some known vector Ai. Delay
randomness is handled similar to (4.7), which means that it is again sufficient to consider
only deterministic pairs of delay vectors, i.e., by conditioning on A = a = (a1, a2, . . .)
and Ai = a′ = (a′1, a′2, . . .). This is illustrated in Fig. 4.5. Supposing that Qm is the m-th
OWD from the server to the client, we have am = T + a′m +Qm.
With the new model, redefine the error as em = am−a′m and let s = minm{em} be the
largest possible value of T when a system equipped with a′ is responsible for observation
a. Then, the similarity function becomes
p(a|a′,X ) = E
[ |a|∏
m=1
fQ(em − T )
]
, (4.23)
where fQ(x) is the density of OWD from model X . Assuming fT (x) is the PDF of T , this
leads to
p(a|a′,X ) =
∫ s
0
[ |a|∏
m=1
fQ(em − x)
]
fT (x)dx. (4.24)
We apply Hershel’s exponential OWD with fQ(x) = λe−λx and additionally represent
T as a sum of two exponential variables (i.e., forward SYN delay and server think time),
which leads to fT (x) = ν2xe−νx, i.e., Erlang(2) distribution with some rate ν and mean
2/ν. The OWD classifier (4.24) is more complex than Hershel’s as it requires numerical
integration of a computationally expensive product of shifted density functions. Our next
result shows that this can be avoided through additional derivations.
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Theorem 3. The closed form for (4.24) is
p(a|a′,X ) = 1s≥0ν
2λ|a|ψ
|a|∏
m=1
e−λem , (4.25)
where 1 is an indicator variable and
ψ =


1−e−(ν−λ|a|)s(1+(ν−λ|a|)s)
(ν−λ|a|)2 |a| 6=
ν
λ
s2
2
|a| = ν
λ
. (4.26)
Proof. If s < 0, there exists m such that em − T is less than zero. Since OWD cannot
be negative, the corresponding term fQ(em − T ) = 0. Consequently, we need to consider
only s ≥ 0, in which case all em are non-negative. Substituting the densities of Q and T
into (4.24), we get
p(a|a′,X ) = 1s≥0
∫ s
0
[ |a|∏
m=1
λe−λ(em−x)
]
ν2xe−νxdx
= 1s≥0ν
2λ|a|
[ |a|∏
m=1
e−λem
]∫ s
0
xe(λ|a|−ν)xdx.
Using WolframAlpha’s integral solver [117] yields (4.25).
Replacing Hershel’s p(δ|δ′,X ) with (4.25) and keeping the rest of the method un-
changed gives rise to a technique we call Hershel+. Our next step is to verify that its
accuracy is no worse than that of Hershel even when the assumed Erlang model for T ,
which uses ν = 4 in all computation below, does not match the true distribution. To this
end, we use the simulation setup from Section 3.4, where the only new parameter is T .
In the first scenario, we keep T uniform in [0, 1] seconds, maintain zero packet loss, and
run both methods over Hershel’s original database with 116 stacks. The result is shown
Distribution of OWD Features used Hershel Hershel+
Pareto (mean = 0.5) RTO only 22.1% 24.2%
Pareto (mean = 0.1) RTO only 33.1% 33.3%
Uniform (mean = 0.5) RTO only 21.7% 22.1%
Uniform (mean = 0.5) All 99.9% 99.9%
Table 4.3: Accuracy on the Hershel database.
Distribution of T Loss Hershel Hershel+
Exponential (mean = 0.1) – 96.9% 97.6%
Pareto (mean = 0.1) – 96.9% 97.4%
Pareto (mean = 0.1) 3.8% 95.2% 95.8%
Pareto (mean = 0.1) 10% 92.3% 92.9%
Table 4.4: Accuracy on the Plata database.
in Table 4.3. As the new model only changes the RTO classifier, the most important com-
parison involves the first three rows of the table, which confirm superiority of Hershel+.
In the second scenario, we fix the OWD to be uniform in [0, 1] and use the larger Plata
database. Table 4.4 shows that Hershel+ again edges out Hershel, despite its higher uncer-
tainty related to T .
4.6.3 Closed-Form Plata-Hershel+ Matrix
Armed with the new classifier, we revisit the issue of obtaining a Plata matrix without
Monte-Carlo simulations. To model X , we disturb each Ai using a random OWD vector
V = (V1, V2, . . .), where all Vi are iid exponential with rate λ. We additionally apply
noise to the forward SYN delay and server think time, which are collectively given by
an Erlang(2) random variable W with rate ν. Note that we use λ and ν from Hershel+,
although other options are possible.
Define matrix H = (Hij) to consist of all pairwise Hershel+ similarities between the
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signatures in the database under distortion V +W . This requires computing
ζ(a, a′) := E[p(a+ V +W |a′,X )] (4.27)
and setting Hij = E[ζ(Ai, Aj)], where the second expectation is taken over random vari-
ables (Ai, Aj).
Theorem 4. Define v = (λ/2)|a|ν/4. Then,
ζ(a, a′) = v
∫ ∞
−∞
e−λ
∑
m |em+z|(1 + ν|z|)e−ν|z|dz. (4.28)
Proof. We first require the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Define Z = W − T , where W and T are Erlang(2) with rate ν. The density of
Z is then
f(z) =
ν
4
e−ν|z|(1 + ν|z|). (4.29)
Proof. Notice that W −T has the same distribution as X+Y , where X, Y are iid Laplace
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with the same rate ν. Their convolution for z ≥ 0 produces
fX+Y (z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fX(x)fY (x− z)dx
=
ν2
4
∫ ∞
−∞
e−ν|x|e−ν|x−z|dx
=
ν2
4
[∫ 0
−∞
eνxeν(x−z)dx+
∫ z
0
e−νxeν(x−z)dx
+
∫ ∞
z
e−νxe−ν(x−z)dx
]
=
ν2
4
(e−νz
2ν
+ ze−νz +
e−νz
2ν
)
=
ν2
4
(2e−νz
2ν
+ ze−νz
)
=
ν2
4
(e−νz + νze−νz
ν
)
.
Combining with the symmetric case z < 0, we get (4.29).
Now we are ready to establish Theorem 4. The general form of this expectation is
ζ(a, a′) = E
[ |a|∏
m=1
fQ(am + Vm +W − a
′
m − T )
]
= E
[ |a|∏
m=1
fQ(em + Vm +W − T )
]
= E
[ |a|∏
m=1
fQ(em + Vm + Z)
]
, (4.30)
where Z = W − T . Note that em can be negative as long as the sum em + Vm + Z ≥ 0.
Condition on Z = z and define
ζz(a, a
′) := E
[ |a|∏
m=1
fQ(em + Vm + z)
]
=
|a|∏
m=1
∫ ∞
dm
fQ(x− cm)fV (x)dx, (4.31)
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where cm = −(em+z), fV (x) = λe−λx is the density of each Vm, and the integration range
starts at dm = max(cm, 0) to ensure the terms inside the density fQ are non-negative. This
leads to
ζz(a, a
′) =
|a|∏
m=1
∫ ∞
dm
λe−λ(x−cm)λe−λxdx
=
|a|∏
m=1
λ
2
e−λ(2dm−cm). (4.32)
Since 2max(x, 0)− x = |x|, this yields
ζz(a, a
′) = (
λ
2
)|a|e−λ
∑
m |cm|. (4.33)
Unconditioning Z and recalling cm = −(em + z),
ζ(a, a′) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ζz(a, a
′)fZ(z)dz
= (
λ
2
)|a|
∫ ∞
−∞
e−λ
∑
m |em+z|fZ(z)dz, (4.34)
which leads to (4.28) after invoking Lemma 1.
Note that (4.28) can be computed by splitting the integral into |a|+2 regions such that
|z| and |em + z| are conclusively resolved as being either positive or negative. Each of
these smaller integrals expands in closed-form; however, due to the large number of terms
involved and lacking structure, this result is difficult to represent symbolically. Algorith-
mically, however, this is simple to code using a bit-vector of size |a| + 1 that keeps track
of which of the terms (z, e1 + z, e2 + z, . . .) is positive. Moving from one interval to the
next flips one bit from 0 to 1 and switches to the corresponding integral.
After verifying that (4.28) and its |a|+ 2 sub-integrals produce correct results, we run
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Plata separation over H instead of M˜ and obtain 420 signatures, out of which 79 come out
unlabeled. Recalling Table 4.1, notice that Hershel+ increases the dimension of its prede-
cessor by 22 entries, indicating a more powerful classifier. Performance improvement is
remarkable as well – the runtime reduces from over 24 hours to just 12 minutes. Added
benefits include higher accuracy of Hershel+ decisions and alleviation of uncertainty if r
is large enough to keep Monte-Carlo results convergent.
4.7 Internet Scan
We now use Hershel+ to classify every visible webserver on the Internet against the
previously constructed Plata database.
4.7.1 Classification Results
In July 2015, we sent 2.7B SYN probes on port 80 to every IP address advertised in
BGP and obtained SYN-ACK responses from 66.4M hosts. This is almost double the 37M
IPs used in the Hershel study. The scan lasted 6 hours and operated at 125K packets per
second.
Table 4.5 shows the Hershel+ output on the Internet data. We break down the result by
OS category, showing the 5 most-popular signatures in each. Not surprisingly, Linux still
dominates the webserver market. Although its top-5 signatures are separable at the feature
level, limitations of our banner-based labeling do not allow identification of the specific
version of these OSes. In second place, there is a large number of embedded devices,
mostly routers and printers. This finding agrees with those in previous measurements at
this scale [42], [55]. In third place, we combine hosts that map to a signature without a
useful banner and those with a zero probability of matching to anything in D. The former
category is responsible for 94% of these cases, where 79 "mystery" signatures in D catch
almost 12% of all Internet classification, despite being rare on our campus. Future work
will attempt to uncover their OS.
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Category OS / Device Hosts
Linux
Ubuntu / Redhat / CentOS 14, 551, 706
Ubuntu / Redhat / SUSE 2, 620, 566
Ubuntu / Debian / Redhat 2, 381, 733
Ubuntu / CentOS / SUSE 1, 831, 519
Ubuntu / Redhat / Sci. Linux 1, 413, 660
Total in category 25, 679, 480
Embedded
3Com Routers 2, 661, 835
Dell Laser / Xerox Printers 1, 985, 840
Embedded Linux 1, 869, 053
Cisco Embedded 1, 699, 418
Citrix Netscaler 1, 118, 748
Total in category 24, 447, 390
Unknown
No label in database 7, 936, 268
Zero probability of match 474, 585
Total in category 8, 410, 853
Windows
Windows 7 / 8 / 2008 / 2012 2, 186, 229
Windows XP / 2003 822, 130
Windows XP / 2000 / 2003 791, 298
Windows 2008 R2 / 2012 701, 204
Windows 2008 R2 / 2012 427, 401
Total in category 7, 124, 444
Other
FreeBSD 480, 789
FreeBSD 107, 635
Novell Netware 37, 981
Mac OSX Server 35, 613
Solaris 9 / Solaris 10 35, 375
Total in category 752, 602
Table 4.5: OS classification of the Internet dataset.
Next, there is Windows in fourth place with 7M hosts. Unlike the previous categories,
we can identify the specific type of Windows from its IIS version in the HTTP header.
While it is by far the most popular desktop OS [70], its penetration of the webserver do-
main has been lagging behind Linux. This is in contrast to our campus scan, which was
dominated by Windows. One explanation for Unix prevalence is migration of online ser-
vices to enterprise clouds, which have traditionally favored Linux installations. Another
is the possibility that Linux distributions more commonly enable a webserver in their de-
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Figure 4.6: OS popularity distributions.
fault configurations or alias more IPs to the same physical server. And yet another is a
higher percentage of Unix computers not being protected by a firewall (either corporate or
host-level).
The table ends with 752K devices (1.1% of the total) in the "other" category that in-
cludes BSD, Mac, Novell, and Solaris. Compared to our previous large-scale fingerprint-
ing effort that used scans from July 2010, the table shows that Linux and embedded have
doubled their numbers (i.e., from 13-14M to 25-26M), Windows remained pretty much
unchanged (i.e., a slight drop from 7.5M to 7.1M), and the remaining group lost 68% of
its membership (i.e., from 2.3M to 752K). In summary, 99.3% of all IPs are successfully
classified and 87.3% have a label.
4.7.2 OS Popularity and Confidence
To better understand device deployment at different scales, we next examine the distri-
bution of cluster size W for each of the 420 signatures in our database. Fig. 4.6(a) shows
the CCDF P (W > x) using the initial campus scan. This plot is a close match to Pareto
tail (x/β)−α, where α = 0.8 and β = 1. Interestingly, the bottom 40% of the signatures
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Figure 4.7: Hershel+ classification confidence.
map to a single host each. In contrast to the well-known stacks in Table 4.2, these clusters
enjoy more esoteric items such as security cameras, room-temperature controllers, UPS
(uninterruptable power supplies), tape backup, humidity sensors, and even discontinued
oscilloscopes. Fig. 4.6(b) plots the same tail for the Internet scan, which is a good match
to the Weibull distribution exp(−(x/λ)k), where k = 0.4 and λ = 45K. Each of the top-14
signatures accounts for at least 1M hosts and the top-17 are responsible for 60% of IPs.
The bottom 204 signatures match a combined 1% of the servers (i.e., 664K).
Another interesting issue is the amount of confidence with which Hershel+ selects
the best OS during classification. Assuming a is a measurement from some IP, (4.24)-
(4.25) can be used to obtain similarity score p(a|Aj ,X ) for each OS j, the highest of
which is selected as the match after normalization. Fig. 4.7(a) plots the distribution of
this probability across all 66.4M IPs. Observe that almost no classifications occur with
less than 20% likelihood and over half the hosts fit some signature with probability at
least 65%. The far end of the CDF shows 7% of the IPs with a 100% match, which are
devices with truly unique combinations of features. In the same vein, to determine if the
second-best match follows closely the top signature and how often the classifier might
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be "guessing," Fig. 4.7(b) shows the CDF for the ratio of the two highest probabilities.
In 17% of the cases, the second-best match is pretty close, i.e., within a factor of 1.2.
Afterwards, the curve sharply rises and yields over 68% of IPs with a decisive winner (i.e.,
ratio 2:1 or better).
4.8 Comparison with Nmap
Since ground-truth for millions of Internet hosts is difficult to obtain, we next perform
comparison against Nmap v6.49 [73]. During the scan, we randomly selected 1% of re-
sponsive hosts and invoked Nmap to fingerprint them as soon as the first SYN-ACK was
received. Real-time execution was needed to minimize the possibility they left the network
and other hosts appeared in their place (e.g., due to DHCP). We used Nmap’s least-verbose
mode to limit the traffic and complaints from target networks; however, this still resulted in
80 sent and 60 received packets per IP, as well as several notifications to campus network
administrators about intrusive activity coming from our subnet. The complaints identified
Nmap by name, which raises questions how often IDS tools not just detect, but drop its
traffic.
Out of 664K IPs, Nmap was successful for only 481K (i.e., 72%). To rule out host de-
parture, we verified that an overwhelming majority (99.8%) of the attempted IPs returned
at least one reply to Nmap probes. The failed cases include responses unknown to the
database and firewall obstruction of non-SYN packets. We uniformly subsampled these
481K IPs, excluded roughly 12% for which Hershel+ returned "unknown," and ended up
with 603 cross-labeled samples for further manual analysis.
4.8.1 Agreement
We first investigate how well Nmap and Hershel+ agree on the classification of the
selected subset of hosts. Comparison with Nmap is far from straightforward since its stack
names are human-created and rather fine-granular. The most detailed category in our Plata
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Category Category match String match Total
Linux 301 (98.6%) 25 (8.1%) 305
Embedded 158 (75.5%) 34 (16.2%) 209
Windows 82 (95.3%) 82 (95.3%) 86
Other 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3
Total 544 (90.2%) 144 (23.8%) 603
Table 4.6: Internet subsample classification.
database is Windows, while the majority of other hosts are marked with just the name
of the OS and/or device. Thus, it makes sense to separately consider whether Hershel+
matches the exact signature string of Nmap or just the category.
Table 4.6 shows the result of this process, where we group hosts based on Hershel+
classification. In the category match, we achieve over 98% agreement in Linux, 95% in
Windows, and 100% in "other." With embedded systems, Nmap often claims the host is
running Linux, whereas we have a specific (non-Linux) device name from the banner.
Without tedious manual effort, it is difficult to know if Nmap has been exposed to these
devices and whether it can reliably identify them. With that said, we still mark these cases
as a mismatch, which drops the agreement rate to 75%.
As for OS strings, lower numbers were expected due to the difference in how the
databases are labeled. The biggest drop occurs in Linux, where our D consists of just
distribution names (e.g., Ubuntu, Redhat, SUSE), while Nmap provides both major and
minor kernel versions (e.g., Linux 2.6.18-22). Nevertheless, there are 25 matching signa-
tures for which both methods can identify only the Linux family. For embedded systems,
Nmap produces a large variety of device names, many absent from our campus. Finally,
the Windows group keeps the same 95% consensus rate since all 82 agreed-upon cases are
exact string matches.
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Vector Win TTL DF TCP options MSS RST SYN-ACK arrival (sec) Label
D1 8,192 128 1 MNWST 1,464 1, 0, 0, 1 0.00, 2.99, 9.00, 21.00 Windows 7 / 2008 R2
S1 8,192 128 1 MNWST 1,464 1, 0, 0, 1 0.22, 3.22, 9.22, 21.22
S2 8,192 64 1 MNWST 1,460 0, 0, 0, 0 0.18, 3.17, 9.17
D2 16,384 128 0 MNWNNTNNS 1,380 0, 0, 0, 0 0.00, 2.65, 9.21 Windows 2000 / 2003
S3 16,384 128 0 MNWNNTNNS 1,460 0, 0, 0, 0 0.21, 2.67, 9.22
S4 16,384 128 0 MNWNNTNNS 1,370 0, 0, 0, 0 0.21, 3.07, 9.63
Table 4.7: Hershel+ classification and features.
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4.8.2 Disagreement
We now analyze the peculiar case of the four Windows hosts from Table 4.6 where
Nmap and Hershel+ disagree. We call these observations S1, . . . , S4. Table 4.7 shows their
features and the corresponding database signaturesD1−D2 for the Hershel+ classification.
Notice that S1 is an easy classification decision because the RTT is small (i.e., ≈ 220 ms)
and D1 matches all of its features. For S2, Hershel+ prefers the same OS, overcoming
a change in TTL/MSS and a loss of the RST packet at 21 sec. For the other two hosts,
both matching to D2, the only discrepancy is the MSS, which is a highly volatile field
that depends on the MTU. Judging from the OPT and RTO features, the accuracy of these
decisions is not in doubt.
To explain the Nmap outcome for these IPs, we need to review its classification tech-
nique. Suppose vector R = (R1, . . . , Rl) consists of indicator variables such that Ri = 1
iff probe i elicits a response from the network stack. We split R into several groups – a
regular SYN to an open port (R1), four TCP packets with extra flags (i.e., ECN, null, rain-
bow, ACK) to an open port (R2 − R5), three TCP packets to closed ports (R6 − R8), and
UDP/ICMP probes (R9−R10). For cases withRi = 1, suppose Fij records the j-th feature
of that packet, where Fij = ∅ indicates a missing optional header field. A combination of
vector R and corresponding matrix F constitutes a signature Φ = (R,F ).
Suppose a match in Ri carries weight wi and that in feature Fij some other weight wij .
Then, Nmap computes similarity between an observation Φ and a signature Φ′ = (R′, F ′)
from the database using the following
∑l
i=1(Yi1Ri=R′iwi +RiR
′
i
∑
j Zij1Fij=F ′ijwij)∑l
i=1(Yiwi +RiR
′
i
∑
j Zijwij)
, (4.35)
where variable Zij = 1 iff field j in packet i is non-empty in both the observation and
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database (i.e., Fij 6= ∅, F ′ij 6= ∅) and Yi = Ri for i ∈ [6, 8] and 1 otherwise. The last rule
ignores closed-port tests unless Φ contains a response to them. All signatures Φ′ with at
least 0.85 similarity are reported as likely matches.
This algorithm has no provisions for packet loss, which makes it increasingly unreli-
able as more probes are blocked. The issue is compounded by the usage of large weights
wi ≫ wij , which ensure that a mismatch in a feature carries little impact compared to that
in the receipt/non-receipt of a packet. As a result, presence of firewalls skews the score
towards signatures Φ′ that originally had fewer responses, regardless of their Fij . Empty
features cause Zij = 0 to remove the corresponding weight wij from consideration, grav-
itating the classifier towards results with more frequent occurrence of ∅. Finally, if the
target does not respond to a given closed-port test, i.e., Yi = 0, the denominator no longer
contains the associated weight wi. This allows Nmap to match Ri = 0 and R′i = 1 with
no penalty for 6 ≤ i ≤ 8.
Armed with this insight, consider in Table 4.8 the Nmap features of S1 − S4, as well
as their best matches – a network boot card, modem jail-break firmware, a decade-old
OpenBSD 4.3, and an ancient D-link switch – where S1 scores over 85% with both D1
and D2. From the table, notice that Nmap sampled the same SYN features as Hershel+,
meaning they contacted similar network stacks. For inexplicable reasons, the database
allows ∅ for mandatory values (e.g., Win, TTL, DF), where all four entries D1 − D4
contain at least one such case.
Based on Table 4.8, it is pretty clear that Nmap decisions are heavily influenced by the
R vector and empty fields. Indeed, iPXE/Tomato have no features Fij in common with S1,
OpenBSD 4.3 matches S2 only in three fairly generic fields TTL/DF/MSS, and D-Link
agrees with S3/S4 in just the DF bit. We thus find no evidence to suggest that Nmap
signatures D1 − D4 are statistically probable, let alone better than the Hershel+ result in
Table 4.7. In fact, D3 and S2 are conclusively different stacks judging from their ordering
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Vector R1 F11 = Win F12 = TTL F13 = DF F14 = TCP options F15 = MSS (R2, . . . , R10) Label
D1 1 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ 0000 111 00 iPXE 1.0.0+
D2 1 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ 0000 111 01 Tomato 1.28
S1 1 8,192 128 1 MNWST 1,464 0000 000 00
D3 1 ∅ 64 1 MNNSNWNNT 1,460 1000 100 11 OpenBSD 4.3
S2 1 8,192 64 1 MNWST 1,460 1000 100 11
D4 1 ∅ 64 0 ∅ ∅ 0000 111 01 D-Link DWL-624
S3 1 16,384 128 0 MNWNNTNNS 1,460 0000 000 01
S4 1 16,384 128 0 MNWNNTNNS 1,370 0000 111 01
Table 4.8: Nmap classification and features.
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Signature Subsample Total
Tomato 1.28 132 (21.8%) 105, 525 (21.9%)
OpenBSD 4.3 91 (15.0%) 64, 050 (13.3%)
D-Link DWL-624 12 (1.9%) 6, 454 (1.3%)
iPXE 1.0.0+ 6 (0.9%) 5, 723 (1.1%)
Table 4.9: Popularity of Nmap signatures.
of non-NOP TCP options (i.e., MSWT vs MWST).
From a broader perspective, Table 4.9 shows the number of hosts for which Nmap
decides that D1 − D4 exceed the 85% threshold. Remarkably, Tomato appears in 21%
of the cases and OpenBSD in 13%. These results raise questions about Nmap’s ability
to provide meaningful classification, not just in the four cases we dissected, but generally
in wide-area networks, where R is easily distorted by IDS, host-level packet filters, and
network firewalls.
4.9 Conclusion
In this section, we introduced a novel unsupervised clustering algorithm called Plata,
which can be used to separate gathered signatures according to known noise model, elim-
inate duplicates, and allow user tuning of the separability desired. We applied Plata to
a scan of our university campus, capturing 420 unique signatures, labelled them auto-
matically, and used our new automatically built database to accomplish the largest OS
fingerprinting effort ever achieved in the wild. We concluded by comparing our results
with Nmap, showing that Hershel+ classification from using just a single probe agrees
with Nmap in most cases, and provides more accurate results in cases where they do not.
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5. ITERATIVE LEARNING OF FEATURE DISTORTION
5.1 Introduction
Now that we have built a scalable classifier in Hershel+ and a framework for construct-
ing an automated database with Plata, in this section we turn our attention to solving the
existing issues remaining in our system, as well as looking at some measurement applica-
tions of our work. One point of concern is that Hershel+ has many built-in assumptions
that may be violated in practice, which in turn may affect its classification accuracy and
overall performance on such basic metrics as the fraction of the Internet running a partic-
ular stack. Our motivation is to understand these limitations and offer novel avenues for
increasing both the classification accuracy and amount of information that can be recov-
ered from responses to a SYN packet.
Assume a database of known fingerprints x = (x1, . . . ,xn) and an observation x′ =
(x′1, . . . ,x
′
m) from a large number of Internet hosts. Suppose vector α = (α1, . . . , αn)
specifies the distribution of popularity among the known OSes, i.e., αi is the fraction of
hosts using fingerprint xi. Deciding which OS generated each x′j is generally hindered
by presence of distortion during observation, which adds random delays to packets, drops
some of them, and modifies header fields.
Hershel+ relies on a-priori knowledge of not only α, but also additional parameters θ of
distortion – the probability of change in each TCP/IP feature and distributions of network
delay, packet loss, and server think time. While the underlying model in Hershel+ is more
robust to distortion than those in prior approaches [7], [112], its performance does depend
on how well α and θ can be estimated ahead of time. Unfortunately, extraction of these
parameters from prior Internet scans and Hershel+ decisions is far from simple. In fact,
using the fraction of previous classifications that went to OS i as a substitute for αi may
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lead to unstable states and inferior results compared to staying with the default parameters,
as we discovered in Section 3.
5.1.1 Contributions
As the Internet is highly heterogeneous and constantly evolving, even if (α, θ) could
be estimated by monitoring routers and/or using end-to-end measurement between strate-
gically positioned hosts (e.g., PlanetLab), it is unclear whether conditions observed in the
past or along certain paths can yield meaningful predictions about the specific network be-
ing fingerprinted (e.g., a corporate LAN is very different from the public Internet). Instead,
we argue that (α, θ) should be the output of the classifier rather than the input. Doing so
allows the unknown parameters to be customized to a specific observation x′, i.e., reflect
the OS composition of the network being analyzed and its distortion properties.
To accomplish this objective, we derive a non-parametric estimator for (α, θ) in Her-
shel+ under the theoretical framework of Expectation-Maximization (EM) [24], [41]. We
call this approach Faulds1 and show that its iterative refinement of unknown distributions,
followed by reclassification of x′, can significantly improve the accuracy of Hershel+.
Additionally, as the algorithm recovers both (α, θ), it provides important network charac-
terization results for OS popularity, as well as distributions of delay, header-modification
probabilities, and packet loss experienced by x′.
Throughout the section, we provide a combination of simulations and discussion of
the various caveats. For example, letting T be the forward latency and ∆ be the reverse
SYN-ACK delay, one of the properties of active OS fingerprinting is that it cannot observe
these variables individually. Instead, they are always coupled into a summation T + ∆
that is carried in x′. We show that under certain conditions Faulds can successfully decon-
volve these distributions without having any a-priori knowledge about them and explain
1Henry Faulds was a Scottish scientist who proposed the first usable forensic fingerprint-identification
method in 1880.
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the rationale behind this seemingly impossible act.
We perform a fresh Internet scan and show new EM-guided classification decisions of
Faulds. We not only update the OS-popularity vector α, which shows non-trivial changes
compared to Hershel+, but also provide estimated distributions of one-way return delay,
forward latency, and one-way SYN-ACK packet loss across 63.5M webservers.
5.2 Background
Characterizing Internet packet loss and delay is a long-standing problem in computer
networks [12], [25], [80], [119], where availability of realistic models can fuel protocol
development, provide theoretical insight, and improve simulations. Besides traditional
usage in congestion control (e.g., retransmission-timer tuning, stability analysis), knowl-
edge of delay/loss are important in research of many modern applications (e.g., content
distribution networks, video streaming, VoIP, cloud computing).
One particularly hard issue is estimating one-way path properties, especially at large
scale. Perhaps the simplest approach is to measure round-trip parameters [123] and then
infer their one-way counterparts using certain assumptions. However, path asymmetry and
the influence of the remote server on the measured parameter (e.g., delay in the reply) may
lead to bias in the result [47], [79], [114]. An alternative is to deploy a measurement plat-
form that allows control of both sides of a connection (e.g., PlanetLab [82], IDmaps [33],
CDNs [44], [48], [116]). Clock-synchronization issues notwithstanding [39], this leads to
accurate estimation, but requires a significant effort to build the underlying infrastructure
and extrapolate the measurements to other parts of the Internet. The final technique places
an observer inside routers that monitor ongoing connections [36]; however, this does not
make estimation any less expensive.
Other broader, but related, topics include distance measurement using coordinate sys-
tems [16], [21], [57], [72], [98], [106], involvement of DNS for estimation of round-trip
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delay/loss between remote servers [37], [54], [113], and application of EM to various
networking problems (e.g., tomography [14], [19], [99], [111], flow sampling [26], [53]).
5.3 Learning from Observation
5.3.1 General Problem
Suppose the OS database consists of n ≥ 1 known stacks (ω1, . . . , ωn), each with some
vector-valued fingerprint xi = (xi1, xi2, . . .). These contain a combination of features,
including temporal information about the SYN-ACK retransmission timer of each OS and
default header values used for incoming connections. Further assume a set of observations
x′ = (x′1, . . . ,x
′
m), where each x′j = (x′j1, x′j2, . . .) is also a vector. Note that x′ is typically
obtained by scanning the Internet and eliciting responses from every live server. For the
type of OS fingerprinting considered here, i.e., single-probe, this is done using a SYN
probe to every IP address in BGP and collection of SYN-ACKs/RSTs from the contacted
servers.
The goal of the classifier is then to determine for each x′j the most-likely fingerprint
in the database. This task is complicated by presence of distortion that randomly modifies
the original features of the system. This typically involves a change in the temporal rela-
tionship between the packets (e.g., queuing delays), removal of some features (e.g., loss
of RST packets), and rewriting of TCP headers in an effort to optimize and/or obscure the
end-system.
Define αi = p(ωi) to be the fraction of hosts with OS i and let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be
the corresponding vector. Suppose θ denotes the distribution of distortion and p(y|ωi, θ) is
the probability that the fingerprint of signature i has been changed into y under θ. On the
other hand, assume p(ωi|y, θ, α) is the probability that an observed vector y was produced
by a host running OS i, conditioned on distortion model θ and popularity α. Then, the
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classifier must determine for each j the one database entry ωi with the largest
p(ωi|x
′
j , θ, α) =
αip(x
′
j |ωi, θ)
p(x′j |θ, α)
, (5.1)
where
p(x′j|θ, α) =
n∑
ℓ=1
αℓp(x
′
j |ωℓ, θ). (5.2)
Analysis of (5.1) in our earlier sections assumed that α was uniform (i.e., αi = 1/n)
and θ was known ahead of time (e.g., exponential one-way delays with mean 500 ms).
Therefore, both αi and denominator p(x′j |θ, α) were independent of i and could be omitted
from the optimization, leaving only p(x′j |ωi, θ) as the target. In contrast, our goal here
is to estimate both α and θ dynamically as the classifier is running, which should both
increase its accuracy and yield interesting Internet-characterization results as byproduct
of classification. Before reaching this objective, a gradual build-up of formalization is
needed. This subsection deals with estimating α, the next one covers network distortion,
and the one after that focuses on modification to fixed header features.
5.3.2 EM Principles
Suppose X(α, θ) is a random variable that models the feature vector observed from a
uniformly selected system on the Internet. Note that randomness in X(α, θ) arises due to
both selection of the host and feature distortion during observation. Then, knowing the
distribution of X(α, θ) allows us to write a set of (generally non-linear) equations
P (X(α, θ) = yℓ) = lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
j=1
1x′
j
=yℓ = p(yℓ|θ, α), (5.3)
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i.e., one equation for each unique vector yℓ from the domain of X(α, θ). Extraction of α
and θ from (5.3) commonly involves the Expectation-Maximization (EM) method, which
is a technique that solves this system using fixed-point iteration [24], [41]. At every step t,
it maximizes the expected log-likelihood function conditioned on the parameters obtained
during the previous iteration t− 1.
Assuming (5.3) is identifiable (i.e., each combination (α, θ) produces a different dis-
tribution for X(α, θ)), EM can accurately recover the unknown parameters [118]. Identi-
fiability is equivalent to (5.3) having a unique solution (α, θ) for any valid distribution of
observations, which is a strong condition; however, EM is also usable in partially identifi-
able cases where (α, θ) is a locally-stable maximum for which common-sense knowledge
about the system allows selection of the initial state in close-enough proximity. If not,
multiple restarts and/or other heuristics (e.g., simulated annealing) can be deployed as
well.
Stability, convergence, and numerical computation of EM under multiple fixed points
is a topic beyond our scope, but it should be noted that as long as the number of non-
redundant equations is larger than the number of unknown variables, EM works well for
many problems in practice.
5.3.3 Fingerprint Popularity
For now, we treat p(x′j |ωi, θ) as a black-box classifier (e.g., Snacktime, Hershel, Her-
shel+), which does not attempt to estimate θ, and focus on determining α. This is the
simplest (and only) case where (5.3) forms a linear system around the unknown parame-
ters. It has a unique solution as long as the rank of the matrix with elements Aiℓ = p(yℓ|ωi)
is n.
Throughout the section, superscripts applied to parameters refer to the iteration number
during which they are estimated, e.g., αti approximates αi during step t. Now notice that a
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sensible estimate of popularity for OS i is the average probability with which observations
map to this fingerprint, conditioned on the previous estimate of popularity, i.e.,
αt+1i =
1
m
m∑
j=1
p(ωi|x
′
j, θ, α
t). (5.4)
Note that this is markedly different from updating the popularity vector using the frac-
tion of classification decisions that go to each OS, which is known as hard EM and com-
monly used in clustering algorithms such as k-means [49]. In fact, all previous fingerprint-
ing tools [7], [10], [73], [120], [122] can be viewed as performing one iteration of hard
EM, i.e., outputting the fraction of classifications that belong to each OS ωi as an estimate
of its popularity αi.
It is not difficult to see that for m → ∞, fixed points of recurrence (5.4) are solutions
to (5.3). Additionally, there is a stronger result. While it is fairly well-known, its proof
methodology is needed for later parts of the section.
Theorem 5. For a classifier with fixed θ, (5.4) represents the EM algorithm for recovering
the popularity vector α.
Proof. For a given set of observations x′ = (x1, . . . ,xm), define the likelihood function of
α with respect to observation x′ as
p(x′|θ, α) :=
m∏
j=1
p(x′j|θ, α) =
m∏
j=1
n∑
i=1
αip(x
′
j |ωi, θ). (5.5)
Direct computation of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for p(x′|θ, α) is
often impossible due to the complex shape of the function. Instead, EM introduces hidden
variables, which help simplify (5.5), and applies maximization to the expected likelihood
function, conditioned on the current estimate of unknown parameters. To this end, define
hidden variables z = (z1, . . . , zm) to specify which OS produced each observation x′j .
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Note that the dataset of pairs ((x′1, z1), . . . , (x′m, zm)) is called complete, as opposed to
just x′, which is incomplete. Then, the complete likelihood function is given by
p(x′, z|θ, α) :=
m∏
j=1
p(x′j , zj |θ, α) =
m∏
j=1
p(x′j|zj , θ)p(zj|α)
=
m∏
j=1
αzjp(x
′
j|ωzj , θ). (5.6)
It is often more convenient to work with summations, in which case the above is re-
placed with
log p(x′, z|θ, α) =
m∑
j=1
(logαzj + log p(x
′
j|ωzj , θ))
=
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(logαi + cij)1zj=i, (5.7)
where cij := log p(x′j |ωi, θ) is a constant that can eventually be removed from optimization
since it does not depend on α. Now, the E-step takes the expectation of (5.7) with respect
to z, conditioned on the previous values αt and the available observations, producing
Q(α|αt) := Ez[log p(x
′, z|θ, α)|x′, θ, αt]
=
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(logαi + cij)E[1zj=i|x
′, θ, αt]
=
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(logαi + cij)β
t
ij, (5.8)
where
βtij := p(ωi|x
′
j , θ, α
t) =
αtip(x
′
j |ωi, θ)∑n
ℓ=1 α
t
ℓp(x
′
j|ωℓ, θ)
. (5.9)
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The M-step maximizes (5.8) with respect to the unknown parameter α and entails
solving
∂Q(α|αt)
∂αi
= 0. (5.10)
Note that we can reduce the number of unknown variables using αn = 1 −
∑n−1
i=1 αi,
which yields for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1
m∑
j=1
(βtij
αi
−
βtnj
αn
)
= 0. (5.11)
Defining c =
∑m
j=1 β
t
nj/αn, we get
αi =
1
c
m∑
j=1
βtij . (5.12)
From normalization
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, it follows that c must be m and that additionally
(5.12) applies to i = n. We therefore get (5.4).
5.3.4 Discussion
We now address the question of whether (5.4) is sufficient for achieving good classifi-
cation on its own and how much of the accuracy depends on knowing the exact distortion
model θ. If the majority of the benefit is already obtained from recovering α, the extra
computational cost and modeling effort involved in estimating θ may be unnecessary. For
discussion purposes, we use a set of toy databases that allow simple demonstration of the
intended effects. Note that the same conclusions apply to larger datasets, but finding the
corresponding scenarios may be more time-consuming.
To accomplish this, we use the simulation setup described in Section 3.4. For the
scenario we call S1, there are four different cases for the distribution of foward/reverse
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Case Forward latency One-way delay Loss
Distribution Mean Distribution Mean
S11 Erlang(2) 0.5 Exp 0.5 0.038
S12 Pareto 0.5 Pareto 0.5 0.5
S13 Reverse exp 1.5 Erlang(2) 0.5 0.1
S14 Pareto 0.1 Uniform 0.1 0.5
Table 5.1: Network distortion in scenario S1.
delays and packet-loss probability. These are shown in Table 5.1 and discussed in more
detail next.
The first row matches exactly the assumed parameters θ in Hershel+. The second row
uses Pareto delays with mean 500 ms and 50% loss, emulating highly volatile network
conditions. The next row uses a shifted reverse-exponential forward latency with CDF
e−λ(2−x), defined for −∞ < x ≤ 2, which tests contrary-to-intuition examples where
larger delays are more likely than smaller. We employ λ = 2 and truncate this distribution
at zero, obtaining the average SYN delay of 1.5 sec. The last case in the table exam-
ines smaller average delays than the assumed model θ in Hershel+, but couples it with
substantial loss.
Our first database D1 contains truncated signatures of Linux 3.2 (ω1), Windows Server
2003 (ω2), and Novell Netware (ω3). We retain the first two retransmission timeouts
(RTOs), remove all fixed header features, and obtain the fingerprints in Figure 5.1(a). Note
that these Linux and Windows signatures are pretty close to each other, albeit not identical;
however, they are quite different from Novell. The first three distortions S11−S13 applied
to this database are illustrated in the remaining subfigures, where we show 200 points per
plot and remove observations with lost packets.
Define ρt to be the fraction of correct classifications for a given method during iteration
t, where t =∞ represents the convergence point of the underlying estimator (usually 20-
40 iterations). If the method does not perform iteration, only ρ1 is meaningful. We consider
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Figure 5.1: Database and distorted observations.
three techniques – Hershel+, hard EM with multiple iterations, and soft EM in (5.4), all
using the same function p(x′j|ωi, θ) and starting from uniform popularity α0i = 1/n. Note
that the former two methods estimate α using
αt+1i =
1
m
m∑
j=1
1argmaxi p(ωi|dj ,θ,αt)=i. (5.13)
Results of this process with m = 218 observations are shown in Table 5.2. In the
first row, Hershel+ performs quite well, achieving ρ1 = 67%. Since Novell Netware is
an easy-to-separate signature from the other two, Hershel+ recovers α3 pretty accurately;
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however, it is utterly confused about the frequency of the other two stacks. Applying hard
EM increases accuracy, but full reconstruction of α still proves difficult. Application of
(5.4) solves this issue.
Swapping (α1, α2), the second simulation in Table 5.2 shows that Hershel+ is essen-
tially guessing between Linux and Windows, while hard EM is misled into divergence,
where it drops accuracy from 48% to 6%. While (5.4) is immune to divergence in this
case, its estimate of α suffers from non-negligible errors. The next two cases in the table
are even more difficult. They show that EM can be driven into inferior states when the
assumed θ greatly deviates from that of the underlying network. In fact, application of
(5.4) not only fails to obtain vectors α that resemble the true distribution, but also harms
performance of the system, i.e., ρ∞ ≪ ρ1.
It is interesting that hard-EM techniques, universally used in prior work [7], [10], [73],
[120], [122], may generally be unsuitable for characterizing the fraction of hosts running
each OS, especially if α is highly skewed. Additionally, EM iteration is meaningful only
when θ is either known a-priori, or can be accurately extracted from the collected obser-
vations. We investigate the latter direction next.
5.4 Network Features
5.4.1 Distortion Model
Our goal in this subsection is to estimate unknown distortion parameters θ inside
p(x′j |ωi, θ). Let features xi = (di,ui) consist of network components (i.e., delays di)
and user-modified header values (i.e., ui). Since our classification assumes that distortion
is applied to each subvector independently, it follows that
p(x′j |ωi, θ) = p(d
′
j |ωi, θd)p(u
′
j |ωi, θu), (5.14)
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Case α Hershel+ Hard EM EM in (5.4)
ρ1 α1 ρ∞ α∞ ρ∞ α∞
S11 0.90 0.67 0.59 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.89
0.05 0.35 0.00 0.06
0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
S12 0.05 0.48 0.45 0.06 0.98 0.89 0.11
0.90 0.41 0.00 0.82
0.05 0.12 0.02 0.07
S13 0.90 0.45 0.37 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.11
0.05 0.51 0.88 0.79
0.05 0.12 0.11 0.10
S14 0.3 0.60 0.65 0.33 0.97 0.34 0.81
0.6 0.23 0.00 0.13
0.1 0.12 0.03 0.05
Table 5.2: Classification results in D1.
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Figure 5.2: Delay features.
where θd, θu are the network/user distortion models, respectively. Each of them contains
multiple PMFs (probability mass functions) that we elaborate on below. Since in this
subsection we consider only the network component, we assume that p(u′j |ωi, θu) = 1 for
all i, j, i.e., all observed user features are the same and thus perfectly match all fingerprints.
To understand the notation involved in expanding the first factor in (5.14), we present
a re-illustration of RTOs in Figure 5.2, where a host with network signature di generates
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an observation d′j . Measurement begins with a random forward latency Tj , which has
some unknown distribution fT (τ) = P (Tj = τ). This includes the time needed for the
SYN packet to reach the server and for it to process the request. Along the return path,
one-way delays (∆j1,∆j2, . . .) are iid random variables with another unknown distribution
f∆(δ) = P (∆jr = δ). In practice, Tj and ∆jr are continuous variables, but it is convenient
to discretize them into small bins and directly work with PMFs.
Database feature vectors di consist of departure timestamps from the server, where
di1 = 0 for all i. Note that di,r+1 − dir is the r-th retransmission timeout (RTO) of the
stack, which is what we considered in Hershel. However Hershel+ switched to usage of
absolute timestamps dir as it identified these as having certain modeling advantages (i.e.,
independence between delays after conditioning on Tj), and we retain this approach. To
handle packet loss, assume that γj is a random vector that maps the received packets in
observation j to their order on the server, i.e., γj(r) = k means that the r-th received
packet was originally in position k. In Figure 5.2, for example, we have γj = (1, 3). Then,
if the j-th observation comes from a system with fingerprint ωi, it follows that
d′jr = Tj + d
′
i,γj(r)
+∆jr, r = 1, 2, . . . , |d
′
j|. (5.15)
As in our earlier sections, we keep the assumption of no reordering due to the large
spacing between the packets (often several seconds), which implies γj(r + 1) > γj(r).
Letting Γ(i, j) be the set of all monotonic loss vectors that start with |di| packets and
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finish with |d′j |, the Hershel+ network classifier can be summarized by
p(d′j |ωi, θd) =
∑
τ
fT (τ)p(d
′
j |ωi, τ, θd)
=
∑
τ
fT (τ)
∑
γ∈Γ(i,j)
pi(γ)p(d
′
j|ωi, τ, γ, θd)
=
∑
τ
fT (τ)
∑
γ∈Γ(i,j)
pi(γ)
|d′j |∏
r=1
f∆(d
′
jr − τ − di,γ(r)), (5.16)
where pi(γ) is the probability to observe loss pattern γ under |di| transmitted packets. To
avoid clutter, we omit here the formulas for handling random signatures di in Hershel+,
which require an extra summation over all possible sub-OSes and normalization by the
corresponding weights, but keep this functionality in the code. For lack of a better as-
sumption, Hershel+ uses binomial pi(γ), Erlang(2) fT (τ), and exponential f∆(δ), all with
some fixed parameters. Since θd encapsulates the set of these distributions, our next goal
is to recover them using EM iteration.
5.4.2 Intuition
We start with a heuristic explanation of the proposed update formulas, which is fol-
lowed by a more rigorous treatment. Recall that f tT (τ) is an estimate of P (Tj = τ) during
iteration t. Then, one obvious approach is to set this value to the average probability
that each observation j has experienced a forward latency τ , conditioned on the previous
estimates of unknown parameters, i.e.,
f t+1T (τ) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
P (Tj = τ |d
′
j , θ
t
d, α
t). (5.17)
Next, each database signature with k original packets admits 2k−1 unique loss patterns
γ, where k goes as high as kmax = 21. Estimating the probability pi(γ) for each possi-
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ble option γ is likely to produce too many unknown variables in (5.3) and lead to poor
convergence of EM. Instead, suppose that all
(
k
ℓ
)
patterns of losing ℓ packets out of k are
equally likely and define the probability of this event to be qk(ℓ), where k = 1, 2, . . . , kmax.
The resulting reduction in the number of unknown variables is significant – from roughly
2kmax+1 = 4M to just kmax(kmax − 1)/2 = 210. Despite its simplicity, the framework
of using qk(ℓ) allows quite a bit more general scenarios than the traditional iid Bernoulli
model we used in Section 3 and 4.
To update distribution qk(ℓ), our approach involves computing the probability that ob-
servations experienced loss of ℓ packets out of k transmitted, normalized by the probability
that the original host sent k packets in the first place. To express this mathematically, de-
fine Yj to be the number of SYN-ACKs originated by the host in observation j. Then, we
get
qt+1k (ℓ) =
∑m
j=1 P (Yj = k|θ
t
d, α
t)1|d′j |=k−ℓ∑m
j=1 P (Yj = k|θ
t
d, α
t)1|d′j |≤k
, (5.18)
from which the estimated probability of pattern γ can be expressed as
pti(γ) =
qt|di|(|di| − |γ|)(
|di|
|γ|
) . (5.19)
Finally, updates to PMF f t∆(δ) involve computing the probability that one-way delay of
each received packet equals δ, normalized by the total number of packets collected during
the scan, i.e.,
f t+1∆ (δ) =
∑m
j=1
∑|d′j |
s=1 P (∆js = δ|d
′
j, θ
t
d, α
t)∑m
j=1 |d
′
j|
. (5.20)
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5.4.3 Analysis
To make the framework outlined above usable, our next task is to expand it into an
explicit recurrence using the distributions contained in θtd, i.e., (f tT , f t∆, qtk). Let
δijτγr = d
′
jr − τ − di,γ(r) (5.21)
be the one-way delay ∆jr conditioned on Tj = τ , loss pattern γ, signature ωi, and obser-
vation j. For brevity of notation, suppose
∑
ijτγs refers to five nested summations, where
i goes from 1 to n, j rolls from 1 to m, τ moves over all bins of the PMF fT (τ), γ iterates
over all monotonic loss vectors in Γ(i, j), and s travels from 1 to |d′j |. If some of the vari-
ables are absent from the subscript, the corresponding sums are omitted from the result.
With this in mind, define
ptijτγ := α
t
if
t
T (τ)p
t
i(γ)
|d′j |∏
r=1
f t∆(δijτγr), (5.22)
βtijτγ := p(ωi, τ, γ|d
′
j, θ
t
d, α
t) =
ptijτγ∑
iτγ p
t
ijτγ
(5.23)
and consider the next result.
Theorem 6. Under network distortion, estimators (5.4), (5.17), (5.18), and (5.20) can be
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written as
αt+1i =
1
m
∑
jτγ
βtijτγ, (5.24)
f t+1T (τ) =
1
m
∑
ijγ
βtijτγ, (5.25)
qtk(ℓ) =
∑
ijτγ β
t
ijτγ1|d′j |=k−ℓ,|di|=k∑
ijτγ β
t
ijτγ1|d′j |≤|di|=k
, (5.26)
f t∆(δ) =
∑
ijτγs β
t
ijτγ1δijτγs=δ∑
j |d
′
j|
. (5.27)
Proof. We start with the recurrence on α. Keeping distortion limited to network features,
(5.4) becomes
αt+1i =
1
m
m∑
j=1
αtip(d
′
j|ωi, θ
t
d)
p(d′j |θ
t
d, α
t)
.
With the help of (5.16), we get
p(d′j |ωi, θ
t
d) =
∑
τγ
f tT (τ)p
t
i(γ)
|d′j |∏
r=1
f t∆(δijτγr), (5.28)
which leads to
αtip(d
′
j |ωi, θ
t
d) =
∑
τγ
pijτγ (5.29)
and, leveraging (5.2) for the denominator of (5.28),
αt+1i =
1
m
m∑
j=1
∑
τγ p
t
ijτγ∑
iτγ p
t
ijτγ
=
1
m
∑
jτγ
βtijτγ. (5.30)
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Moving on to the forward latency, notice that (5.17) becomes
f t+1T (τ) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
p(d′j |τ, θ
t
d, α
t)p(τ |θtd)
p(d′j |θ
t
d, α
t)
=
1
m
m∑
j=1
∑
i α
t
ip(d
′
j |ωi, τ, θ
t
d)f
t
T (τ)
p(d′j|θ
t
d, α
t)
=
1
m
m∑
j=1
∑
iγ p
t
ijτγ∑
iτγ p
t
ijτγ
=
1
m
∑
ijγ
βtijτγ. (5.31)
Next, the probability that the host in observation j sent k packets is
P (Yj = k|θ
t
d, α
t) =
n∑
i=1
p(ωi|d
′
j , θ
t
d, α
t)1|di|=k
=
n∑
i=1
αtip(d
′
j|ωi, θ
t
d, α
t)1|di|=k
p(d′j |θ
t
d, α
t)
. (5.32)
Using this, the numerator of (5.18) expands to
m∑
j=1
∑
i α
t
ip(d
′
j |ωi, θ
t
d, α
t)1|d′j |=k−ℓ,|di|=k
p(d′j |θ
t
d, α
t)
=
∑
ijτγ
βtijτγ1|d′j |=k−ℓ,|di|=k. (5.33)
Applying the same logic to the denominator of (5.18), we get (5.26). Finally, updates
to one-way delay admit the following interpretation
P (∆js = δ|d
′
j, θ
t
d, α
t) =
∑
iτγ p
t
ijτγ1δijτγs=δ
p(d′j |θ
t
d, α
t)
=
∑
iτγ
βijτγ1δijτγs=δ, (5.34)
which is a sum of match probabilities over all signatures, forward latencies, and loss pat-
terns that result in one-way delay δ in the s-th received packet. Adding the two summations
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over j, s and dividing by the total number of observed packets, we get (5.27).
While the result of Theorem 6 may appear daunting due to the number of nested sum-
mations, its implementation in practice can be done with little extra overhead compared
to Hershel+. Specifically, usage of (5.16) in (5.1) for all i, j already requires five nested
loops. In the inner-most loop of that algorithm, (5.27) adds one increment to a hash ta-
ble that maintains the PMF of one-way delay. Updates in (5.24)-(5.26) are performed
much less frequently and, in comparison, consume negligible computation time. The only
caveat is that Hershel+ can be optimized to remove the outer summation in (5.16) when
fT is Erlang(2) and f∆ is exponential, as we described in Section 4.6.2. This approach, on
the other hand, requires a hash-table lookup for both distributions. This makes its single
iteration similar in speed to unoptimized Hershel+.
Theorem 7. Iteration (5.24)-(5.27) is the EM algorithm for recovering (θd, α).
Proof. Assume Hj = (zj , Tj , γj) are the hidden variables that specify for observation
j its true OS, forward latency, and loss pattern, respectively. Further suppose H =
(H1, . . . , Hm) is the collection of hidden variables for the entire measurement. Then,
the complete likelihood function is given by
p(d′, H|θd, α) :=
m∏
j=1
p(d′j , H|θd, α)
=
m∏
j=1
p(d′j |Hj, θd, α)p(Hj|θd, α), (5.35)
where
p(d′j |Hj, θd, α) =
|d′j |∏
r=1
f∆(d
′
jr − τj − dzj ,γj(r)) (5.36)
p(Hj|θd, α) = αzjfT (Tj)pzj (γj). (5.37)
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Define
pijτγ = αifT (τ)pi(γ)
|d′j |∏
r=1
f∆(d
′
jr − τ − di,γ(r)). (5.38)
Following the proof of Theorem 5, the log-likelihood expands to
log p(d′, H|θd, α) :=
m∑
j=1
log(pzj ,j,Tj,γj)
=
m∑
j=1
∑
iτγ
log(pijτγ)1zj=i,Tj=τ,γj=γ . (5.39)
The expected log-likelihood function is then given by
Q(θd, α|θ
t
d, α
t) =
∑
ijτγ
log(pijτγ)p(ωi, τ, γ|d
′
j, θ
t
d, α
t)
=
∑
ijτγ
log(pijτγ)β
t
ijτγ. (5.40)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to αi and fT (τ), we get a set of equations similar
to (5.10)-(5.11). Their solution is trivially given by (5.24)-(5.25). A more interesting case
is the loss PMF. Using substitution
qk(k − 1) = 1−
k−2∑
ℓ=0
qk(ℓ), (5.41)
in (5.40), we get for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 2 that
∂Q(θd, α|θ
t
d, α
t)
∂qk(ℓ)
=
∑
ijτγ
1|d′j |=k−ℓ,|di|=k
qk(ℓ)/
(
k
ℓ
) βtijτγ
−
∑
ijτγ
1|d′j |=1,|di|=k
qk(k − 1)
βtijτγ. (5.42)
109
Case ρ1 ρ∞ α∞
S11 0.67 0.95 0.90, 0.05, 0.05
S12 0.48 0.91 0.05, 0.90, 0.05
S13 0.45 0.95 0.90, 0.05, 0.05
S14 0.60 0.85 0.30, 0.60, 0.10
Table 5.3: Classification results of network EM in D1.
Setting c to be the second summation in (5.42) and equating the derivative to zero, we
get
qk(ℓ) =
1
c
∑
ijτγ
1|d′j |=k−ℓ,|di|=k
(
k
ℓ
)
βtijτγ. (5.43)
Since the PMF qk must add up to 1, it follows that
c =
k−1∑
ℓ=0
∑
ijτγ
1|d′
j
|=k−ℓ,|di|=k
(
k
ℓ
)
βtijτγ
=
∑
ijτγ
1|d′j |≤k,|di|=k
(
k
ℓ
)
βtijτγ. (5.44)
Using this in (5.43) and canceling (k
ℓ
)
yields (5.26). Note that derivation of (5.27) is
very similar. We omit it for brevity.
5.4.4 Discussion
We revisit earlier simulations on dataset D1, run (5.24)-(5.27) over the same input, and
show the result in Table 5.3. Compared to Table 5.2, the derived EM estimator significantly
improves the accuracy of classification and vector α, especially in the bottom two rows.
Note that S12 and S14 contain 43% of the observations with just one packet, i.e., zero RTOs.
In methods that rely on RTO, these samples would be either discarded as impossible to
classify or assigned to a uniformly random signature. In contrast, (5.24)-(5.27) manages
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Figure 5.3: Recovery of delay parameters in D1.
to do much better because it learns distributions (fT , f∆, α) and makes the best decision
possible under these difficult conditions. The accuracy of estimated delay distributions is
shown in Figure 5.3. With the exception of noise at the points of discontinuity of each
density, functions f∞T , f∞∆ match the true parameters quite well.
Recalling (5.15), where Tj +∆jr are always measured together, it may not be obvious
how T can be separated from ∆ and why the result in Figure 5.3 is possible. Indeed, this
is reminiscent of the classical deconvolution problem: given observations {Xi + Yi}mi=1,
where Xi ∼ FX(x) and Yi ∼ FY (x) are iid, determine the individual distributions FX , FY .
Deconvolution is generally unsolvable unless either FX or FY is known ahead of time.
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Case Delay fT , f∆ q3 q4
S21 Same as S12 BinT(3, 0.3) BinT(4, 0.3)
S22 Same as S13 BinT(3, 0.7) BinT(4, 0.7)
S23 Same as S12 BinT(3, 0.1) BinT(4, 0.8)
S24 Same as S12 RevBin(3, 0.1) RevBin(4, 0.1)
Table 5.4: Network parameters of scenario S2.
While our problem is similar, there is a crucial difference – EM can see the same value
Tj coupled with multiple instances of ∆jr, for r = 1, 2, . . . , |d′j |. As long as qk(k − 1) <
1 (i.e., packet loss leaves at least two packets in enough observations) and m → ∞,
deconvolution is possible in our setting, but up to a location shift, i.e., one of the estimated
distributions may be shifted left by a constant and the other right by the same amount. If
we know that one of them starts at zero, it is possible to determine the shift after the fact.
Furthermore, if both estimated densities f∞T , f∞∆ already begin at zero, no correction is
needed. This is the case in Figure 5.3 and later in our Internet scan.
Since all signatures in D1 had three packets, it was easy to figure out the number of
them lost in each d′j , which led to q∞k being perfectly accurate, regardless of whether (5.26)
was used or not. In a more interesting database, which we call D2, Linux is augmented
with a fourth packet that follows after a 3-second RTO. To experiment with different loss
patterns, define BinT(k, p) to be a binomial distribution truncated to the range [0, k − 1].
Since the loss of all k packets cannot be observed, we avoid generating this case in the
simulator. Additionally, suppose RevBin(k, p) is the reverse binomial distribution that has
the following property: if X ∼ BinT(k, p) and Y = k − 1 −X , then Y ∼ RevBin(k, p).
With this in mind, consider scenario S2 in Table 5.4. The first two rows have iid loss at
30% and 70%, respectively. The next case applies 10% loss to signatures with 3 packets
(i.e., Windows, Novell) and 80% loss to those with 4 (i.e., Linux). The final row uses
reverse-binomial loss for all ωi.
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Case α Hershel+ EM α, fT , f∆ full EM
ρ1 α1 ρ∞ α∞ ρ∞ α∞
S21 0.90 0.76 0.68 0.70 0.63 0.91 0.90
0.05 0.25 0.31 0.05
0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
S22 0.90 0.42 0.33 0.14 0.10 0.92 0.90
0.05 0.38 0.88 0.05
0.05 0.29 0.02 0.05
S23 0.90 0.45 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.97 0.90
0.05 0.47 0.84 0.05
0.05 0.19 0.10 0.05
S24 0.90 0.45 0.36 0.10 0.06 0.90 0.90
0.05 0.46 0.90 0.05
0.05 0.18 0.04 0.05
Table 5.5: Classification results in D2.
Table 5.5 shows classification results for three methods – Hershel+, the partial EM
framework without loss updates (5.26), and the full algorithm from Theorem 6. Not sur-
prisingly, Hershel+ again struggles to recover α, even when its classification accuracy is
pretty high. Omission of (5.26) does create challenges for partial EM, where in all four
cases it produces worse results than Hershel+. On the other hand, the full algorithm im-
proves accuracy and delivers the exact α despite complex underlying network conditions.
The corresponding distributions q∞k are shown in Table 5.6. They all match ground-truth
qk with high precision.
Besides aiding fingerprinting, ability of EM to estimate one-way distributions of delay
and loss (conditioned on at least one packet surviving) may open up interesting angles to
Internet measurement and help with end-to-end sampling of these parameters in scenarios
that do not have a suitable infrastructure of cooperating receivers.
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Case Vector k = 3 k = 4
S21 qk (0.35, 0.45, 0.19) (0.24, 0.41, 0.27, 0.08)
q∞k (0.35, 0.45, 0.19) (0.24, 0.41, 0.27, 0.08)
S22 qk (0.04, 0.29, 0.67) (0.01, 0.10, 0.35, 0.54)
q∞k (0.04, 0.29, 0.67) (0.01, 0.10, 0.35, 0.54)
S23 qk (0.73, 0.24, 0.03) (0.00, 0.04, 0.26, 0.69)
q∞k (0.73, 0.24, 0.03) (0.00, 0.04, 0.26, 0.69)
S24 qk (0.03, 0.24, 0.73) (0.00, 0.05, 0.29, 0.66)
q∞k (0.03, 0.24, 0.73) (0.00, 0.05, 0.29, 0.66)
Table 5.6: Recovery of loss PMFs in D2.
5.5 User Features
5.5.1 Distortion Model
Our goal in this subsection is to expand the second factor in (5.14) and develop an
estimator for its distortion model. This is done in isolation from the network features, i.e.,
using p(d′j|ωi, θd) = 1 for all i, j. Assume b ≥ 1 user features, where each observation
j provides a constant-length vector u′j = (u′j1, . . . , u′jb). These include the TCP window
size, IP TTL (Time to Live), IP DF (Do Not Fragment flag), TCP MSS (Maximum Seg-
ment Size), and TCP options, for a total of b = 5 integer-valued fields. Since RST features
depend on network loss, we delay their discussion until the next subsection. Note that
each field may be allocated a different number of bits and the number of available options
av for u′jv may depend on v.
Modification to user features, which we model with a set of distributions θu, can be
accomplished by manually changing default OS parameters (e.g., editing the registry),
using specialized performance-tuning software, requesting larger/smaller receiver kernel
buffers while waiting on sockets (i.e., using setsockopt), and deploying network/host
scrubbers [20], [84], [90], [101], [115] whose purpose is to obfuscate the OS of protected
machines. Besides intentional feature modification, distortion θu may also accommodate
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unknown network stacks that build upon a documented OS, but change some of its features
(e.g., new versions of embedded Linux customized to a particular device).
Prior work in OS fingerprinting is mostly rule-based, and omits formally modeling
user volatility entirely [7], [73], [120], [122]. In Hershel, we introduced a model which
assumed that uiv can stay the same with some probability πv and change to another integer
with probability 1−πv. While this approach works well in certain cases, it has limitations.
Besides the fact that πv is generally unknown, binary decision-making fails to create a
distribution over the available choices. For example, πv = 0.9 assumes that each of the
65,534 non-default window sizes may occur with probability 0.1. Instead, a more balanced
approach would be to assume a uniform distribution over the distortion possibilities and
assign them probability (1 − πv)/(av − 1). Second, it is likely that certain devices are
modified less frequently than others (e.g., due to firmware restrictions in printers) and in-
dividual distortions are OS-specific, which implies that πv should depend on i. Finally, the
existing methods have no way of tracking the location and probability mass of distortion,
which does not have to be uniform in practice (e.g., non-default window size 57 bytes is
less likely than 64K).
To overcome these problems, assume that πiv(y) is the probability that feature v of OS
i is modified to become y, which gives rise to a set of nb distributions that comprises our
user-distortion model θu. Then, the proposed classifier can be summarized by
p(u′j |ωi, θu) =
b∏
v=1
πiv(u
′
jv), (5.45)
where modification to features is assumed to be independent. Note that doing otherwise
does not appear tractable at this point (i.e., estimation of covariance matrices produces too
many variables for EM to handle).
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5.5.2 Iteration
We begin by discussing under what conditions the problem is identifiable, despite hav-
ing a large number of unknown distributions. Assume φiv := πiv(uiv) is the probability
with which feature v stays the same for OS i. Because we do not know ahead of time the
reasoning of the user for changing the features or the new values of modified fields, the
estimation problem for πiv is unsolvable unless enough of the probability mass remains at
the original location, i.e., φiv is above some threshold. From common sense, it is likely
that φiv ≥ 0.5 holds among the general population of Internet hosts; however, EM con-
verges under even weaker conditions – as long as φiv is the largest value in each PMF πiv.
Coupling this with an initial state that satisfies the same constraint leads to discovery of a
unique solution in (5.3).
We define the estimator for user distortion as the probability to observe y in feature v
across all matches against OS i, i.e.,
πt+1iv (y) =
∑m
j=1 p(ωi|u
′
j , θ
t
u, α
t)1u′jv=y∑m
j=1 p(ωi|u
′
j, θ
t
u, α
t)
. (5.46)
To simplify this expression, define
ptij := α
t
ip(u
′
j |ωi, θ
t
u, α
t) = αti
b∏
v=1
πtiv(u
′
jv), (5.47)
βtij := p(ωi|u
′
j , θ
t
u, α
t) =
ptij∑n
i=1 p
t
ij
. (5.48)
The next result follows from substitution of (5.47)-(5.48) into (5.4) and (5.46), as well
as earlier proofs of Theorems 5 and 6.
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OS Win TTL DF OPT MSS
Linux 5,792 64 1 MSTNW 1,460
Windows 16,384 128 0 MNWNNTNNS 1,380
Novell 6,144 128 1 MNWSNN 1,460
Table 5.7: User features of database D3.
Theorem 8. Under user distortion, estimators (5.4) and (5.46) can be written as
αt+1i =
1
m
m∑
j=1
βtij , (5.49)
πt+1iv (y) =
∑m
j=1 β
t
ij1u′jv=y
mαt+1i
. (5.50)
Furthermore, this is the EM algorithm for recovering (θu, α).
5.5.3 Discussion
To evaluate the result of Theorem 8, we construct a new database D3, shown in Table
5.7, by switching from RTOs to user features (in the OPT string, M stands for MSS, N for
NOP, S for SACK, T for timestamp, and W for window scale). Note that this Windows
signature ties Novell in TTL, while Linux does the same in DF and MSS. For simplicity
of presentation, we use simulation scenarios with φiv = φv for all i, where φv is the
probability with which feature v stays at the default value. This replaces matrix φiv with a
vector φv, which is easier to follow across the different tables.
The initial PMFs π0iv of EM are set up to include 90% of the mass on the default
value and split the remainder uniformly across the viable alternatives. Since the order of
non-NOP options cannot be changed without rewriting the TCP/IP stack of the OS, we
initialize π0i4 to allow only candidates compatible with the original di4. For example, MST
is feasible for Linux, but not the other two signatures in Table 5.7. Note that any single
option (M, S, W) and the empty set are valid for all three OSes.
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Vector Win TTL DF OPT MSS
u
′′
1 5,793 128 0 M 1,461
u
′′
2 16,386 32 1 M 1,382
u
′′
3 6,147 64 0 M 1,463
Table 5.8: Patched user features.
We use two models for generating the alternatives for each field. The first one, which
we call RAND, picks uniformly from the space of possible values observed in our Internet
scan, except OPT is limited to compatible subsets/supersets of the original. We have 5695
candidates for Win, four for TTL, two for DF, 266 for OPT, and 1082 for MSS. Decisions
are made independently for each feature v and each observation j, which models users
"tweaking" their OS without coordinating with each other or sharing a common objective.
Even though RAND can generate 13.1 billion unique combinations u′j , only a small subset
is encountered by the classifier in our examples below.
The second model, which we call PATCH, selects an alternative vector of features u′′i
for each OS ωi and switches the individual uiv to u′′iv with probability φv, again indepen-
dently for each v. This represents deployment of software patches that change one of the
features to an updated value. The probability for a host to use multiple patches is the prod-
uct of corresponding (1 − φv)’s. For example, modification to both Win and OPT affects
(1 − φ1)(1 − φ4) fraction of hosts. Vectors u′′i are non-adversarial and do not attempt to
confuse the classifier. We construct them by flipping the DF flag, setting OPT to M, and
adding i to all remaining fields (modulo the maximum field value). The result is presented
in Table 5.8.
Our next scenario S3 is detailed in Table 5.9 and the corresponding outcome in Table
5.10. Due to the differences in treatment of non-default features, Hershel+ is slightly
inferior to the first iteration of EM. However, both are much worse than the last iteration.
It should be noted that the second case S32 modifies Win, TTL, and MSS in 100% of the
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Case Model Feature stay prob φv Popularity α
S31 RAND (0.3, 0.2, 0.5, 0.4, 0.4) (0.90, 0.05, 0.05)
S32 RAND (0.0, 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.0) (0.90, 0.05, 0.05)
S33 PATCH (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2) (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)
Table 5.9: Parameters of scenario S3.
Case Hershel+ EM
ρ1 ρ1 ρ∞
S31 0.76 0.79 0.96
S32 0.29 0.32 0.91
S33 0.31 0.50 1
Table 5.10: Classification results in D3.
samples. Identifiability in such conditions is helped by the fact that OPT is constrained to a
subset of the original string, which makes a certain fraction of randomly generated values
feasible for only one OS. This allows EM to learn to ignore (Win, TTL, MSS) and focus
decisions on (DF, OPT). Furthermore, when guessing is involved, EM uses its knowledge
of α to correctly pick the most-likely OS. It is also interesting that S33 is classified with
100% accuracy once EM gets a grasp on the new values in Table 5.8 and their probability
of occurrence.
To estimate vector φtv in the classifier, we use a weighted average of feature non-
modification across all OSes, i.e., φtv =
∑n
i=1 α
t
iφ
t
iv. The result, together with the final
estimate of α, is shown in Table 5.11. Both are an excellent match to the parameters of the
simulation.
5.6 Complete System
5.6.1 Reset Packets
Because loss of RST packets causes the corresponding user features (i.e., ACK/RST
flags, ACK sequence number, window size) to be wiped out, there is dependency between
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Case α∞ φ∞v
S31 (0.90, 0.05, 0.05) (0.30, 0.20, 0.50, 0.40, 0.40)
S32 (0.90, 0.05, 0.05) (0.00, 0.00, 0.10, 0.20, 0.00)
S33 (0.70, 0.20, 0.10) (0.20, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20)
Table 5.11: Recovery of α and φv in D3.
RST present Action Multiplier ζtij
d
′
j di
yes yes – πti,b+1(u
′
j,b+1)
yes no ignore RST in d′j πti,b+1(u′j,b+1)
no yes – 1
no no – 1
Table 5.12: Handling of RST packets.
distortion applied by the network and the user. As a result, this case should be handled
separately. The first modification needed is to increase the length of network vectors di
and d′j to accommodate the RST timestamp. The second change is to record RST header
values into user features. Since RST fields are unmodifiable independently of each other
, they can be combined into a single integer and appended to user vectors ui and u′j in
position b+ 1.
There are four possible scenarios for handling RST packets. They are shown in Table
5.12, each with a certain probability ζ tij that must be factored into the formulas developed
earlier. When both the observation and candidate signature contain a RST, the only mul-
tiplier needed is the probability that the received feature matches that of the original OS.
If the sampled OS has a RST, but the signature does not, this indicates a possible injec-
tion from an intermediate device (e.g., IDS after expiring connection state, scrubbers). In
this case, it is likely meaningless to use the temporal characteristics of the RST, which
is why we omit it from d′j before computing the loss and delay probabilities. However,
multiplication by πti,b+1(uj,b+1) is still warranted since we must assign proper weights to
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this mismatch. The third row of the table corresponds to packet loss, which is handled
automatically in pti(γ), i.e., no additional actions or multipliers are needed. Finally, the
last row is identical to the setup assumed earlier.
5.6.2 Final Model
We now combine the developed network, user, and RST models into a single frame-
work. First, redefine (5.22) as
ptijτγ = α
t
iζ
t
ij
b∏
v=1
πtiv(u
′
jv)f
t
T (τ)p
t
i(γ)
|d′j |∏
r=1
f t∆(δijτγr). (5.51)
This allows us to compute βtijτγ still via (5.23), as well as reuse (5.24)-(5.27); however,
(5.50) requires an update to
πt+1iv (y) =
∑m
j=1 1ujv=y
∑
τγ β
t
ijτγ
mαt+1i
, (5.52)
where v = 1, 2, . . . , b + 1. The final classifier, which we call Faulds, is applied after EM
has converged and is given by
p(ωi|x
′
j, θ
∞, α∞) =
∑
τγ
β∞ijτγ. (5.53)
It is fairly straightforward to generalize our earlier results to cover the complete model.
We thus present the next theorem without proof.
Theorem 9. Under both network and user distortion, estimator (5.23)-(5.27), (5.51)-
(5.52) is the EM algorithm for (θ, α).
121
5.6.3 Scaling the Database
Due to the large number of features it combines, Faulds is not challenged by the pre-
vious toy databases. We therefore switch to a more realistic set of signatures – our Plata
database. To keep continuity in the notation, we call this database D4 and note that it con-
tains 420 stacks, among which some have the same exact RTO vector and others overlap in
all user features. We constructed this database to ensure that signatures were sufficiently
unique under delay distortion, but packet loss and user modifications were not taken into
account. As a result, the database contains a number of entries that would be difficult to
distinguish under the types of heavy distortion considered in this section. Nevertheless,
these tests should indicate how well Faulds scales to larger databases and whether its re-
covery of the unknown parameters (α, θ) is affected by an increased uncertainty during
the match.
We set popularity α to the Zipf distribution with shape parameter 1.2 and continue
using m = 218 observations, which gives us 64K samples from the most common OS and
just 49 from the least. We borrow the delay from case S13 (i.e., reverse exponential T with
mean 1.5 sec, Erlang(2) ∆ with mean 0.5) and packet loss from S24 (i.e., reverse-binomial
with probability 0.1). Finally, we use RAND with stay probability φv = 0.8 for all v.
The first iteration of Faulds produces a respectable ρ1 = 0.42. This is gradually im-
proved with each step, until convergence to a more impressive ρ∞ = 0.70. To make sense
out of α∞, we sort all signatures in rank order from the most popular to the least and plot
the result in Figure 5.4(a). This is a strong match in the top-100, while the random noise
in the tail is explained by the scarcity of these OSes in the observation (i.e., below 250
samples each). For comparison, the outcome of Hershel+ is displayed in part (b). Next,
subfigures (c)-(d) show estimates of fT and f∆. Despite an overall 30% classification mis-
match, these PMFs are no worse than previously observed in Figure 5.3, which indicates
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Figure 5.4: Results in D4.
that incorrect decisions overwhelmingly went to signatures with similar RTO vectors as
the true OS.
Instead of scrutinizing 21 different loss PMFs, suppose we compute a single metric –
the fraction of packets dropped within the entire observation x′, conditioned on at least
one packet surviving. To this end, define during step t
Ltk =
k−1∑
ℓ=1
ℓqtk(ℓ) (5.54)
to be the average number of lost replies in signatures with k packets. Then, taking the ratio
123
of all dropped packets to the total transmitted yields the expected loss rate
ptloss =
∑n
i=1 α
t
iL
t
|di|∑n
i=1 α
t
i|di|
. (5.55)
Recall that the simulation allowed packet loss to affect at most k − 1 packets in an OS
with |di| = k. Therefore, its ground-truth packet loss should represent the same quantity
as (5.55). Traces show that 70.1% of the packets were dropped, which matches quite well
against p∞loss = 69.3%.
Since φv = 0.8 was a constant in this simulation, it makes sense to compare it against
feature-modification estimates averaged across all fields and all OSes, i.e.,
E[φtv] =
1
b+ 1
b+1∑
v=1
φtv =
1
b+ 1
b+1∑
v=1
n∑
i=1
αiφ
t
iv. (5.56)
Results show that E[φ∞v ] = 0.802, which is again very close to the actual value. While
there is some variation in individual φiv, it is of little concern due to the small number of
samples seen by Faulds from these OSes.
5.6.4 Unknown Signatures
We recognize that having a database that knows all devices on the Internet is near
impossible. Therefore, infiltration of samples from unknown signatures into x′, which we
call injections, is inevitable in practice. Understanding the impact of these cases is our
next topic.
Suppose x′j is produced by some unknown OS ω that does not belong to the database.
If x′j is so different from the known signatures that p(x′j|θt, αt) = 0, i.e., it matches each
OS with probability 0, its injection into the observation will contribute nothing to updates
of (αt, θt) and thus will have no impact on classification decisions. In order to achieve
a flat-out mismatch of this type, either delay δijτγ must be negative for all i, τ, γ or the
124
New size Injected ρ1∗ ρ∞∗ p∞loss E[φ∞v ]
378 (90%) 7,089 (2.8%) 0.88 0.91 0.10 0.80
336 (80%) 49,648 (19.0%) 0.87 0.89 0.11 0.74
294 (70%) 60,058 (22.9%) 0.87 0.89 0.11 0.73
210 (50%) 91,408 (34.9%) 0.91 0.91 0.11 0.72
126 (30%) 189,293 (72.2%) 0.95 0.93 0.17 0.60
Table 5.13: Injection classification summary.
product in (5.51) must be smaller than the precision of floating-point arithmetic.
For injections with p(x′j |θt, αt) > 0 the situation is less clear-cut. In some cases, ω
may be close to an existing signature ωi, which makes injections minimally different from
distorted instances of xi. As a result, they do not negatively impact EM or its convergence
point. On the other hand, it is also possible that x′j is a potential match to multiple unrelated
OSes and the amount of distortion needed to make them appear as x′j is much greater than
the underlying θ. If the volume of injections is high, how likely is EM to taint the PMFs
πtiv of multiple OSes and introduce bias into distributions of delay/loss to the point of
impacting classification accuracy for non-injected samples?
We do not consider encountering of adversarial injections (i.e., special signatures
crafted to cause maximum harm for a given database and classifier) to be likely in practice
and instead focus on evaluating the effect of random subset removal from D4. Specifically,
assume the simulator produces distorted observations using all 420 network stacks; how-
ever, Faulds has access to only some of the original signatures. For the next simulation, we
use Pareto fT and f∆, both with mean 0.1 seconds, iid packet loss at 10%, and φv = 0.8.
Define ρt∗ to be the classification accuracy among non-injected observations during
step t and consider Table 5.13, which shows the shrunk database size, number of injected
samples among m = 218 observations, and the output of Faulds. The result shows that
removal of signatures does not carry a significant negative impact on accuracy of clas-
sification for the known OSes. In fact, ρt∗ slightly rises as the database shrinks since it
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Figure 5.5: Recovered delay under 72% injection.
becomes easier to classify among fewer options. Packet loss p∞loss also appears immune,
except in the last row where 72% of x′ contains observations from unknown OSes. This
loss of accuracy is explained by matches that now require more packet loss to be feasible.
Finally, the feature-stay probability in the last column is the most affected, which was also
expected due to the increased header-field mismatch.
Figure 5.5 shows the two delay PMFs estimated by Faulds in the last row of Table
5.13. Recovery is quite good, except for a slight bump in f∆ between 200 and 400 ms.
This shows that removing 70% of the signatures inD4 still leaves enough unique RTO vec-
tors to produce highly accurate results. In the actual Internet, however, we do not expect
injection conditions to be anywhere near these levels because D4 contains an array of ma-
jor network stacks (e.g., Windows, Unix), printer firmware (e.g., HP, Lexmark, Brother),
Cisco equipment, and various derivative implementations that run on embedded devices.
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5.7 Internet Measurement
5.7.1 Overview
To experiment with Faulds, we conducted a port-80 SYN scan of all BGP-reachable
IPv4 addresses on the Internet in December 2016. Of the 2.8B IPs contacted, we gathered
responses from 67.6M hosts (compared to 66.4M in our previous scan, the Internet web-
server population appears to have reached saturation). In large-scale classification, such
as the one attempted here, Faulds produces a huge volume of information in the form of
various PMFs and estimates. Due to limited space, we present only a brief review of the
obtained results and leave more detailed analysis (including attempts to uncover injections
and correct for them) for future work. We start with vector α, then examine parameters of
network distortion θd, and finish with those of user modification θu.
5.7.2 Classification Results
Define classification to be successful for sample j if the denominator of (5.1) is non-
zero, i.e., p(xj |θt, αt) > 0. Using the Hershel+ database, Faulds successfully classified
63.5M hosts (i.e., 94%). From a pure statistical point of view, the remaining 4.1M devices
should be assigned to the OS with the highest α∞i . But it is also likely these cases come
from unknown stacks or observations with too much packet loss, in which case excluding
them from classification might be prudent as well, which is our approach below.
The left side of Table 5.14 shows the top ten OSes after one iteration of Faulds. As the
database of Hershel+ is auto-generated and does not contain fine-granular details about
individual OS versions, many signature names appear similar; however, these often corre-
spond to different kernel versions and/or physical devices. The dominance of Linux and
embedded devices in Table 5.14 matches the statistics we found in our previous studies in
Section 3 and Section 4; however, a more interesting result is the amount of change occur-
ring in the classification as Faulds goes through its iterations. The right side of Table 5.14
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OS α1 Count
Ubuntu / Redhat / CentOS 0.227 14,662,315
Ubuntu / Redhat / SUSE 0.108 8,388,020
Windows 7 / 8 / 2008 / 2012 0.048 2,938,499
Embedded Linux 0.033 2,401,181
Ubuntu / Debian / Embedded 0.028 1,848,388
Embedded Linux 0.025 1,672,805
Ubuntu / Redhat / Sci. Linux 0.019 1,320,081
Windows XP / 2003 0.018 1,190,617
3Com Routers 0.015 1,013,943
Cisco Embedded 0.013 991,881
−→
OS α10 Count Change
Ubuntu / Redhat / CentOS 0.226 14,639,486 −0.002
Ubuntu / Redhat / SUSE 0.102 6,669,700 −0.20
Embedded Linux 0.067 4,384,225 0.82
Windows 7 / 8 / 2008 / 2012 0.045 2,948,567 0.003
Cisco Embedded 0.022 1,497,269 0.51
Ubuntu / Redhat / Sci. Linux 0.018 1,148,008 −0.13
3Com Routers 0.018 1,128,655 0.11
Embedded Linux 0.017 1,057,361 −0.37
Dell Laser / Xerox WorkCenters 0.015 982,973 0.15
Ubuntu / Debian / Embedded 0.013 844,958 −0.54
Table 5.14: Faulds classification at iteration 1 (left) and 10 (right).
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Figure 5.6: Internet delay distributions.
shows the α vector after 10 steps. With the exception of two signatures, there is significant
movement in the list, including embedded Linux in third position increasing its member-
ship by 82%, Cisco gaining 51%, 3Com 11% and Windows XP/2003 completely dropping
off the top-ten. There is even more shuffle further down the list, which underscores the
importance of using proper algorithms for estimating α.
5.7.3 Network Distortion
Figure 5.6(a) shows the recovered distribution fT using bin size 30 ms. Interestingly,
32% of delays are in the first bin, which likely represents idle servers that immediately
send back the first SYN-ACK. A relatively large number (i.e., 38%) of cases belong to the
120-180 ms range, which may indicate OS scheduling delays, non-trivial CPU load on the
server, longer forward paths, and involvement of various backend databases to set up the
connection. Overall, we obtain E[T ] = 111 ms, 41% of the samples below 60 ms, 90%
below 180 ms, and 99.4% below 420 ms.
Figure 5.6(b) plots the distribution of one-way delay f∆. The massive peak at 30-60 ms
consolidates 81% of the observations and likely corresponds to fixed propagation delays
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Figure 5.7: Internet packet-loss PMFs.
shared by many Internet paths leading back to our client. With E[∆] = 83 ms, 90% of the
values below 120 ms, and 98.5% below 420 ms, the real Internet distortion θd does appear
quite different from that assumed by Hershel+.
To examine packet loss, define ηtk =
∑n
i=1 α
t
i1|di|=k to be the estimated fraction of
observations that use an OS with k packets. The top values of k are four (η∞4 = 0.42,
112 stacks in D4), six (η∞6 = 0.31, 80 stacks), three (η∞3 = 0.07, 72 stacks), and five
(η∞5 = 0.04, 54 stacks). Figure 5.7 examines the recovered loss PMFs for these values of
k, each fitted with an iid binomial model and accompanied by the average loss rate L∞k /k
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from (5.54). First, it is interesting that the loss rate is heterogeneous, ranging from 1%
in q6 to 15% in q5. This phenomenon may be inherent to the signatures that map to each
k (e.g., certain printers cut the SYN-ACK sequence when their tiny SYN backlog queue
overflows) or their location on the Internet, which suggests there is an extra benefit to
estimating qk independently for different k. If injection of unknowns were responsible for
the increased loss rate in q3 and q5, we would not expect to see a binomial-like distribution.
Instead, an abnormally large spike at ℓ = 1 or 2 would be more likely.
Second, the binomial fit in Figure 5.7 is not perfect, but it shows a similar decaying
trend. Therefore, the iid loss assumption in Hershel+ may be reasonable, but with one
correction that allows for heterogeneous values across different k. Third, computing (5.55)
for the Internet scan yields an average loss rate of 3.7%. This is very close to the assumed
model of Hershel+, whose ploss = 3.8% comes from a 2009 Google study of SYN-ACK
retransmission rates at their servers [18]. Apparently this magic number remains in effect
for the Internet even today.
5.7.4 User Distortion
Faulds produced 420 × 6 = 2520 distributions of user features, among which we
highlight several interesting cases, focusing on the two most volatile fields – Win and
MSS – and limiting all PMFs to values above the 1% likelihood. Since MSS sometimes
depends on the MTU of the underlying data-link layer and/or tunneling protocol (e.g.,
IPv6), this field may experience fluctuation even if the OS does not allow explicit means
for changing this value.
We expected devices with firmware restrictions that prevent user access to the configu-
ration of SYN-ACK parameters to exhibit high φiv. One example is shown in Figure 5.8(a)
for the Dell printer from Table 5.14. Among 982K occurrences on the Internet, this device
keeps the default window with probability 1. Intuition also suggests that general-purposes
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Figure 5.8: Internet distributions πi1 and πi5 (default values are shown with an asterisk).
OSes are more susceptible to modification and/or existence of alternatively patched ver-
sions. An example of this is Ubuntu in Figure 5.8(b). While both features show variation,
the default values dominate. A more diverse case is CentOS (enterprise Linux) in part
(c), which has 29% of its samples with larger windows and 3% with smaller. In subfigure
(d), Citrix Netscaler (data-center load-balancer) has its original combination (8190, 1360)
overshadowed by (4380, 1460). We conjecture that our Plata database most likely captured
a non-standard version of this stack. Since this is an inherent property of any database, it
is important to allow great flexibility in the match process to accommodate such scenarios.
Faulds does exactly that.
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Computing (5.56), we obtain E[φ∞v ] = 0.89, which confirms the accuracy of the as-
sumed value in Hershel+ (i.e., 0.9); however, sampling the distributions in Figure 5.8
or using them in classification is only possible by introducing πtiv and iteratively refining
(θt, αt). As the first method to implement this functionality, Faulds paves way for scalable,
low-overhead Internet characterization, robust device identification, and better modeling
of distortion experienced by the numerous hardware artifacts found on the Internet.
5.8 Conclusion
In this section, we developed novel theory and algorithms for improving OS-classification
accuracy in single-probe fingerprinting, measuring one-way Internet path properties, and
extracting latent distributions of feature distortion. Simulations showed exceptional ro-
bustness of our EM techniques against various types of noise, as well as injection of un-
known devices. Applied to Internet scans, this methodology can be used to characterize
stack popularity, network delays, packet loss, and header-tuning probabilities.
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6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this dissertation, we tackled the problem of large scale OS fingerprinting, a direction
which is largely unexplored in the current literature. In order to build fast, low overhead
algorithms that are required to measure a sizeable network, we focused on classification
using a single TCP packet.
We first developed stochastic theory of single-packet OS fingerprinting, and created a
classifier called Hershel based on our formulation. Using simulations, we showed that our
algorithm is accurate even under extremely noisy conditions, and conducted a study where
we successfully classified the OS of 37M Internet hosts.
Next, we turned our attention to building a scalable database of OSes to use with
Hershel. We developed a framework called Plata, which is able to automatically create a
database from a network scan using a novel unsupervised clustering algorithm. We used
Plata on our university campus to discover signatures for 420 OSes, provided an improved
version of our classifier (Hershel+) and showed its viability in an Internet measurement of
66M target hosts.
Finally, we took aim at one possible shortcoming of Hershel – the assumptions of
volatility it makes for each noisy parameter. We derived a new algorithm using Expectation-
Maximization called Faulds to recover the unknown distributions of network one-way
delay, packet loss and user feature modification, using the classification process itself.
After showing its reliability in simulations, we used Faulds to recover network-wide de-
lay distributions, packet loss probabilities and likelihoods of stack tuning performed by
administrators across the Internet.
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6.1 Future Directions
Network stack fingerprinting has well-known pitfalls (e.g., scrubbers [20], [90], [84],
[101], [115], traffic intercepts by middleboxes [43], load-balancers, RST injection by
IDS), but nevertheless it is fascinating that a single SYN packet can elicit so much in-
formation about the target. With our algorithm for automated construction of databases
and robust classification (i.e., Plata, Hershel+ and Faulds), our goal is to make single-
packet tools a legitimate competitor for use over the public Internet. However, despite
the recent developments in this field, there are still many open problems and avenues for
improvement, which we discuss next.
From our classification efforts, we showed that Hershel+ and Faulds are tolerant of
samples gathered from unknown devices on the Internet, either by discarding them if they
are a complete non-match, or matching them to the closest possible signature. Future
work can focus on more reliable detection of unknown stacks among the observations,
and automatic generation of database signatures for them. This would require research to
continue on discerning the separation of a "tweaked" sample versus an unknown one, and
the impacts of such observations on the final accuracy.
Once this detection is possible, it leads to the next question which is whether the en-
tire Internet dataset can be used to build a OS fingerprint database. We have considered
this direction; however, Plata matrix construction has quadratic complexity and signature
separation is even worse (i.e., n3). The largest cluster in the Internet dataset formed after
separation on the user features still contains over 50K RTO vectors, which will take Plata
weeks to separate. Additionally, collection of loss-free samples from each IP not only re-
quires pestering hosts with 3.3B additional packets, but also consumes a large amount of
time that may result in host departure and incomplete measurement. Finally, presence of
non-trivial delay T during database construction violates the current assumptions that the
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initial fingerprints are clean, with currently unknown consequences.
This train of thought also gives rise to another question, which is whether Plata’s dis-
tortion modelX can include the additional types of disturbance we observe in single-probe
fingerprinting. Including packet loss seems like a viable direction as Plata can handle this
transparently in the Monte-Carlo version; however, deriving a Hershel+ matrix in closed-
form requires additional research. Including user modification would require incorporat-
ing some knowledge from the gathered labels (e.g., windows, linux, printer), as our results
from Faulds show that these parameters are dependent on the class of the device. To this
end, additional data mining from the Faulds classification would be required to build real-
istic user modification distributions.
Finally, now that we have accomplished multi-iterative classification on features ob-
tained from a single-packet using Faulds, the next logical step to investigate is whether we
can increase accuracy by abandoning the single-packet assumption and sending multiple
packets to each target IP. Future work would need to assess the viability of this approach on
Internet scale, and find the correct balance that would make the target host elicit enough
responses without triggering IDS and harassing network administrators. Furthermore, a
new database with a new distortion model would also be required. For example, X may
be extended to include blocking of ICMP/UDP packets as done by a firewall, censorship
of certain invalid flag combinations known to IDS, emulation of load-balancers, and fin-
gerprint obfuscation by scrubbers found on the Internet.
136
REFERENCES
[1] H. Abdelnur, R. State, and O. Festor, “Advanced Network Fingerprinting,” in Proc.
RAID, Sep. 2008, pp. 372–389.
[2] Akamai. [Online]. Available:
http://www.akamai.com/html/about/facts_figures.html.
[3] L. Alt, R. Beverly, and A. Dainotti, “Uncovering Network Tarpits with Degreaser,”
in Proc. ACM ACSAC, Dec. 2014, pp. 156–165.
[4] O. Arkin, “A Remote Active OS Fingerprinting Tool using ICMP,” USENIX login,
vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 14–19, 2002.
[5] ATInternet, “Operating Systems Barometer,” Aug. 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://www.atinternet.com/uploads/Operating-Systems-August-2014.pdf.
[6] P. Auffret, “SinFP, Unification of Active and Passive Operating System
Fingerprinting,” Journal in Computer Virology, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 197–205, Nov.
2010.
[7] T. Beardsley, “Snacktime: A Perl Solution for Remote OS Fingerprinting,” Jun.
2003. [Online]. Available: http://www.planb-security.net/wp/snacktime.html.
[8] R. Beck, “Passive-Aggressive Resistance: OS Fingerprint Evasion,” Linux Journal,
vol. 2001, no. 89, Aug. 2001.
[9] D. B. Berrueta, “A Practical Approach for Defeating Nmap OS-Fingerprinting,”
2003. [Online]. Available: http://nmap.org/misc/defeat-nmap-osdetect.html.
[10] R. Beverly, “A Robust Classifier for Passive TCP/IP Fingerprinting,” in Proc.
PAM, Apr. 2004, pp. 158–167.
137
[11] R. Beverly and A. Berger, “Server Siblings: Identifying Shared IPv4/IPv6
Infrastructure via Active Fingerprinting,” in Proc. PAM, Mar. 2015, pp. 149–161.
[12] J. Bolot, “End-to-End Packet Delay and Loss Behavior in the Internet,” in Proc.
ACM SIGCOMM, Sep. 1993, pp. 289–298.
[13] R. Braden, “Requirements for Internet Hosts – Communication Layers,” IETF
RFC 1122, Oct. 1989.
[14] T. Bu, N. Duffield, F. Presti, and D. Towsley, “Network Tomography on General
Topologies,” in Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS, Jun. 2002, pp. 21–30.
[15] J. Caballero, S. Venkataraman, P. Poosankam, M. G. Kang, D. Song, and A. Blum,
“FiG: Automatic Fingerprint Generation,” in Proc. NDSS, Feb. 2007, pp. 27–42.
[16] Y. Chen, K. H. Lim, R. H. Katz, and C. Overton, “On the Stability of Network
Distance Estimation,” SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, vol. 30,
no. 2, pp. 21–30, Sep. 2002.
[17] Y.-C. Chen, Y. Liao, M. Baldi, S.-J. Lee, and L. Qiu, “OS Fingerprinting and
Tethering Detection in Mobile Networks,” in Proc. ACM IMC, 2014, pp. 173–180.
[18] H. K. J. Chu, “Tuning TCP Parameters for the 21st Century,” Jul. 2009. [Online].
Available: http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/75/slides/tcpm-1.pdf.
[19] M. Coates and R. Nowak, “Network Loss Inference Using Unicast End-to-End
Measurement,” in Proc. ITC Conference on IP Traffic, Modeling and Management,
Sep. 2000, pp. 1–9.
[20] A. Crenshaw, “OSfuscate,” 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/code.
[21] F. Dabek, R. Cox, F. Kaashoek, and R. Morris, “Vivaldi: A Decentralized Network
Coordinate System,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2004, pp. 15–26.
138
[22] D. Dagon, N. Provos, C. P. Lee, and W. Lee, “Corrupted DNS Resolution Paths:
The Rise of a Malicious Resolution Authority,” in Proc. NDSS, Feb. 2008.
[23] Maxmind GeoIP Databases. [Online]. Available: http://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/.
[24] A. Dempster, N. Laird, and D. Rubin, “Maximum Likelihood from Incomplete
Data via the EM Algorithm,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 39,
no. 1, pp. 1–38, 1977.
[25] A. B. Downey, “Using PATHCHAR to Estimate Internet Link Characteristics,” in
Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 1999, pp. 241–250.
[26] N. Duffield, C. Lund, and M. Thorup, “Estimating Flow Distributions from
Sampled Flow Statistics,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2003, pp. 325–336.
[27] T. Dunigan, M. Mathis, and B. Tierney, “A TCP Tuning Daemon,” in Proc.
ACM/IEEE Supercomputing, Nov. 2002, pp. 1–16.
[28] Z. Durumeric, D. Adrian, A. Mirian, M. Bailey, and J. A. Halderman, “A Search
Engine Backed by Internet-Wide Scanning,” in Proc. ACM CCS, Oct. 2015, pp.
542–553.
[29] Z. Durumeric, E. Wustrow, and J. Halderman, “ZMap: Fast Internet-wide scanning
and its Security Applications,” in Proc. USENIX Security, Aug. 2013, pp. 605–620.
[30] R. Ensafi, D. Fifield, P. Winter, N. Feamster, N. Weaver, and V. Paxson,
“Examining How the Great Firewall Discovers Hidden Circumvention Servers,” in
Proc. ACM IMC, Oct. 2015, pp. 445–458.
[31] Ericsson, “Ericsson Mobility Report,” Nov. 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://www.ericsson.com/mobility-report.
[32] X. Feng, Q. Li, Q. Han, H. Zhu, Y. Liu, J. Cui, and L. Sun, “Active Profiling of
Physical Devices at Internet Scale,” in Proc. IEEE ICCCN, Aug. 2016, pp. 1–9.
139
[33] P. Francis, S. Jamin, C. Jin, Y. Jin, D. Raz, Y. Shavitt, and L. Zhang, “IDMAPS: A
Global Internet Host Distance Estimation Service,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 525–540, Oct. 2001.
[34] P. Garcia-Laencina, J.-L. Sancho-Gomez, and A. Figueiras-Vidal, “Pattern
Classification with Missing Data: A Review,” Neural Computing and Applications,
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 263–282, Mar. 2010.
[35] L. G. Greenwald and T. J. Thomas, “Toward undetected operating system
fingerprinting,” in Proc. USENIX WOOT, Aug. 2007, pp. 1–10.
[36] Y. Gu, L. Breslau, N. Duffield, and S. Sen, “On Passive One-Way Loss
Measurements Using Sampled Flow Statistics,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr.
2009.
[37] K. P. Gummadi, S. Saroiu, and S. D. Gribble, “King: Estimating Latency between
Arbitrary Internet End Hosts,” in Proc. ACM IMW, Nov. 2002, pp. 5–18.
[38] S. Guoqiang and D. Lee, “Network Protocol System Fingerprinting: A Formal
Approach,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr. 2006, pp. 1–12.
[39] O. Gurewitz, I. Cidon, and M. Sidi, “One-way Delay Estimation Using
Network-Wide Measurements,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 2710–2724, Jun. 2006.
[40] M. Hall, E. Frank, G. Holmes, B. Pfahringer, P. Reutemann, and I. H. Witten, “The
WEKA data mining software: An update,” SIGKDD Explorations, vol. 11, pp.
10–18, Jul. 2009.
[41] H. O. Hartley, “Maximum Likelihood Estimation from Incomplete Data,”
Biometrics, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 174–194, 1958.
140
[42] J. Heidemann, Y. Pradkin, R. Govindan, C. Papadopoulos, G. Bartlett, and
J. Bannister, “Census and Survey of the Visible Internet,” in Proc. ACM IMC, Oct.
2008, pp. 169–182.
[43] M. Honda, Y. Nishida, C. Raiciu, A. Greenhalgh, M. Handley, and H. Tokuda, “Is
It Still Possible to Extend TCP?” in Proc. ACM IMC, Nov. 2011, pp. 181–194.
[44] C. Huang, A. Wang, J. Li, and K. Ross, “Measuring and Evaluating Large-Scale
CDNs,” in Proc. ACM IMC, Oct. 2008, pp. 15–29.
[45] IRL Fingerprinting Dataset. [Online]. Available:
http://irl.cs.tamu.edu/projects/sampling/.
[46] V. Jacobson, R. Braden, and D. Borman, “TCP Extensions for High Performance,”
IETF RFC 1323, May 1992.
[47] M. Kalman and B. Girod, “Modeling the Delays of Successively-Transmitted
Internet Packets,” in Proc. IEEE ICME, Jun. 2004, pp. 2015–2018.
[48] E. Katz-Bassett, H. Madhyastha, V. Adhikari, C. Scott, J. Sherry, P. V. Wesep,
T. Anderson, and A. Krishnamurthy, “Reverse Traceroute,” in Proc. USENIX
NSDI, Apr. 2010, pp. 219–234.
[49] M. Kearns, Y. Mansour, and A. Ng, “An Information-Theoretic Analysis of Hard
and Soft Assignment Methods for Clustering,” in Proc. Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence, 1997, pp. 282–293.
[50] T. Kohno, A. Broido, and K. C. Claffy, “Remote physical device fingerprinting,”
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 2, no. 2, pp.
93–108, May 2005.
[51] E. Kollmann, “Chatter on the Wire: A Look at DHCP Traffic.” [Online]. Available:
http://myweb.cableone.net/xnih/download/chatter-dhcp.pdf.
141
[52] M. Kührer, T. Hupperich, J. Bushart, C. Rossow, and T. Holz, “Going Wild:
Large-Scale Classification of Open DNS Resolvers,” in Proc. ACM IMC, Oct.
2015, pp. 355–368.
[53] A. Kumar, M. Sung, J. Xu, and J. Wang, “Data Streaming Algorithms for Efficient
and Accurate Estimation of Flow Size Distribution,” in Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS,
Jun. 2004, pp. 177–188.
[54] D. Leonard and D. Loguinov, “Turbo King: Framework for Large-Scale Internet
Delay Measurements,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr. 2008, pp. 430–438.
[55] D. Leonard and D. Loguinov, “Demystifying Service Discovery: Implementing an
Internet-Wide Scanner,” in Proc. ACM IMC, Nov. 2010, pp. 109–122.
[56] Z. Li, A. Goyal, Y. Chen, and V. Paxson, “Automating Analysis of Large-Scale
Botnet Probing Events,” in Proc. ACM ASIACCS, Mar. 2009, pp. 11–22.
[57] H. Lim, J. C. Hou, and C.-H. Choi, “Constructing Internet Coordinate System
Based on Delay Measurement,” in Proc. ACM IMC, Oct. 2003, pp. 129–142.
[58] J. Lippard, “Craigslist no longer uses TCP window size of 0.” [Online]. Available:
http://lippard.blogspot.com/2006/07/craigslist-no-longer-uses-tcp-window.html/.
[59] M. Luckie, R. Beverly, T. Wu, and M. Allman, “Resilience of Deployed TCP to
Blind Attacks,” in Proc. ACM IMC, Oct. 2015, pp. 13–26.
[60] G. S. Manku, A. Jain, and A. D. Sarma, “Detecting Near Duplicates for Web
Crawling,” in Proc. WWW, May 2007, pp. 141–149.
[61] J. Matherly, “Shodan Search Engine.” [Online]. Available: https://www.shodan.io.
[62] T. Matsunaka, A. Yamada, and A. Kubota, “Passive OS Fingerprinting by DNS
Traffic Analysis,” in Proc. IEEE AINA, 2013, pp. 243–250.
142
[63] C. McNab, Network Security Assessment: Know Your Network. O’Reilly Media,
Inc., 2007.
[64] J. Medeiros, A. Brito, and P. Pires, “A Data Mining Based Analysis of Nmap
Operating System Fingerprint Database,” in Proc. IEEE CISIS, Sep. 2009, pp. 1–8.
[65] J. P. Medeiros, A. Brito, and P. M. Pires, “An Effective TCP/IP Fingerprinting
Technique Based on Strange Attractors Classification,” in Proc. Data Privacy
Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security, Sep. 2009, pp. 208–221.
[66] Microsoft Support. [Online]. Available: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2525390.
[67] A. Mirian, Z. Ma, D. Adrian, M. Tischer, T. Chuenchujitasphon, T. Yardley,
R. Berthier, J. Mason, Z. Zakir Durumeric, and J. A. Halderman, “An
Internet-Wide View of ICS Devices,” in Proc. IEEE Privacy, Security, and Trust
Conference, Dec. 2016.
[68] D. Napier, “IPTables/NetFilter – Linux’s Next Generation Stateful Packet Filter,”
SysAdmin Magazine, vol. 10, pp. 8–16, Nov. 2001.
[69] A. Nappa, Z. Xu, M. Z. Rafique, J. Caballero, and G. Gu, “Cyberprobe: Towards
Internet-Scale Active Detection of Malicious Servers,” in Proc. NDSS, Feb. 2014,
pp. 1–15.
[70] NetApplications, “Market Share Statistics for Internet Technologies.” [Online].
Available: http://netmarketshare.com/.
[71] Netcraft Web Server Survey. [Online]. Available: http://news.netcraft.com/.
[72] T. S. E. Ng and H. Zhang, “Predicting Internet Network Distance with
Coordinates-Based Approaches,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Jun. 2002, pp.
170–179.
[73] Nmap. [Online]. Available: http://nmap.org/.
143
[74] J. Novak and S. Sturges, “Target-Based TCP Stream Reassembly,” Sourcefire Inc.,
Tech. Rep., Aug. 2007.
[75] SpeedGuide TCP Optimizer. [Online]. Available:
http://www.speedguide.net/downloads.php.
[76] Oracle, “Operating System Tuning.” [Online]. Available:
http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E12839_01/web.1111/e13814/os_tuning.htm.
[77] J. Padhye and S. Floyd, “On Inferring TCP Behavior,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM,
Aug. 2001, pp. 287–298.
[78] I. Papapanagiotou, E. Nahum, and V. Pappas, “Smartphones vs. Laptops:
Comparing Web Browsing Behavior and the Implications for Caching,” in Proc.
ACM SIGMETRICS, Jun. 2012, pp. 423–424.
[79] A. Pathak, H. Pucha, Y. Zhang, C. Hu, and Z. M. Mao, “A Measurement Study of
Internet Delay Asymmetry,” in Proc. PAM, Apr. 2008, pp. 182–191.
[80] V. Paxson, “End-to-end Internet Packet Dynamics,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM,
1997, pp. 139–152.
[81] V. Paxson, M. Allman, J. Chu, and M. Sargent, “Computing TCP’s Retransmission
Timer,” IETF RFC 6298, Jun. 2011.
[82] PlanetLab. [Online]. Available: http://www.planet-lab.org/.
[83] J. Postel, “Transmission Control Protocol,” IETF RFC 793, Sep. 1981.
[84] G. Prigent, F. Vichot, and F. Harrouet, “IpMorph: fingerprinting spoofing
unification,” Journal in Computer Virology, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 329–342, Nov. 2010.
[85] N. Provos, “A Virtual Honeypot Framework,” in Proc. USENIX Security, Aug.
2004, pp. 1–14.
144
[86] N. Provos and P. Honeyman, “ScanSSH - Scanning the Internet for SSH Servers,”
in Proc. USENIX LISA, Dec. 2001, pp. 25–30.
[87] Y. Pryadkin, R. Lindell, J. Bannister, and R. Govindan, “An Empirical Evaluation
of IP Address Space Occupancy,” USC/ISI, Tech. Rep. ISI-TR-2004-598, Nov.
2004.
[88] D. Richardson, S. Gribble, and T. Kohno, “The Limits of Automatic OS
Fingerprint Generation,” in Proc. ACM AISec, Oct 2010, pp. 24–34.
[89] M. Roesch, “Snort – Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks,” in Proc.
USENIX LISA, Nov. 1999, pp. 229–238.
[90] G. Roualland and J.-M. Saffroy, “IP Personality.” [Online]. Available:
http://ippersonality.sourceforge.net/.
[91] C. Sarraute and J. Burroni, “Using Neural Networks to Improve Classical
Operating System Fingerprinting Techniques,” Electronic Journal of SADIO,
vol. 8, no. 1, Mar. 2008.
[92] S. Shah, “An Introduction to HTTP Fingerprinting,” May 2004. [Online].
Available: http://net-square.com/httprint_paper.html.
[93] Z. Shamsi and D. Loguinov, “Unsupervised Clustering Under Temporal Feature
Volatility in Network Stack Fingerprinting,” in Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS, Jun.
2016, pp. 127–138.
[94] Z. Shamsi and D. Loguinov, “Unsupervised Clustering Under Temporal Feature
Volatility in Network Stack Fingerprinting,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, 2017 (to be published).
145
[95] Z. Shamsi, A. Nandwani, D. Leonard, and D. Loguinov, “Hershel: Single-Packet
OS Fingerprinting,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 24, no. 4, pp.
2196–2209, Aug. 2016.
[96] Z. Shamsi, A. Nandwani, D. Leonard, and D. Loguinov, “Hershel: Single-Packet
OS Fingerprinting,” in Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS, Jun. 2014, pp. 195–206.
[97] U. Shankar and V. Paxson, “Active Mapping: Resisting NIDS Evasion Without
Altering Traffic,” in Proc. IEEE SP, May 2003, pp. 44–61.
[98] P. Sharma, Z. Xu, S. Banerjee, and S.-J. Lee, “Estimating Network Proximity and
Latency,” ACM SIGCOMM, pp. 39–50, Sep. 2006.
[99] M.-F. Shih and A. O. Hero, “Unicast-Based Inference of Network Link Delay
Distributions with Finite Mixture Models,” IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, vol. 51, no. 8, pp. 2219–2228, Aug. 2003.
[100] B. Skaggs, B. Blackburn, G. Manes, and S. Shenoi, “Network Vulnerability
Analysis,” in Proc. IEEE MWSCAS, Aug. 2002, pp. 493–495.
[101] M. Smart, G. R. Malan, and F. Jahanian, “Defeating TCP/IP Stack Fingerprinting,”
in Proc. USENIX Security, Jun. 2000, pp. 229–240.
[102] Snort IDS. [Online]. Available: http://www.snort.org.
[103] RedHat Customer Case Study. [Online]. Available:
https://www.redhat.com/cms/managed-files/Telefonica_EN-compressed_0.pdf.
[104] G. Taleck, “Ambiguity Resolution via Passive OS Fingerprinting,” in Proc. RAID,
Sep. 2003, pp. 192–206.
[105] G. Taleck, “SYNSCAN: Towards Complete TCP/IP Fingerprinting,” CanSecWest,
Apr. 2004.
146
[106] L. Tang and M. Crovella, “Virtual Landmarks for the Internet,” in Proc. ACM IMC,
Oct. 2003, pp. 143–152.
[107] THC-RUT Fingerprint Database. [Online]. Available:
https://www.thc.org/thc-rut/thcrut-os-fingerprints.
[108] S. Theodoridis and K. Koutroumbas, Pattern Recognition, 4th ed. Academic
Press, 2009.
[109] B. Tierney, “TCP Tuning Guide for Distributed Applications on Wide Area
Networks,” USENIX & SAGE Login, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 33–39, Feb. 2001.
[110] C. Valli, “Honeyd – A OS Fingerprinting Artifice,” in Proc. Australian Computer,
Network and Information Forensics Conference, Nov. 2003.
[111] Y. Vardi, “Network Tomography: Estimating Source-Destination Traffic Intensities
from Link Data,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 91, no. 433,
pp. 365–377, Mar. 1996.
[112] F. Veysset, O. Courtay, O. Heen, and I. R. Team, “New Tool and Technique for
Remote Operating System Fingerprinting,” Apr. 2002. [Online]. Available:
http://www.ouah.org/ring-full-paper.pdf.
[113] A. Y. Wang, C. Huang, J. Li, and K. Ross, “Queen: Estimating Packet Loss Rate
Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts,” in Proc. PAM, Apr. 2009, pp. 57–66.
[114] F. Wang, Z. M. Mao, J. Wang, L. Gao, and R. Bush, “A Measurement Study on the
Impact of Routing Events on End-to-End Internet Path Performance,” in Proc.
ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2006, pp. 375–386.
[115] K. Wang, “Frustrating OS Fingerprinting with Morph,” 2004. [Online]. Available:
http://hackerpoetry.com/images/defcon-12/dc-12-presentations/Wang/dc-12-wang.pdf.
147
[116] Z. Wen, S. Triukose, and M. Rabinovich, “Facilitating Focused Internet
Measurements,” in Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS, Jun. 2007, pp. 49–60.
[117] Wolfram Alpha, “Computational Knowledge Engine.” [Online]. Available:
http://www.wolframalpha.com.
[118] C. F. J. Wu, “On the Convergence Properties of the EM Algorithm,” The Annals of
Statistics, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 95–103, Mar. 1983.
[119] M. Yajnik, S. Moon, J. Kurose, and D. Towsley, “Measurement and Modelling of
the Temporal Dependence in Packet Loss,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Mar. 1999,
pp. 345–352.
[120] F. V. Yarochkin, O. Arkin, M. Kydyraliev, S.-Y. Dai, Y. Huang, and S.-Y. Kuo,
“Xprobe2++: Low Volume Remote Network Information Gathering Tool,” in
Proc. IEEE/IFIP DSN, Jun. 2009, pp. 205–210.
[121] M. Zalewski, “Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence Number Analysis,” Apr.
2001. [Online]. Available: http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/.
[122] M. Zalewski, “p0f v3: Passive Fingerprinter,” 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/p0f3.
[123] A. Zeitoun, C.-N. Chuah, S. Bhattacharyya, and C. Diot, “An AS-level Study of
Internet Path Delay Characteristics,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, Nov. 2004, pp.
1480–1484.
[124] Y. G. Zeng, D. Coffey, and J. Viega, “How Vulnerable are Unprotected Machines
on the Internet?” in Proc. PAM, Mar. 2014, pp. 224–234.
[125] X. Zhang, J. Knockel, and J. Crandall, “Original SYN: Finding Machines Hidden
Behind Firewalls,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr. 2015, pp. 720–728.
148
